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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCI'ION 
UNIFICATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Quansheng Zhao 
This book brings together the first major collection of research on 
politics of current or formerly divided nations - China, Korea, Ger-
many, and Vietnam. There is a wide range of diversity among the four 
countries in terms of historical backgrounds, geographic locations, 
and the international roles that they have played. But, they have all 
shared at least one common characteristic: these divided nations are 
products of the Cold War, dividing along political and ideological 
lines: communist v. capitalist. Therefore, they all have to answer a 
series of questions with regard to conflict resolution and political de-
velopment in each society: How should the current political and eco-
nomic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relationship 
should exist between communist and non-communist political forces? 
And how can national unification be achieved by peaceful means? 
Hence, the issue of national unification can be effectively linked to 
broader research topics such as conflict resolution and political devel-
opment. Studies on conflict and conflict resolution have increasingly 
drawn attention from specialists in international relations, whereas 
political development (process of democratization, for example) has 
remained a favorite topic among scholars of comparative politics. The 
divided nation cases of China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam will cer-
tainly provide useful examples for the examination of these theoretical 
as well as practical issues. 
The evolution of the Cold War (from the peak in the 1950s and 
1960s to its end in the late 1980s and the post-Cold War era in the 
1990s) and the changing international environment have inevitably 
played a significant, if not a decisive, role in the internal and external 
politics of the divided nations. The radical changes in the Soviet 
Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the internal up-
heaval of China, the increasing demands for unification within both 
North and South Korea have all had a great impact on the politics of 
divided nations and the issue of unification. One may conclude that a 
(I) 
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peaceful and favorable international environment is crucial for the res-
olution of conflicts such as those arising out of national divisions that 
were caused primarily by external powers. 
At the same time, domestic factors have proved to be extremely 
important. All of these divided countries have developed different 
political and economic systems, as a direct result of either the Cold 
War (in the cases of Korea and Germany), or a civil war between 
communist and non-communist forces (in the case of China). These 
separations are long-standing: The shortest is the 22-year division of 
Vietnam, the others have existed for more than four decades. These 
long separations inevitably have had a great impact on the political 
development of both sides and have inspired different interpretations 
of the issue of unification. 
In addition to examining the past experiences and future direc-
tions of unification between PRC-Taiwan, North-South Korea, East-
West Germany, and North-South Vietnam, this comparative analysis 
will contribute to a strengthening of the understanding of how domes-
tic political developments shape the attitude toward unification in each 
country, and the impact of changing global and regional international 
relations on these countries. 
Each country study in this volume reviews unification politics in 
both domestic and international terms. Attention to these countries, 
however, is not equally distributed. More discussion and examination 
are devoted to China and Korea, the two countries that have so far 
remained divided. There are two chapters on China and three on Ko-
rea, and one chapter each for Germany and Vietnam, the two coun-
tries that have already achieved national unification. 
The first two chapters examine the issue of China - the Main-
land and Taiwan. Both articles provide detailed discussions of the re-
lationship between unification and domestic politics. Hungdah Chiu 
surveys the evolutionary process of Beijing's peaceful unification over-
ture toward Taiwan and the responses from Taipei. In addition to the 
main themes of his paper, Chiu touches upon several sensitive issues, 
such as the development of the Taiwan independent movement, the 
"ADB (Asian Development Bank) formula" for Taiwan's future activ-
ities in the international communities, and the Taiwan authority's new 
mainland policies including one that deals with members of the Chi-
nese Communist Party. Quansheng Zhao concentrates on the likely 
impact of the unification process on China's political development and 
democratization. He argues that the unification policy of "one coun-
try, two systems" proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of 
"one country, two (or more) parties," which is an unintended conse-
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quence of unification. Therefore, the prolonged evolutionary process 
of unification is likely to promote China's political pluralization. Zhao 
also discusses the suitability of a federal system for China, including 
the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao. 
The second group of chapters discusses North-South relations in 
Korea and the prospects for unification. George Totten and Yung-
hwan Jo review North-South relations for the last several decades in 
detail, and raise three possible scenarios for the future development. 
By making a brief comparison with the case of Germany, Totten and 
Jo argue that a collapse of North Korea (the kind that happened to 
East Germany) would not be in the interests of South Korea. Byung-
joon Ahn argues that both the international environment and the situ-
ation in the South favor negotiations for unification, whereas the 
North is ambivalent regarding negotiations. Sung-Joo Han believes 
that South Korea has undergone a political transformation (for exam-
ple, the merger of three parties into one large ruling party), which 
makes it receptive to any reasonable proposals about improving 
North-South Korea relations that the North can offer. Han further 
discusses the new South Korean proposal, "a dual track plan": The 
reunification of the people will precede the restoration of a unified 
state. 
The third country study is concerned with German politics and 
unification. As Germany is a newly unified country, its experience 
may provide a useful example to examine the prolonged, evolutionary 
process of unification. Dirk V erheyen analyzes the issue of Germany 
from a broad range of perspectives: German identity, German unity, 
and the management of German power. Verheyen surveys not only 
the current political development, but also its historical and cultural 
roots, thereby providing a comprehensive picture of the German ques-
tion and its likely development in the future. 
Vietnam, the only country among the four to achieve unification 
through military conquest after decades of war, is the focus of Gerard 
Mare's chapter. Mare convincingly argues that even though Vietnam 
achieved its goal of unification in 1975, a deep north-south cleavage 
continues to skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two 
societies remain distinct. This cleavage was caused by Hanoi's eco-
nomic incompetence and political inability to penetrate and remold 
the Southern society. Mare warns that other divided countries should 
draw a lesson from the case of Vietnam - unification may bring not 
only national unity but also a long period of self-absorption, frustra-
tion, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility, which may alter 
the country's regional and international orientation. 
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Finally, the concluding chapter focuses on possible outcomes and 
implications for American foreign policy. Robert Sutter analyzes U. 
S. interests in three dimensions: political-security, economic, and 
political-ideological. While fundamentally optimistic about the future, 
Sutter calls for a more prudent course for U.S. policy-makers that 
would keep enough American strength available to deal with possible 
contingencies and to check potentially adverse trends before they be-
come major crises. 
In sum, there are different paths leading to national unification 
and conflict resolution. One is unification through military force 
where one side takes over the other side entirely. This happened to 
Vietnam in 1975, when the North took over the South and eliminated 
all opposition forces. Another path to unification is peaceful evolu-
tion, which is a long process involving political, economic and cultural 
exchanges between the two sides. These exchanges will eventually cre-
ate an environment in which new political forces may emerge to pro-
mote further mutual understanding. This is the case of Germany, 
where the goal of national unification was reached in 1990. 
In the cases of China and Korea, the second path of unification -
peaceful evolution - is apparently the choice desired by the peoples of 
both sides. Even though one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of 
military action between Beijing and Taipei or Pyongyang and Seoul, 
there are encouraging signs that the two countries may realize their 
unification through peaceful and evolutionary means. The recent de-
velopments in Germany demonstrate that peaceful unification is a pro-
longed and evolutionary process. Political change and unification as 
two different yet closely related processes may take place simultane-
ously. As several authors in this book point out, the process of unifica-
tion itself may create a new environment for political development, 
thereby promoting political pluralization. 
There are close linkages between political and economic develop-
ment. Enormous capital, advanced administrative personnel, and 
technologies from the non-communist side (such as West Germany, 
Taiwan, and South Korea) are increasingly needed by the communist 
side. It is probable that mutual economic benefits, together with the 
close cultural and geographic connection, will push bilateral private 
economic exchanges to new levels. More importantly, economic de-
velopment will stimulate each society's demand for political develop-
ment. This pressure is one of the basic foundations of political 
pluralization. Pluralistic development in the non-political fields of ec-
onomics and culture will foster future political pluralization. Mean-
while, the development and consolidation of various political forces 
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will provide favorable conditions for future political development, 
leading to a gradual accommodation between the two sides. The pro-
cess of unification, therefore, may have the unique function of serving 
as a catalyst for political pluralization in the divided nations. 
One important point worthy of a closer examination by future 
studies, the achievement of the goals for national unification, as 
demonstrated by the on-going experiences of Germany and Vietnam, 
does not necessarily mean the end of conflict between the formerly 
divided parts. Unification may only solve conflict in political and legal 
dimensions, but not in economic, psychological, and cultural dimen-
sions. The need for continuing work on conflict resolution has thus 
remained. 
The original idea for this collection arose during the course of the 
1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in 
Atlanta, where several authors of this volume participated in a panel 
on the politics of divided nations. The panel was organized by Quan-
sheng Zhao for the Asian Political Scientists Group. The chapters 
written by Sung-Joo Han and Byung-joon Ahn on Korea were origi-
nally presented at the Asian-Pacific Dialogue in Honolulu sponsored 
by the East-West Center and the University of Hawaii, and subse-
quently appeared in an East-West Center publication. The permission 
from Charles Morrison of the East-West Center for the inclusion of 
these two articles in this volume is appreciated. I would also like to 
thank Jim McAdams and Wonmo Dong for valuable inputs at the 
earlier stages, Paula Smith for research assistance, and Old Dominion 
University, the East-West Center, and the United States Institute of 
Peace for research support. 

CHAPTER II 
CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND 
THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION* 
Hungdah Chiu 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 1981, Marshall Yeh Jianyin, then Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and de 
facto head of state of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1 made a 
specific nine-point proposal to Taiwan on unification. The proposal 
offers Taiwan "a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative 
region" after unification with the PRC. Taiwan can also retain its 
armed forces. It also renewed its 1979 call for establishing "three 
links" (mail, air and shipping services, and trade) and "four ex-
changes" (relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, 
and sports representatives) with Taiwan as a first step toward the ulti-
mate goal of unification. 2 This proposal set forth the basic principles 
of the Chinese Communists' unification policy toward Taiwan. 
At a panel on unification of China of the 35th Annual Meeting of 
the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) held at San Francisco, March 
25-27, 1983, I made the following personal comments on Yeh's propo-
sal as follows: 
credible terms [for unification] should contain at least the 
• The Wade-Giles system is used for Republic of China (Taiwan) names, places and 
others, the Pinyin system is used for People's Republic of China (Mainland) na:nes, places 
and others. This paper was originally published in Issues & Studies, Vol. 27, No. I 
(January 1991), pp. 13-38 and reprinted with revisions for publication here with the 
permission of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 
Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China. 
1. There is no head of state under the 1978 Chinese Constitution. According to Arti-
cle 26, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress in fact exercises the function of the head of state. In 1982, 
China enacted a new Constitution. 
2. "Chairman Y e Jianying's Elaboration on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to 
Motherland and Peaceful Reunification," Beijing Review, Vol. 24, No. 40 (October 5, 
1981), p. 10. See "N.P.C. Standing Committee Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Bei-
jing Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), pp. 16-17 for PRC's call for "three-links" and 
"four exchanges." 
(7) 
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right to self-defense, including the right to purchase ade-
quate defensive weapons, before and after unification; no 
possibility of unilateral alteration of the settlement terms af-
ter unification; complete, not just "a high degree" of auton-
omy, and appropriate international status in foreign relations 
and international organizations. If these terms could be of-
fered, if the mainland could attain a certain degree of polit-
ical stability and economic development, and if the people 
there could enjoy considerable political and economic free-
dom, then the Chinese people in Taiwan would definitely be 
willing to consider peaceful unification. 3 
After the AAS meeting, one of the panelists, Professor Winston 
L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University, visited the Chinese mainland and 
had a two-hour interview with Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Mili-
tary Affairs Commission - the most powerful position in the PRC. 
Deng said that after unification, Taiwan could continue to buy weap-
ons abroad to sustain its own defense capability, "so long as they do 
not constitute a threat to the mainland." Taiwan would also keep its 
own judicial system, which would not be subject to control or review 
by the PRC's Supreme Court. Deng, however, rejected the concept of 
"complete autonomy" and placed two important limitations on the 
"high degree of autonomy" offered by the PRC: (1) Taiwan can no 
longer be called the "Republic of China" but would be called China-
Taipei or China-Taiwan and (2) the PRC would be the sole representa-
tive for foreign affairs and international relations. On one specific is-
sue, Deng said that "Taiwan" can remain a member of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) under the name "China-Taipei," after the 
PRC's admission to that organization.4 
On June 22 and 23, 1984, during the period of Sino-British nego-
3. Hungdah Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China, An Analysis of the Views 
of the Republic of China on Taiwan," Asian Survey, Vol. XXIII, No. 10 (October 1983), p. 
1094. 
4. Li-yu Yang (Winston Yang), "Deng Xiaoping's New Idea on Peaceful Unification 
-A Two Hour Talk with Deng Xiaoping," Qishi Niandai (The Seventies), 1983, No. 8, 
pp. 17-19. Reported in Michael Weisskopf, "New Proposals From Peking Being Offered to 
Taiwan," Washington Post, July 30, 1983, p. A20; Edward A. Gargan, "Taiwan Could Buy 
Arms Abroad After Unification, Deng Asserts," New York Times, August 21, 1983, p. 20 
and commented on in Allen Whiting, "Deng's Bait to Taiwan," New York Times, August 
23, 1983, p. 23. An excerpt of this interview, which omits the ADB issue and Taiwan's 
right to purchase arms after unification but emphasizes rejection of "complete autonomy,'' 
is published in [Deng Xiaoping], Jianshe you Zhongguo tese di shehui zhuyi (On construct-
ing socialism with distinctive Chinese features), Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1987, 
pp. 15-17 [hereinafter On Constructing Socialism]. 
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tiation on the question of returning Hong Kong to China in 1997, 
Deng Xiaoping referred to its policy toward Hong Kong and Taiwan 
as "one country, two systems," i.e., allowing both places to continue 
their "capitalist system" after unification. 5 
Despite the rejection by the Republic of China (ROC) of the 
PRC's terms for unification, which is preconditioned on the ROC's 
giving up its sovereignty, the PRC decided to implement its "one 
country, two systems" policy with Hong Kong and is attempting to 
use that as a model for unification with Taiwan. 
II. THE HONG KONG MODEL FOR UNIFICATION AND 
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE 
On September 26, 1984, the United Kingdom (UK) and the PRC 
initialed, after almost two years of negotiation, a Joint Declaration on 
the Question of Hong Kong.6 From the PRC's point of view, this 
agreement is an example of successful implementation of the "one 
country, two systems" policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping to serve as 
the basis for incorporating Taiwan into the PRC. 7 
The Joint Declaration spelled out in detail the PRC's policy to-
ward Hong Kong, the post-1997 Hong Kong regime and its interna-
tional relations. The highlights of the Declaration are as follows: 
(1) After 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Ad-
ministrative Region of the PRC under Article 31 of the PRC 
Constitution. It will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" ex-
cept in foreign and defense affairs. 
5. On Constructing Socialism, ibid., pp. 41-42. 
6. For the text of the agreement and related documents, see Hong Kong 1985, Hong 
Kong: Government Publication Center, n.d., pp. 1-16; International Legal Materials, Vol. 
23, No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1366-87; and, Hungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao and Yuan-li Wu, 
eds., The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond, Westport, Connecticut: The 
Greenwood Press, 1987, pp. 181-196. The agreement was signed on December 19, 1984 
and instruments of ratification were exchanged on May 27, 1985. Facts on File, 1985, Vol. 
45, No. 2323 (May 31, 1985), p. 412, Col. A3. 
7. See, Michael Weisskopf, "Peking Eyes Taiwan as Accord is Initialed," The Wash-
ington Post, September 27, 1984, p. A21. On November 6, 1984, in his report to the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress, PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian 
said: "The nature of the Taiwan question and Hong Kong question is different, but the 
idea of 'one country, two systems' is equally applicable to the settlement of the Taiwan 
question. The settlement of the Hong Kong question will produce a far-reaching impact on 
the Taiwan authorities and the Taiwan people and thus is beneficial to the promotion of the 
early completion of the unification of the motherland." Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao (Gazette of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress), No. 5 (November 22, 1984), p. 10. 
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(2) Hong Kong will be vested with executive, legislative 
and independent judicial power, including that of final 
adjudication. 
(3) Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by 
the PRC after elections or consultation in Hong Kong. The 
government of Hong Kong will be composed of local people. 
(4) Hong Kong shall maintain the capitalist economic 
and trade systems for 50 years after 1997. 
( 5) The existing social and economic system will re-
main unchanged. Freedoms of speech, of movement, of the 
press, of assembly, to strike, of religion, and others will be 
protected by law. Similarly, private property rights will be 
protected. 
(6) Apart from displaying the national flag and national 
emblem of the PRC, Hong Kong may use a regional flag and 
emblem of its own. 
(7) Hong Kong may participate in relevant interna-
tional organizations and international trade agreements. It 
may establish official and semi-official economic and trade 
missions in foreign countries, using the name "Hong Kong, 
China" to maintain and develop relations and to conclude 
and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant 
international organizations in appropriate fields. 
(8) The PRC defense force stationed in Hong Kong 
shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Hong Kong and 
the expenditures for these military forces shall be borne by 
the PRC's Central People's Government. 
Under the above arrangements, Hong Kong will enjoy on the sur-
face a "high degree of autonomy," but a closer analysis of the Declara-
tion and the PRC's 1982 Constitution casts serious doubt on the 
durability and credibility of such autonomy. First, under Article 1 of 
Annex 1 of the Declaration, the PRC's National People's Congress 
(NPC) shall enact a basic law for the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region, to guarantee the continuation of Hong Kong's capitalist 
system and lifestyle for 50 years and other matters as provided in the 
Joint Declaration. While under the PRC's law, Hong Kong may elect 
roughly 40 delegates to the NPC;8 the practical use and strength of 40 
8. According to PRC law, city residents can elect one delegate for every 130,000 per-
sons, while rural residents can elect one delegate for every 1,040,000 persons. See 1983 
Zhongguo baike nianjian (1983 Yearbook of the Encyclopedia of China), Shanghai: 
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Hong Kong delegates among the 3,000 delegates9 in the NPC's deci-
sion-making process would be insignificant. Moreover, Article 67, 
paragraph 4, of the 1982 Constitution 10 provides that the Standing 
Committee of the NPC shall have the power "to interpret statutes," 
thus both legislative and interpretative powers regarding the basic law 
for Hong Kong are in the hands of the NPC. Under such circum-
stances, the persistence of the so-called "high degree of autonomy" is 
at the mercy of the NPC, and thus the commitment lacks a credible 
guarantee. 
Second, under Article 2, paragraph 1, of Annex 1 of the Declara-
tion, "after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong . . . shall be 
maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law .... " As 
stated above, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right to 
"interpret statutes;" therefore, the Standing Committee could annul 
those local Hong Kong laws it dislikes on the ground that they contra-
vene the Basic Law. 
Third, while Article 2, paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the Declaration 
provides that the Hong Kong "Legislature may on its own authority 
enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and 
legal procedure," Article 67, paragraph 8 of the PRC Constitution 
provides that the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power "to 
annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power 
of .... _autonomous regions ... that contravene the Constitution, the 
statutes or the administrative rules and regulations," thus effectively 
placing a severe restraint on the power of the Hong Kong legislature. 
Fourth, under Article 89, paragraph 14, of the PRC Constitution, 
the State Council (Cabinet) has the power "to alter or annul inappro-
priate decisions and orders issued by local organs of state administra-
tion at different levels." Therefore, the PRC's State Council can 
interfere, based on this legal foundation, with the Hong Kong govern-
ment's administrative function at anytime if it chooses to do so. 
Fifth, Article 1, paragraph 3 of Annex 1 of the Declaration pro-
vides that the "chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region shall be selected by election or through consultation held 
locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government." Since 
the PRC has the final say on the appointment of their chief executive, 
Xinhua Press, 1983, p. 226. Assuming all Hong Kong residents are considered city resi· 
dents, its 5,147,900 population can elect roughly 40 delegates. 
9. See, 1983 Yearbook of the Encyclopedia of China, supra, note 8, p. 227. 
10. For the English translation of this constitution, see The Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983. 
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to what extent the Hong Kong people can exercise their free will to 
choose is open to serious doubt. In a country with a federal system 
such as the United States, the election of the chief executive of a mem-
ber state is the sole decision of the people of that state without any 
participation of the central government. For instance, in the United 
States, a governor of a state is elected by the people of that state, and 
there is no way for the President or federal government to block that 
selection. 
In view of the above analysis, it is clear that the so-called "high 
degree of autonomy" for Hong Kong has no credible guarantee and 
the PRC can legally interfere with the legislative and administrative 
operation of Hong Kong any time it chooses to do so. 
On September 27, 1984, a day after the announcement of the 
Joint Declaration, an editorial in the People's Daily, the official news-
paper of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that the Hong Kong 
Declaration will "promote Taiwan's return to the motherland," and 
noted that the same formula could be applicable to Taiwan. 11 The 
ROC government and public opinion in Taiwan immediately rejected 
this statement. On October 4, 1984, the Foreign Minister of the ROC, 
Chu Fu-sung, told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative 
Yuan (Congress) that the so-called theory of "one country, two sys-
tems" is nothing but a guise used to confuse foreign nations as the 
Chinese Communists pursue their political plots. 12 He thus categori-
cally rejected the Hong Kong model as the basis for unification. The 
reason for this rejection is very simple. By agreeing to become a "spe-
cial administrative region" of the PRC, the ROC would immediately 
lose its sovereignty and international personality. Without sovereignty 
and an international personality, there would be no legal restraints to 
prevent the PRC from taking away what it promised Taiwan at the 
time of unification. 
In the case of Taiwan, the PRC leaders have stated that no mili-
tary or administrative personnel will be sent to Taiwan after unifica-
tion. There is, however, no credible guarantee to prevent the PRC 
from doing so. During the Hong Kong negotiation, PRC leaders first 
announced that no troops would be sent to Hong Kong after 1997, but 
they later changed their minds. 13 Commenting on the credibility of 
11. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), September 27, 1984, pp. 1, 4. 
12. "Foreign Minister Rejects Hong Kong Solution," Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report, China (hereinafter referred to as "FBIS, China"), October 5, 1984, p. 
VI. 
13. "Troops in Hong Kong in '97, China Says," The New York Times, May 26, 1984, p. 
3. 
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the Chinese Communists, then ROC Premier Kuo-hua Yu said on 
September 26, 1984: 
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the 
Chinese Communists - fearful of resistance from the Chi-
nese in Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and 
democracy - went out of their way to embellish an illusion 
of "one country, two systems." They "promised that the 
present Hongkong system would remain unchanged for 50 
years, in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of 
Hongkong and Kowloon. 
It is no secret that throughout the history of the Com-
munists, there has never been any record established of their 
good faith nor any "agreement" that was not later trashed. 
No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists at-
tempt to create today, the basic policy identified in their 
"four principles" [socialist road, people's democratic dicta-
torship, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marx-
ism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought] is a sharp illustration of 
the fact that Communism's totalitarian nature will never 
change. 
Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor 
confined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is 
an eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being 
nourished in freedom and democracy. 14 
On April 28, 1988, PRC's Basic Law Drafting Committee pub-
lished the "Draft Basic Law for Solicitation of Opinions," which un-
dercuts the promise of a "high degree of autonomy" provided in the 
1984 Joint Declaration. For instance, Article 17, paragraph 3, of the 
Draft authorizes the PRC's State Council to apply Chinese laws in 
Hong Kong in case of an "emergency" as decided by that Council, 
thus effectively ending Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy." 15 
The ROC government was not even interested in making an offi-
cial denunciation of the Draft, and only the ruling Nationalist Party 
made some comments in an editorial in its party newspaper: 
14. Republic of China, A Reference Book, 1986, New York: Highlight International 
New York, Inc., 1986, p. 469. See also, Yu-ming Shaw, "An ROC View on the Hong 
Kong Question," in Jiirgen Domes and Yu-ming Shao, eds., Hong Kong: A Chinese and 
International Concern, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 95-109. 
15. For a comprehensive analysis of the Draft, see, Hungdah Chiu, ed., The Draft Basic 
Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Se-
ries in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 5-1988 (88). 
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The basic principles of the [Draft Basic Law for Hong Kong] 
are: (1) Adopting a comparatively free and open policy in 
economic aspects; (2) taking strict control of [Hong Kong's] 
politics; and (3) explicitly allowing freedoms of speech, pub-
lications and others, but subject to restrictions .... Moreover, 
[Article 39] of the Draft states that those freedoms provided 
in the Draft may be restricted on the ground of national se-
curity, public order, public health and public morals .... The 
"one country, two systems" concept [to be implemented by] 
the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong is aimed at Taiwan. 
However, the tactics used by the Chinese Communists in 
Hong Kong only make the Chinese in Taiwan know the true 
face of Chinese Communists' "one country, two systems" 
and therefore more resolutely resist Chinese Communists' 
[attempt to unify Taiwan and the mainland]. 16 
In February 1989, the Standing Committee of the PRC's Na-
tional People's Congress published the Basic Law (Draft),t 7 which, 
after further consultation and comments, would be revised and re-
drafted for submission to the National People's Congress for adoption. 
The ROC government and the ruling Nationalist Party totally ignored 
this document because it was absolutely unacceptable to them. 
On April 4, 1990, the Basic Law was adopted by the PRC's Na-
tional People's Congress.l 8 On April 20, 1990, then ROC Premier Li 
Huan (the Premier spells his surname Lee) announced that the ROC 
Government will not recognize this Law. 19 
III. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S "THREE 
LINKS" AND "FOUR EXCHANGES" AND THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE 
The PRC's overture for "three links" and "four exchanges" has 
great appeal to many people in Taiwan. Those who have family ties 
16. "Editorial: More Restriction on Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists: Com-
ment on the Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong," Chung-yang jih-pao (Central Daily News), 
int'l. edition, May 9, 1988, p. 1. 
17. Text published by the Secretariat of the Basic Law Consultation Committee. 
18. For a summary of this law, see Ruan Ping, "Hong Kong Basic Law Guarantees 
'One Country, Two Systems,'" Beijing Review, Vol. 33, No. 15 (April 9-15, 1990); pp. 7, 9 
and Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Backs Some Autonomy in Hong Kong Code,'' New York 
Times, April 5, 1990, p. A6. Complete text in Chinese is printed in Renmin Ribao (Peo-
ple's Daily), Overseas edition, April 7, 1990, pp. 1-2, 4. 
19. Chung-yan Jih-pao (Central Daily News), international edition, April 22, 1990, p. 
l. 
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with people on the mainland would naturally like to visit their rela-
tives. For others, who only learned about China from books, there is a 
natural curiosity and nationalistic feeling toward visiting the Chinese 
mainland. Taiwan businessmen are attracted by the opportunity of 
opening a vast new market on the mainland. Under such circum-
stances, the ROC government is in a dilemma. If it categorically re-
jects the overture, this definitely would cause popular discontent in 
Taiwan. If it responds positively to this overture, it may be seen as 
impliedly acceding to the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan. There is 
also the security concern that extensive contacts with the mainland 
may facilitate the Communists' infiltration of Taiwan and undercut 
the people's anti-communist will and vigilance. This concern is espe-
cially important, from the ROC's point of view, because the Chinese 
Communists have refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. 
Moreover, on August 17, 1982, under PRC pressure, the United States 
signed a joint communique to limit the quality and quantity of its arm 
sales to Taiwan. 20 In view of this dilemma, the ROC has taken an 
indirect and limited, yet positive, response to the PRC's overture for 
"three links" and "four exchanges." 
In the early 1980's, the ROC quietly allowed indirect trade be-
tween Taiwan and the mainland to develop and finally legitimized 
such trade in 1985. It also permitted scientists and others from Tai-
wan to sit down with their PRC counterparts at international meet-
ings. The ROC allowed indirect mail exchanges and did not prosecute 
ordinary people who quietly visited their relatives on the mainland. 
On March 23, 1981, the ROC agreed to have the Republic of China's 
Olympic Committee renamed as the Chinese Taipei Olympic Commit-
tee,21 thus making it possible for athletes from both the mainland and 
Taiwan to compete in international sports activities. 
After the signing of the August 17, 1982 Taiwan arm sales restric-
tion communique, the ROC confronted a serious security problem. 
One can expect the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to gradually 
shift in the PRC's favor as Taiwan's weaponry ages and the PRC gains 
access to U.S. and European weaponry. This concern was partially 
resolved in 1985-1986 when the U.S. permitted its industries to trans-
fer military technology to Taiwan.22 
With the resolution of this basic security issue and generally 
favorable response from indirect contacts with the mainland, the ROC 
20. New York Times, August 18, 1982, p. A12. 
21. See Chinese Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 145-146. 
22. "U.S. Industry Aiding Taiwan in Developing National Fighter to Meet Threat 
from the PRC, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 31, 1986, p. 31. 
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moves toward a more positive response to PRC's "three links" and 
"four exchanges." 
On July 16, 1987, the ROC government formally lifted the ban on 
direct tourist visits to Hong Kong to facilitate people from Taiwan 
meeting their relatives from the mainland.23 On October 15, 1987, the 
Central Standing Committee of the ruling Nationalist Party approved 
a new policy to allow people living in Taiwan to visit their relatives on 
the Chinese mainland. On November 2, 1987, the Red Cross Society 
of the Republic of China began to handle the applications for main-
land visits and to provide assistance to people who want to locate their 
relatives on the mainland.24 Soon after, mail exchanges through Hong 
Kong were permitted. On June 10, 1989, direct mail exchanges with 
the mainland began. 25 In 1988, the ROC began to allow a limited 
number of mainland Chinese to visit their sick relatives in Taiwan or 
to attend their funeral services. 26 
Trade between the mainland and Taiwan has flourished since the 
early 1980's. The total volume of trade between 1979 to 1986 was 
about 4 billion U.S. dollars. In 1987 alone it was 1.6 billion, and in 
1988 it jumped to 2.4 billion. 27 
In April 1989, the ROC began to allow its reporters to visit the 
mainland and considered allowing mainland reporters to visit 
Taiwan.28 
23. "Restrictions Lifted on HK Travel in Wake of ROC's 'Momentous Day,'" The 
Free China Journal, Vol. IV, No. 28 (July 20, 1987), p. 1. 
24. See, "Mainland Visits Policy Comes from 'Heart,'" FBIS. China, October 19, 
1987, p. 38; "Red Cross Begins Mainland Contacts Service," ibid., October 21, 1987, p. 30; 
Ma Hsia-mian, "Thousands of Taiwan Residents Packing for Trip to Mainland," The Free 
China Journal, Vol. IV, No. 42 (October 26, 1987), p. 1; and Mei Hsin-ti, "Red Cross 
Society Starts Check on Thousands of Mainland Kin," ibid., No. 44 (November 9, 1987), p. 
3. 
25. Shao-nian chung-kuo cheng-pao (China Daily News), Monterey Park, California, 
July 29, 1989, p. 4. 
26. In 1988, there were 389 Chinese from the mainland who went to Taiwan to visit 
their sick relatives or attend funerals. See "Press Conference of Ding Guangen, Director of 
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council," Taisheng (Voice of Taiwan), 1989, No. 3, 
p.6. 
27. Ibid. 
28. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989, the ROC decided to post-
pone its decision to allow PRC reporters to visit Taiwan. After the massacre it became 
clear that mainland reporters were under the total control of the PRC government and 
could not report Taiwan's situation in a reasonably objective way. Chung-yang Jih-pao 
(Central Daily News), international edition, August 7, 1989, p. 1. On August 1, 1990, the 
ROC lifted the ban on PRC reporters visiting Taiwan. However, it still requires those 
reporters to renounce their membership in the Chinese Communist Party before being ad-
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In view of the above stated development, it appears that the 
PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges" peace overture to Taiwan 
has been relatively successful. But, would such developments lead, as 
the PRC expects, to unification under Yeh's nine-point proposal and 
Deng's "one country, two systems" formula? 
IV. THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION UNDER THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S TERMS 
Increasing contacts and reduction of tensions between Taiwan 
and the mainland under the so-called "three links" and "four ex-
changes" definitely have created an atmosphere beneficial to the unifi-
cation goal. However, such a development alone will not lead to 
political unification under the PRC's terms as will be analyzed and 
explained below. 
The PRC's terms for unification and its promise for a "high de-
gree of autonomy" after unification are preconditioned on the ROC's 
relinquishment of its sovereignty and its agreement to become a "spe-
cial administrative region" of the PRC. There is no credible guarantee 
to prevent the PRC from repudiating its promise after unification. 
The so-called guarantee of the Basic Law and Article 31 of the 1982 
PRC Constitution, 29 as demonstrated by the history of the drafting of 
the Hong Kong Basic Law, is nothing but a farce. As a matter offact, 
how long any PRC Constitution will last is highly questionable; the 
present Constitution is the fifth official text since the establishment of 
the PRC. 30 
Moreover, since 1979, PRC leaders have spoken of using force 
mitted to Taiwan. As a result, none of them have applied to visit Taiwan yet. See "M'land 
Media Still Shy," Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 60 (August 9, 1990), p. 1. 
29. a. following comment by an ROC writer: 
Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base melody in the Commu-
nists' orchestrated effort to solve the "Taiwan problem," i.e., destroy the Republic 
of China and establish Communist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What 
deserves special notice is this: the "special administrative districts" are to be es-
tablished "when necessary" and when the necessity is no longer operative, they 
may be abolished. The entire system to be practiced there will be "stipulated by 
law" by the Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or eliminated 
"by law." The strategy employed here is one of absolutely gradual, step-by-step 
encroachment. The ambition and the cunning that lie behind it need no 
comment. 
ICM Staff Writer, "Some Key Points in the New Constitution," Inside China Mainland 
Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, January 1983, Supplement, p. 2. ' 
30. The following table will illustrate this point: 
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against Taiwan on a number of occasions.31 On June 10, 1982, then 
Premier Sun Yun-suan responded, quoting President John F. Ken-
nedy's inaugural address, that the ROC would never negotiate out of 
fear. 32 On February 22, 1988, President Li Teng-hui (the President 
spells his surname Lee) also stated at a press conference: 
Stability on the Taiwan Straits is not a unilateral issue. The 
mainland side, while continuing to follow the "four cardinal 
principles," has never rejected the use of force as a means to 
liberate or reunify Taiwan, or to maintain the status quo. I 
believe that if the well-being of the one billion Chinese peo-
l) 1949 Common Program 
of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative 
Conference (Provisional 
Constitution) 
2) 1954 Constitution 
3) Draft 1970 
Constitution 
4) 1975 Constitution 
5) 1978 Constitution 
6) 1982 Constitution 
Replaced by the 1954 Constitution 
When the Great Proletarian Cultural Resolution 
broke out in 1966, this Constitution was in fact 
suspended and later formally replaced by the 
1975 Constitution. 
This draft was allegedly put out by Lin Biao, 
then Defense Minister and Vice-Chairman of the 
Party. It was distributed nationwide for discus-
sion but was recalled after the failure of the 
alleged Lin Biao coup against Mao in the fall of 
1971. 
This was later called the "Gang of Four" Consti-
tution and after the fall of the "Gang" in Octo-
ber 1976, it appeared to be ignored. In fact it 
lasted less than 2 years (17 January 1975 to 
October 1976). It was replaced by the 1978 Con-
stitution. 
Adopted by the National People's Congress on 5 
March 1978. On 1 July 1979, Articles 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38, 42, and 43 were amended. The present 
Constitution replaced it on 4 December 1982. It 
thus lasted only 4 years and 9 months. 
December 4, 1982 - present 
Hungdah Chiu, "The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law," Review 
of Socialist Law, Vol. 11 (1985), pp. 144-145. 
31. Between January 1979 and July 1981, Chinese leaders and official sources at least 
spoke ten times on the use of force against Taiwan. See Chinese Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 14-16. On October 11, 1984, Chinese Communist 
leader Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) said that the PRC could institute a military 
blockade against Taiwan. "Deng Warns of 'Eruption' in U.S.-China Ties Over Taiwan," 
The New York Times, October 12, 1984, p. AS. On April3, 1987, Chinese Deputy Minister 
Qian Qisheng again said that the PRC cannot promise to rule out "non-peaceful means" to 
resolve the Taiwan question. Beimei Ribao (Peimei News), New York, April 4, 1987, p. l. 
32. Lien Ho-pao (United Daily News), international edition, June 12, 1982, p. 3; Eng-
lish translation in The China Issue and China's Reunification, published by the ROC Gov-
ernment Information Office. 
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pie is taken into account, the old concept of using force to 
coerce the other side into reunification must be abandoned. 
Taiwan, as a complex area, will react to whatever pressure 
befalls it. Thus I don't believe this question can be resolved 
by the use of pressure, and this is very important. 33 
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Furthermore, there are wide political, economic, social and cul-
tural gaps between the mainland and Taiwan; unless such gaps narrow 
with the passage of time, the conditions for peaceful unification can 
never gradually mature. Unfortunately, since the suppression of the 
student movement for more democracy and press freedom in late 
1986,34 which culminated in June 1989 massacre of student demon-
strators in Beijing, 35 the gaps between the mainland and Taiwan have 
been widening rather than narrowing. 
Finally, the ROC has been steadily moving toward a multiparty 
democratic system, 36 and the ROC government cannot ignore public 
opinion and popular will when reaching a unification agreement on the 
PRC terms. There has been almost no popular support for Yeh's nine-
point proposal for unification or Deng's "one-country, two systems" 
concept in Taiwan. 
V. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S POLICY TO 
ISOLATE TAIWAN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA'S COUNTER-OFFENSIVE 
While the PRC has taken positive steps to increase contacts and 
to improve mutual understandings with Taiwan, it nevertheless has 
not ceased its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March 
1982, the PRC Foreign Ministry notified many countries that they 
should not establish representative agencies in Taiwan and vice 
33. "Text of President Li's 22 Feb. News Conference," FBIS, China, March 1, 1988, p. 
34. 
34. E.g., see Edward A. Gargan, "Thousands Stage Rally in Shanghai Demanding 
Rights," New York Times, December 21, 1986, pp. 1, 19; "China Denounces Student Pro-
tests as 'Illegal Acts,'" ibid., December 22, 1986, pp. A1, A14; "Beijing Imposes Rules 
Banning Protests in City," ibid., December 27, 1986, pp. 1, 4; "Chinese Officials Criticize 
Protests,'' ibid., December 30, 1986, p. AS; and "Chinese Students End Their Marches,'' 
ibid., December 31, 1986, p. AS. 
35. See, infra, note 44 and accompanying text. 
36. See John F. Copper, A Quiet Revolution, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public 
Policy Center, 1988 and Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, Political and Social Change 
in the Republic of China, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. 
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versa. 37 Since Taiwan's economy relies heavily on international trade, 
the lack of foreign representative agencies in Taiwan will be a great 
inconvenience for businessmen. Moreover, the PRC, which has suc-
cessfully driven Taiwan from all United Nations' affiliated interna-
tional organizations, has continued to exert pressure on other 
international organizations to oust the ROC. 
In 1983, Deng Xiaoping appeared to be willing to reconsider this 
policy of isolating Taiwan from the international community when he 
told Professor Winston L.Y. Yang that, after the admission of the 
PRC to the ADB, Taiwan can retain its seat under "Taipei, China."38 
In March 1986, the PRC was admitted to the ADB without ousting 
the ROC, though the latter had to change its name to "Taipei, 
China."39 The ROC, then under late President Chiang Ching-kuo, 
protested this change of its name, but did not withdraw from the 
ADB. In May 1989, when the ADB held its annual meeting in Bei-
jing, the ROC's new President, Li Teng-hui, approved its delegation to 
participate, though still protesting the change of the ROC's name.40 
Many in Taiwan hope that the ADB formula can be applied simi-
larly to Taiwan's participation in other international organizations, so 
as to resolve one of the basic issues of unification. However, a state-
ment issued by the PRC's Foreign Ministry on December 19, 1988, 
explicitly said: 
Back in 1971, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a resolution which restored the legitimate seat of the 
People's Republic of China in this world body. Accordingly, 
the United Nations has expelled Taiwan from all its organi-
zations, and the offices of organizations of the UN system 
must not have any dealings with Taiwan. This principle also 
applies to other inter-governmental, international organiza-
tions. As for individual intergovernmental international or-
ganizations, for instance, the Asian Development Bank, the 
Taiwan authorities are allowed to join it in the name of 
"Taipei, China," subject to agreement reached through con-
sultations between the Chinese Government and the interna-
tional organization concerned. This is only a kind of special 
37. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), March 19, 1982, reprinted in Xinhua Yuebao (New 
China Monthly), 1982, No. 3, p. 195. 
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
39. People's Daily, May 2-3, 1986, reprinted in New China Monthly, 19S6, No. 5, pp. 
193-194. 
40. "ROC Officials Going to Mainland Meeting of ADB," Free China Journal, Vol. 
VI, No. 25 (April 10, 1989), p. 1. 
CHAPTER II 
arrangement and cannot be regarded as a model universally 
applicable to other intergovernmental, international 
organizations. 41 
21 
The PRC's policy to exclude Taiwan from international organiza-
tions is undercutting its attempt to win over Chinese people in Taiwan 
for the cause of unification. This is because many people in Taiwan 
feel, as long as Taiwan maintains its "one China" policy and accepts 
the ultimate goal of unification, there is no reason to exclude their 
participation in international organizations. Many of the international 
organizations in which Taiwan wishes to participate are non-political, 
but essential to Taiwan's economic and social development (such as 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
and many others). Arrangements can be made, as in the ADB 
formula, to avoid the "two Chinas" issues in which the PRC has a 
legitimate concern. 
The PRC also blocks Taiwan's participation in multilateral inter-
national conventions. For instance, the ROC on Taiwan is the thir-
teenth leading trading country of the world, but it is unable to become 
a contracting party to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sales of Goods. 42 
Furthermore, the PRC uses economic aid to solicit countries one 
by one to establish diplomatic relations with it and to sever diplomatic 
relations with the ROC. In 1981, there were only 23 countries main-
taining diplomatic relations with the ROC.43 However, since the early 
1980's the rapid economic development of the ROC has attracted the 
attention of some third world countries that have diplomatic relations 
with the PRC. A few of them were interested in establishing diplo-
matic relations with the ROC in order to get some economic and tech-
nical assistance. Ironically, the ROC insisted that they must sever 
relations with the PRC before establishing diplomatic relations with 
the ROC in order to avoid a "two Chinas" situation. This condition 
was unacceptable to those countries. 44 This policy was criticized se-
41. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), overseas edition, December 20, 1988, p. 1; English 
translation in Press Release of the PRC Embassy, Washington, D.C., No. 24 (December 
20, 1988). 
42. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 19 
(1980), pp. 671-695. 
43. See, Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981), p. 13. 
44. Surinam was interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1980, 
but could not accept the ROC condition of severing diplomatic relations with the PRC 
first. 
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verely by legislators and scholars in the ROC. 45 In the meantime, the 
PRC stepped up its diplomatic offensive against the ROC. Between 
1983 and 1987, four countries severed diplomatic relations with the 
ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, i.e., Lesotho, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Under strong domestic pressure, the 
ROC in 1989 changed its policy and estaolished diplomatic relations 
with Grenada, Liberia and Belize46 without demanding the severance 
of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC, however, considered 
that such a situation would create "two Chinas" and thus suspended 
its diplomatic relations with these countries.47 The PRC also accused 
the ROC of pursuing a "two Chinas" policy,48 which the ROC cate-
gorically denied. 49 
The PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan from the international com-
munity would ironically help the elements of the "Taiwan Indepen-
dence Movement" to promote their cause. They can make a 
seemingly convincing, though unrealistic, argument that only when 
Taiwan becomes independent, can it break its present international 
isolation, as will be discussed in the last part of this paper. 
45. At the hearings on foreign policy of the ROC at the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Legislative Yuan held on April 13 and 14, 1988, almost all scholars who testified op-
posed the ROC government's policy of requiring a country to sever its diplomatic relations 
with the PRC before it could establish diplomatic relations with the ROC. Almost all 
legislators shared this view. For the text of the testimonies and discussions of the hearings, 
see Chung-kuo kuo-chi-fa yu kuo-chi shi-wu nien-pao (Chinese Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs), Vol. 3 (1987-1988), Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1989, pp. 107-
177. 
46. On July 20, 1989, Grenada established diplomatic relations with the ROC; on Oc-
tober 9, 1989, Liberia resumed its diplomatic relations with the ROC which were sus-
pended on February 24, 1979; and, on October 11, 1989, Belize established diplomatic 
relations with the ROC. See "Diplomatic Ties Established with Grenada," FBIS, China, 
July 21, 1989, pp. 50-51; Lien-ho pao (United Daily News), overseas edition, October 3, 
1989, p. 1 (Liberia) and Shih-jiejih-pao (World Journal), October 13, 1989, p. 1 (Belize), 
respectively. 
47. On August 8, 1989, the PRC suspended its diplomatic relations with Grenada; on 
October 10, 1989, with Liberia and on October 23, 1989, with Belize. See, Renmin Ribao, 
overseas edition, October 8, 1989, p. 1 (Grenada); "Diplomatic Relations with Liberia Sus-
pended," FB/S, China, October 10, 1989, p. 17 and World Journal, October 24, 1989, p. 1 
(Belize), respectively. 
48. E.g., see, "Government's 'Flexible' Foreign Policy Criticized," FB/S, China, No-
vember 6, 1989, p. 65 and "Taiwan's 'Silver Bullet Diplomacy' Viewed," [Yuan Yang, 
"Comment on Taiwan Authorities' 'Silver Bullet Diplomacy,'" Liaowang Overseas Edi-
tion, No. 44, October 30, 1989), FB/S, China, November 17, 1989, pp. 49-50. 
49. E.g., see, President Li Teng-hui's National Day message of October 10, 1989, 
where he severely condemned the concept of Taiwan independence. Central Daily News, 
int'l. ed., October 11, 1989, p. 1. 
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VI. THE TIANANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE AND ITS 
INFLUENCE ON TAIWAN-MAINLAND RELATIONS 
23 
As analyzed in previous sections, before the June 4, 1989, 
Tiananmen massacre, there already had existed several almost irrecon-
cilable differences between the PRC and the ROC on the terms of uni-
fication. Although the PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges" 
overture and the resulting ROC step-by-step positive response to it 
gradually have reduced tensions between Taiwan and the mainland, 
this creates a false impression that both sides are moving toward rap-
prochement and the unification goal. 
The two basic issues between the PRC and the ROC are: (1) the 
ROC considers the PRC's promise unreliable and the so-called consti-
tutional guarantee a farce; and (2) political, economic and social devel-
opment in Taiwan and the mainland are moving in opposite 
directions. Taiwan under the ROC is moving in the direction of West-
em style democracies with free trade and a free enterprise economy, 
while the PRC decides to retain its dictatorial system and allows only 
very limited economic freedom. 
On June 4, 1989, when Chinese students were exercising their 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech, assembly and demonstra-
tion50 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the Chinese Communist gov-
ernment ordered its military forces to use tanks and machine guns to 
massacre them, resulting in thousands of casualties. 51 Moreover, after 
this tragedy, the PRC has engaged in a large scale disinformation cam-
paign to distort the facts, 52 claiming at first that not a single student 
was killed and then saying only a few students were killed. 53 This 
atrocity shocked the whole world and further proves, from the ROC's 
point of view, that the Chinese Communists are totally unreliable. 
50. Article 35 of the 1982 Chinese Constitution provides: "Citizens of the People's 
Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration." The Laws of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 1 
(1979-1982), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, p. 12. 
51. This massacre is reported in almost all newspapers. FBIS, China has an extensive 
collection of media reports on this subject in its June 5, 1989 issue. See also, "Beijing 
Bloodbath," Newsweek, June 12, 1989, pp. 24-29; "Despair and Death in a Beijing Square," 
Time, June 12, 1989, pp. 24-27; "Reign of Terror," Newsweek, June 19, 1989, pp. 14-22. 
52. E.g., see, "Dealing Death With a Big Lie, China's leaders deny that the massacre 
occurred- and condemned some of the survivors to execution," Newsweek, June 26, 1989, 
pp. 26-28; Jill Smolowe, "China, Deng's Big Lie, The Hard-liners Rewrite history to justify 
arrests and bury democracy," Time, June 26, 1989, pp. 32-34; "Expert tells how Chinese 
are turning lies into truth," The Sun, Baltimore, August 15, 1989, p. 2A. 
53. John Suhidlovsky, "China raises students' death toll," The Sun, Baltimore, July 1, 
1989, pp. lA, 2A. 
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Soon after the massacre, Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General 
Zhao Ziyang was removed from power54 and the Chinese mainland 
entered a period of political and economic instability. 55 
On June 27, 1989, Tang Shubei, Deputy Director of the Taiwan 
Affairs Office of the State Council stated that the Chinese Communist 
Party and government will not change the basic national policy for the 
solution of the Taiwan question, i.e., "peaceful reunification and one 
country, two systems." But he blamed Taiwan for repeatedly expres-
sing "support" to what he called "an extremely small number of peo-
ple who created the counterrevolutionary riot in Beijing."56 The 
PRC's media also launched an attack on Taiwan for supporting the 
students' democratic movement. 57 The PRC's security agencies also 
arrested several so-called Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist 
Party) agents on the mainland for alleged involvement in the recent 
turmoil, i.e., the democratic movement on the mainland. 58 
The ROC's response to the democratic movement on the Chinese 
Mainland has been very cautious in order not to give the PRC an ex-
cuse to renew its military threat against Taiwan. While severely con-
demning the atrocity committed by the Chinese Communist military 
forces in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent mass arrests and ex-
ecutions, 59 the ROC has made it clear that it does not consider the 
54. Michael Weisskopf, "Chinese Communist Party Ousts Zhao as Chief in Wide 
Shake-Up," Washington Post, June 25, 1989, pp. Al, A25. 
55. E.g., see, Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Communist Party Calls for Purge," New 
York Times, June 26, 1989, p. AS; Daniel Southerland, "China's Economy May Renew 
Strife," Washington Post, June 28, 1989, pp. Al, Al8. 
56. "PRC Official Says Taiwan Policy Unchanged," FBIS, China, June 28, 1989, p. 71. 
57. E.g., see, "Taiwan Authorities Stir Up Anticommunist Wave," FB/S, China, June 
26, 1989, p. 83. 
58. E.g., see, "Mainland Detains KMT 'Agents'; Profile Given," FBIS, China, June 23, 
1989, p. 42. 
59. E.g., President Li Teng-hui issued a statement on June 4, 1989, stating: 
With a deeply grieved and heavy heart, I wish, on behalf of the government 
and people of the Republic of China, to summon all the peace-loving nations and 
people of the world who share a concern for human rights to sternly condemn the 
Chinese Communists; to demand they put an immediate stop to this bloody mas-
sacre; and to demand they offer their best care and relief to the wounded and 
families of the dead. 
I also summon all Chinese people at home and abroad to put their great love 
for their countrymen into practice, to closely unite and act as a backup for our 
mainland compatriots in their struggle for survival and freedom, to support and 
assist them in every way possible, and to make a complete break with the Chinese 
Communists. 
The Free China Journal, Vol. VI, No. 42 (June 8, 1989), p. 1. 
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mainland under Communist rule as a belligerent60 and it will not at-
tempt to launch a military attack against the mainland.61 On July 20, 
1989, President Li Teng-hui severely condemned the Chinese Commu-
nists' bloody crackdown on the democratic movement on the main-
land and called upon all countries to morally and materially support 
the democracy movement on the Chinese mainland, 62 but he did not 
mention any belligerent or subversive actions against the PRC. Ear-
lier then ROC's Premier, Li Huan, also denied that his government 
instigated the recent turmoil on the mainland. 63 These responses ap-
pear to suggest that the ROC on Taiwan does not want to increase 
tension in its relations with the PRC, but after the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre it does want to slow down its recent policy to increase con-
tacts with the mainland. 64 For instance, it indefinitely postponed con-
siderations to allow mainland reporters to visit Taiwan. 65 Both sides, 
however, have decided to maintain their present mutually beneficial 
trade relations. 66 
VII. THE DECEMBER 2,1989 ELECTION IN TAIWAN AND 
THE RISE OF THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT 
In the 1983 election for the Legislative Yuan, the candidates who 
later formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) jointly espoused 
a platform that advocated, among other points, "self-determination 
for Taiwan." After the formation of the DPP, the new party platform 
said that "the future of Taiwan should be decided jointly by all the 
inhabitants there." Many believe both platforms are just a euphemism 
for "Taiwan independence." However, before the December 2, 1989 
Legislative Yuan, Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung City 
Councils, and City Magistrates election, a faction of the DPP called 
New Tide formed a "New Country Front" and publicly advocated 
60. "Cabinet Says Mainland Not Considered Belligerent," FB/S, China, June 16, 1989, 
p. 68. 
61. "Taiwan Not to Consider 'Military Counterattack,'" FBIS, China, June 19, 1989, 
p. 63; "Premier Stresses No Military Attack on Mainland," FB/S, China, June 21, 1989, p. 
79. 
62. "President Li Supports Mainland Democracy Movement,'' FB/S, China, July 21, 
1989, p. 49. 
63. "PRC Charges of Taiwan Instigation Refuted,'' FB/S, China, June 15, 1989, p. 69. 
64. "'Relaxation' of Mainland Policy Still Slow," FB/S, China, July 17, 1989, p. 69. 
65. "No Entry for Mainland Journalists," FB/S, China, July 17, 1989, p. 69. 
66. See, "Mainland Trade Policy with Taiwan Unchanged," FBIS, China, June 29, 
1989, p. 59; "Commentary Reaffirms Commitment to Trade," FB/S, China, July 24, 1989, 
p. 83; "Trade Official Interviewed on Mainland Trade," FB/S, China, June 30, 1989, p. 57. 
26 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
"Taiwan Independence." The PRC, through its controlled media, se-
verely criticized this view.67 Finally, an article published in the 
Liaowang (The Outlook) Weekly of November 27, 1989, implied the 
use of force could be used to eliminate the Taiwan independence 
movement by stating: 
The flood of thought of "Taiwan independence" on the is-
land will cause some very bad influences to the development 
of relations across the strait and for the Taiwan authorities. 
1. To some extent, it will disrupt the stable develop-
ment of Taiwan. At present, Taiwan is at the stage of polit-
ical change, transforming itself from the despotic and 
totalitarian "anticommunist martial law system" to an "in-
complete" form of "democratic politics." Owing to the esca-
lation of speeches and activities for "Taiwan independence," 
the ruling authority in Taiwan has been "shaken." This will 
necessarily intensify the "struggle between reunification and 
independence" and cause a tense relation between the Kuo-
mintang and the opposition forces. Under external and in-
ternal pressure, the Kuomintang will find that it cannot 
tolerate the open activities for "Taiwan independence," 
which will weaken and shake the foundation of its rule. Re-
cently, the Kuomintang authorities have announced that 
"any words or activities advocating 'Taiwan independence' 
must shoulder legal responsibility," and that the persons in-
volved will be investigated and prosecuted. This will cause 
opposition or even conflict between both sides, and bring 
about "chaotic" clashes in the election for government posts 
in the end of this year, making Taiwan's already confused 
67. E.g., see following table: 
News Media Date 
New China October 27, 
New Agency 1989 
New China November 7, 
News Agency 1989 
Title of Article 
There is Only One China is Our Unshaken 
Stand 
Unbridled View on "Taiwan" 
Independence" within Island of Taiwan 
Causing Attention 
Wen Hui Po, November 8, Behind the Unbridled Activities of Taiwan 
Hong Kong 1989 Independence [Movement] ==~==~------~~------
China News November 17, Watching "Election Campaign" Across the 
Agency 1989 Sea 
China News November 23, Opposing "Taiwan Independence" is the 
Agency 1989 Joint Responsibility of Both Sides of the 
Strait 
Source: World Journal, November 26, 1989, p. 7 
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situation at the stage of political change even more confused 
and jeopardizing the stable development of Taiwan in every 
aspect. 
2. It will . . . jeopardize . . . the development of rela-
tions across the strait. In the past few years, relations across 
the strait have become less tense, and various exchanges, in-
cluding visits by relatives across the strait, have developed; 
this is beneficial to China's reunification and is in conformity 
with the interests of the Chinese people. "Taiwan indepen-
dence" or the "Republic of Taiwan" will not be permitted by 
the PRC authorities and will not be accepted by the absolute 
majority of compatriots in the mainland. If it really hap-
pens, the PRC authorities must respect the will of the people 
in the whole country and react forcefully; this, I am afraid, 
would not be for the well-being of the people in Taiwan. At 
present, some people in Taiwan think that by relying on the 
factors such as support from the United States, even if Tai-
wan announces independence, the PRC will not "dare to use 
force." This is a very dangerous thought. To conclude, 
"Taiwan independence" can only bring disaster to Taiwan 
people, not welfare. 
3. It will increase difficulties for the opposition forces. 
The radical advocators of "Taiwan independence" can only 
create a "bad image" for themselves and their allies, scare 
away some people, and lose some votes in the election to be 
held at the end of this year. At the same time, they can only 
cause disputes and internal strife within the opposition forces 
or even within the Democratic Progressive Party to the ex-
tent that their normal growth is affected. . . . 68 
27 
Despite the PRC warning, candidates of the "New Country 
Front" did surprisingly well in the election as indicated in the follow-
ing table: 
68. Yao Yiping, "Guarding Against the Ideological Trends of 'Taiwan Independence' 
on the Island," Liaowang (The Outlook), overseas edition, No. 48 (November 27, 1989), p. 
22; translated in "Liaowang Speculates on Use of Force," FBIS, China, November 29, 
1989, p. 54. 
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Taiwan Taipei Kaobsiung 
City Provincial City City 
Le~slators Ma~strates Assembly Council Council 
Total 
Number 
of Seats 101 21 77 51 43 
Number of 
New Candidates 15 2 8 6 5 
County Elected 8 3 6 4 
Front Percentage 
of Popular 
Votes 7.79% 5.17% 4.81% 9.96% 6.47% 
Source: Chung-kuo Shih-2.ao (China Times), December 4, 1989, E· 2. 
If this trend for supporting Taiwan independence continues, 
tension in the Taiwan Strait will increase. Ironically, it is the PRC's 
policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community that helps 
the advocates of Taiwan independence, because they can make a 
seemingly convincing argument that only when Taiwan becomes 
independent can it break its present international isolation. At 
present, only a minority of people in Taiwan are convinced of this 
view. However, if Taiwan's international isolation engineered by the 
PRC continues, more people, out of frustration, may support the cause 
of Taiwan independence. 
VIII. NEW INITIATIVE FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
TO BREAK THE MAINLAND-TAIWAN 
STALEMATE AND THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S 
RESPONSE 
In order to break the stalemate in mainland-Taiwan relations, 
President Li Teng-hui took a new initiative in his inaugural speech of 
May 20, 1990.69 After reaffirming the position that "Taiwan and the 
mainland are indivisible parts of China's territory ... and all Chinese 
should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to 
achieve our common goal of national reunification,"70 he stated: 
I would like at this point to earnestly declare that, if the Chi-
nese communist authorities can recognize the overall world 
trend and the common hope of all Chinese, implement polit-
69. "Reportage on Li Teng-hui Inauguration Activities, Li Teng-hui Sworn in 20 
May," FB/S, China, May 21, 1990, pp. 61-63. 
70. Ibid., p. 62. 
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ical democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use 
of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not interfere with 
our development of foreign relations on the basis of a one-
China policy, we would be willing, on a basis of equality, to 
establish channels of communication, and completely open 
up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and tech-
nological exchange, to lay a foundation of mutual respect, 
peace, and prosperity. We hope then, when objective condi-
tions are ripe, we will be able to discuss our national reunifi-
cation, based on the common will of the Chinese people on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait.71 
29 
Two days later, at his press conference, President Li stated that 
"it is not necessary that all the three conditions I put forward are met 
before we can improve relations with the Mainland China," and "is-
sues can be dealt with one by one.'m He gave two examples of how 
the Chinese Communist authorities could show their sincerity toward 
Taiwan: refrain from opposing Taiwan's membership73 in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and pull back their armed 
forces along coastal areas by 300 kilometers (about 187 miles).74 
On June 11, 1990, Jiang Zemin, General Secretary ofthe Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee, responded to Lee's appeal at 
his speech delivered at the opening ceremony of a national conference 
on the work of the united front. Jiang repeated the earlier call for 
"talks on a reciprocal basis between the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Kuomintang [KMT, Nationalist Party]," but made a minor 
concession on allowing other parties to participate in the talk. He said 
that before the negotiation between the Communist Party and the 
Kuomintang could get underway, all political parties and people's or-
ganizations must be consulted; during the negotiations, they would be 
well-informed and their opinions would be solicited. Representatives 
from these parties and people's organizations may also be invited to 
attend the negotiations. Jiang rejected the "one China, two govern-
ments" concept, 75 which he apparently considered as implied in Presi-
71. Ibid., p. 63. 
72. "President Li Teng-hui Holds News Conference," FBIS, China, May 24, 1990, p. 
68. 
73. In early 1990, the Republic of China applied to join the GATT under the name of 
"Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs Territory." See, "ROC GATT Title A 
Mouthful," Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 8, 1990), p. 1. 
74. See, supra, note 72. 
75. "Party Chief Stands for One China and Two-Party Negotiation," Beijing Review, 
Vol. 33, No. 25 (June 18-24, 1990), p. 7. 
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dent Li's calling on establishing "channels of communication" on "a 
basis of equality." 
Jiang also said that the exchange of mail, trade, and air and ship-
ping services should be realized prior to formal negotiations and that 
specific problems that emerge in the exchanges may be dealt with 
through consultations between appropriate authorities. He did not, 
however, respond to President Li's call for not opposing Taiwan's 
membership at the GA TT76 and pulling out troops from the coast. He 
also criticized President Li's call for the Chinese Communists to im-
plement political democracy and a free economic system by pointing 
out that "some of [Li's] remarks ... were quite improper and lacked 
sincerity. " 77 
While Jiang's response to Li's initiative was generally negative, 
the tune of his speech was mild and moderate. Articles before and 
subsequently appearing on PRC-controlled medias, however, severely 
criticized President Li's position. 78 
The ROC responded to Jiang's June 11, 1990 speech on the same 
day. Commenting on Jiang's speech, Chiu Chin-i, spokesman of the 
ROC Presidential Office, stated that President Li's speech made no 
mention of "one country, two governments," and the Chinese Com-
munists' strong criticism and their response, which indicate a lack of 
good intentions, also bear out the fact that they have not changed their 
attitude and nature. 79 
76. On October 19, 1989, the spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry stated that after 
the ''restoration" of Chinese membership at the GAIT, then there is a possibility for Tai-
wan, as a province of China, to join the GAIT. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), October 
20, 1989, p. 1. In August 1990, a PRC responsible official in charge of economic and trade 
affairs, reiterated the above position. "Official of Economic and Trade Ministry Talks on 
the Question of Taiwan's Participation in the GAIT," Liaowang, No. 33 (August 13, 
1990), p. 5. 
77. See, supra, note 75. 
78. E.g., see, "Xinhua on Li Teng-hui Inaugural Speech," FBIS. China, May 22, 1990, 
p. 77; Commentary by Kan Cheng entitled "Li Teng-hui Proposes Three Conditions for 
Communication Between the Two Sides of the Strait" released by the PRC's Zhongguo 
Tongxun She, in "Commentary Views Conditions, FBIS. China, May 23, 1990, p. 74; 
Huangfu Chi, "Li Teng-hui's Remarks; Plus Annotation Equals Empty Talk," Hong Kong 
Ta Kung Pao, May 20, 1990, p. 4, translated in "Ta Kung Pao Views Remarks," FBIS, 
China, May 23, 1990, pp. 74-76; Shih Chun-yu, "Political Talk: Beijing's Reaction to Li 
Teng-hui's Inaugural Speech," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, May 22, 1990, p. 2, translated in 
"Beijing Reaction Viewed," FBIS, China, May 23, 1990, pp. 76-77 and Wang Kuai, "Look-
ing at the 'Policy Toward the Mainland' Through the 'Inaugural Speech,' " released by the 
PRC's Zhongguo Xinwen She, translated in "Commentary Views Li Teng-hui Inaugural 
Speech," FBIS. China, June 7, 1990, pp. 62-63. 
79. "Spokesman on Jiang's Remarks on 'Taiwan Issue,'" FBIS, China, June 14, 1990, 
p. 65. 
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Despite the lack of positive response from the PRC on President 
Li's initiative, the ROC has continued its effort to normalize its rela-
tions with the mainland. It is now working on lifting the ban on mem-
bers of the Chinese Communist Party visiting Taiwan. 80 To resolve 
legal issues involving the mainland, the ROC decided to adopt the 
concept of "one country, two regions [areas]" so that some PRC laws 
and regulations may be applied by Taiwan administrative agencies or 
courts through conflict of law principles.81 
In early September 1990, representatives of the Red Cross Com-
mittees of the mainland and Taiwan conducted talks at Quemoy 
(Kinmen) on the problem of repatriating mainlanders who illegally 
went to Taiwan and reciprocal repatriation of criminals. 82 As this is 
an unofficial contact, the ROC considers it did not violate the "three 
nos" principles. 
IX. THE ROC'S GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL 
UNIFICATION AND THE PRC'S RESPONSE 
President Li Ten-hui of the Republic of China (ROC) set up a 
National Unification Council in October 1990. The Council is headed 
by the President and has three vice-chairmen and 30 members repre-
senting a wide spectrum of Chinese interests at home and abroad. 
President Li also appointed 12 research members of the Council to 
study various aspects of mainland-Taiwan relations. 83 
On February 23, 1991, the Council adopted Guidelines for Na-
tional Unification which were approved by President Li on March 5, 
1991. According to the Guidelines, the unification process of China 
should go through three phases as stated below:84 
1. Short term - A phase of exchanges and 
reciprocity. 
(1) To enhance understanding between two sides 
of the Straits through exchange and eliminate hostility 
80. "CPC Members to Be Permitted to Enter Taiwan," FBIS. China, September 18, 
1990, p. 54. 
81. See "(ROC Executive] Yuan Proposes 'One Country, Two Regions,'" FB/S, 
China, September 6, 1990, p. 60 and "Editorial Lauds 'One Country, Two Areas' Con-
cept," FB/S, China, September 10, 1990, pp. 57-58. 
82. See, Shih-chiehjih-pao (World Journal), New York, September 20, 1990, p. 8 and 
"Agreement on Repatriating Mainland Stowaways," FB/S, China, September 20, 1990, p. 
68. 
83. Huang Jen-yu, "New National Council Places ROC Squarely Behind Unification," 
The Free China Journal, Vol. VII, No. 78 (October 11, 1990), p. 4. 
84. The Free China Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 18 (March 11, 1991), p. 1. 
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through reciprocity; and to establish mutually benign rela-
tions by not endangering each other's safety and stability 
while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other's 
existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting 
reciprocity. 
(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the 
Straits, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to 
establish intermediary organizations in order to protect peo-
ple's rights and interests on both sides of the Straits; to grad-
ually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people 
contacts in order to promote the social prosperity of both 
sides. 
(3) To improve the people's welfare on both sides 
of the Straits with the ultimate objective of unifying the na-
tion, economic reform should be actively carried out in the 
mainland area, the expression of public opinion there should 
gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of 
law should be implemented; while the Taiwan area should 
accelerate constitutional reform and promote national con-
struction to establish a society of equal prosperity. 
(4) The two sides of the Straits should end the 
state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve 
all disputes by peaceful means, and furthermore respect -
not reject- each other in the international community, so 
as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation. 
2. Medium term - A phase of mutual trust and 
cooperation. 
(1) Both sides of the Straits should establish offi-
cial communication channels on equal footing. 
(2) Direct postal, transport and commerce links 
should be allowed, and both sides should jointly develop the 
southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then 
gradually expand this to other areas of the mainland in order 
to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides. 
(3) Both sides of the Straits should work together 
and assist each other in taking part in international organiza-
tions and activities. 
(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both 
sides should be promoted to create favorable conditions for 
consultation and unification. 
3. Long term - A phase of consultation and 
unification. 
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A consultative organization for unification should 
be established through which both sides, in accordance with 
the will of the people on both the mainland and Taiwan, and 
while upholding the principles of democracy, economic free-
dom, social justice and nationalization of armed forces, 
jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a 
constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and eq-
uitably prosperous China. 
33 
The Guidelines were adopted on March 14, 1991 by the Execu-
tive Yuan Council (Cabinet) as guiding principles for dealing with 
mainland-Taiwan relations. Earlier, the Executive Yuan established a 
Mainland Affairs Commission to take charge of mainland-Taiwan re-
lations. A "private" Strait Exchange Foundation was also established 
to make unofficial contacts and negotiations with the Chinese commu-
nist authorities on the mainland. The Foundation is funded two-
thirds by the Government .and one-third by private contribution. It is 
specifically authorized to undertake the following tasks: 
(1) Accepting, ratifying and forwarding on entry and 
exit documents from the two sides of the Straits; 
(2) Verifying and delivering documents issued on the 
mainland; 
(3) Deporting fugitives on the two sides of the Straits; 
(4) Arbitrating trade disputes; 
(5) Promoting cultural and academic exchanges; 
(6) Providing consultation on general affairs; 
(7) Helping protect the legal rights of ROC citizens 
during their visits to the mainland; and 
(8) Dealing with other affairs commissioned by the 
ROC government. 85 
X. THE PRC'S RESPONSE TO THE UNIFICATION 
GUIDELINE AND THE ROC'S TERMINATION OF 
THE STATE OF HOSTILITIES TOWARD 
THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS 
The language and tone used in the Unification Guidelines are 
quite conciliatory and mild. The Guidelines also avoid any offensive 
language against the Chinese communists. It does not explicitly de-
mand the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, nor does 
85. "Coordinating Mainland Affairs," The Free China Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 14 (Feb-
ruary 25, 1991), p .. 
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it require the PRC to give up the so-called four basic principles, 
namely, the socialist road, the People's Democratic Dictatorship, the 
leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. With respect to the PRC's "one country, two sys-
tems" model for unification, the Guidelines do not categorically reject 
it, but imply that at the third phase (long term) of unification process, 
every model for unification is negotiable as long as it is based on the 
principle of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and national-
ization of armed forces. 
The PRC has so far not yet officially responded to the Unification 
Guidelines, though several commentators have taken a somewhat crit-
ical view of the Guidelines. 86 Among their major criticisms are: 
( 1) "Three direct links," i.e., direct trade, direct invest-
ment and direct air and shipping services should be moved to 
the short term phase, rather than remain in the medium term 
phase. 
(2) "Not denying [each other's] existence as a political 
entity" means "two Chinas" which is not acceptable to the 
PRC. 
(3) Taiwan attempts to promote peaceful changes on 
the mainland by bringing about China's unification on the 
basis of democracy, freedom, and equal distribution of social 
wealth, i.e., unifying China on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Prin-
ciples of the People, which is rejected. 
The PRC has not published the entire text of the Guidelines in its 
official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily).87 On the contrary, in recent 
years, all major newspapers in Taiwan usually publish the full text of 
the Chinese communists' documents on Taiwan or other important 
subjects. 
On May 1, 1991, the ROC terminated the "Period of Mobiliza-
tion for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,"88 which was 
86. E.g., see "Taiwan's Reunification Program Challenged," [Bao Xin, "Letter from 
Beijing," in Liaowang Overseas Edition, No. 10 (March 11, 1991), p. 2], FB/S, China, 
March 20, 1991, pp. 81-82; Commentator, "On Taiwan's 'National Unification Guide-
lines'," Renmin Ribao (People's daily), March 18, 1991, reprinted in Shih-chieh jih-pao 
(World journal), New York, March 18, 1991, p. 2; and" 'Random Talk' Studies Reunifica-
tion Guidelines," FB/S, China, May 7, 1991, p. 69. 
87. But it was published in Cankao Ziliao (Reference Materials), which is distributed 
only to high officials. 
88. "Li Addresses News Conference, Ends Mobilization," FBIS. China, May 3, 1991, 
p. 51 and "ROC terminates hostilities toward Peking," The Free China Journal, Vol. VII, 
No. 32 (May 2, 1991), p. 1. 
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announced on July 4, 1947, thus formally ending the state of hostility 
toward the Chinese Communists. 
On June 7, 1991, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued a statement on 
mainland-Taiwan relations. 89 After rejecting the "equal political enti-
ties" and "changing the mainland peacefully" concepts allegedly advo-
cated by the "Taiwan authorities" (ROC), the statement again calls 
for establishing three direct links and urges the Chinese Nationalist 
Party to send representatives to contact the CCP "so that conditions 
can be created for negotiations in connection with formally ending the 
two sides' hostility and achieving peaceful reunification step by step." 
It further states that "under the premise of upholding the principle 
that there is but one China, we can also discuss other issues which the 
Taiwan authorities are concerned about." It also offers to send a Chi-
nese Communist Party delegation to Taiwan to discuss the unification 
issue or welcomes the Chinese Nationalist Party to send a delegation 
to the mainland to establish contacts. 
The next day, ROC Government Spokesman Dr. Yu-ming Shaw 
rejected the Chinese Communist Party's offer for party-to-party con-
tacts and considered that the Chinese Communist Party's statement 
"lacks new meaning [and] does not contain any good intention." 
"Before the Chinese Communists renounce the use of military force to 
invade Taiwan and refrain from exerting diplomatic isolation against 
us, their offer to send a delegation to Taipei for a party-to-party talk 
would be absolutely unacceptable," he said.90 
With respect to the question of establishing "three direct links" 
(trade, investment, and air and shipping services), Shaw said that 
"they are listed as the second stage [phase] of cross-strait development 
under our National Unification Guidelines," and would only be made 
possible when the communists commit to stop threatening to use force 
against us and isolating us from international community."91 
On July 2, 1991, the National Unification Council decided not to 
make further comments on the Chinese communist statement of June 
7, 1991. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the above study, it seems clear that there is almost no 
89. "CPC Office Issues Statement on Ties," FB/S, China, May 7, 11991, pp. 70-71. 
90. "Mainland Delegation's Proposed Visit Rejected," FB/S, China, June 12, 1991, p. 
58. 
91. Ibid. 
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possibility for the PRC and the ROC to reach an agreement on unifi-
cation in the foreseeable future - though cultural, commercial and 
other contacts between them will continue. However, the rise of the 
Taiwan independence movement as indicated in the December 2, 1989 
Taiwan election has introduced an unstable element in mainland-Tai-
wan relations. If this movement continues, even the present cultural, 
commercial and other contacts between the mainland and Taiwan will 
be in jeopardy. The PRC may renew its military threat against Tai-
wan to deter the expansion of the independence movement. Since the 
Taiwan independence movement is primarily a response to the PRC's 
policy to isolate Taiwan in the international community, unless the 
PRC modifies this policy, it seems likely that this movement will con-
tinue to spread in Taiwan. Moreover, as long as the PRC maintains 
its present policy of anti-democratic reform on the mainland, thus 
widening the political, economic and social gaps between Taiwan and 
the mainland, the PRC's call for unification will have little appeal to 
the Chinese people on Taiwan. 
The PRC has been demanding complete and direct exchange of 
mail, trade, and air and shipping services before formal negotiation. 
In view of the PRC's lack of positive response to President Li's initia-
tive, as expressed in his inaugural speech and the Guidelines for Na-
tional Unification, it is unlikely that the ROC will respond positively 
to such a demand. Moreover, even if direct exchange of mail, trade, 
and air and shipping services were established between the mainland 
and Taiwan, it will not necessarily follow that the ROC and its people 
will be willing to enter unification negotiations with the PRC on the 
latter's proposal of "one country, two systems." Hong Kong has di-
rect exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services with the 
mainland for many years. The people of Hong Kong have, however, 
responded negatively to the PRC's decision to unify on the basis of 
"one country, two systems" as embodied in the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by the PRC National 
People's Congress in 199 U 2 Since the adoption of the Basic Law, the 
people of Hong Kong have accelerated their immigration to other 
countries to avoid living under "one country, two systems" after the 
Chinese Communist takeover on July 1, 1997.93 
As the PRC has insisted on "party-to-party" negotiations with 
Taiwan and refused to consider President Li's call for establishing 
92. See, supra, note 18. 
93. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Increases Emigration Estimates," New York Times, 
September 9, 1990, p. 5. 
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"channels of communication" on "a basis of equality"; high level con-
tacts between Taiwan and the mainland do not appear to be possible in 
the foreseeable future. However, "unofficial" contacts, such as 
through Red Cross Committees of Taiwan and the Mainland, tore-
solve non-political issues will continue. 

CHAPTER III 
FEDERATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
CHINA'S UNIFICATION1 
Quansheng Zhao 
The issue of Taiwan's unification with China is closely linked to 
China's political development. There has been an increasing consen-
sus that unificiation will have a significant impact on the process of 
political pluralization on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
The Mainland-Taiwan separation, a direct outcome of the late 
1940's civil war, has now existed for more than forty years. The civil 
war and the long separation inevitably have had a great impact on the 
political development of both sides. The issue of unification, although 
with different interpretations, has been equally important to people on 
both sides, and especially to the two ruling parties, the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) on the Mainland and the Nationalist Party 
(KMT) in Taiwan. 
This chapter will elaborate a theme I raised in 1983 that, "Unifi-
cation can promote smooth development of democratic processes on 
both sides,"2 and will analyze how unification may promote China's 
democratization. A related subject is what kind of nation system will 
be most suitable for the PRC-Taiwan unification. I will first discuss 
the concept of federation and the ideas of federalism, and then will 
examine the relationship between unification and democratization. 
UNIFICATION AND FEDERATION 
In addition to political considerations, one of the major obstacles 
to China's unification is the traditional idea of authoritarian central 
government, which seems to have significant influence over China's 
political leaders. But one has to consider the current political reality. 
The division between the Mainland and Taiwan has lasted for more 
than four decades. Neither side is willing to give up its own political 
1. A part of this chapter was published as an article entitled "One Country Two 
Systems and One Country Two Parties: PRC-Taiwan Unification and Its Political 
Implications," Pacific Review, Vol. 2, No.4, 1989, pp. 312-319. 
2. Quansheng Zhao, "An Analysis of Unification: The PRC Perspective," Asian Sur-
vey, Vol. 23, No. 10, October 1983, pp. 1081-1114. 
(39) 
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and economic system. Furthermore, unification brought about 
through the use of military force is unacceptable to either side. 3 
Therefore, the notion of a united China under an authoritarian central 
government is neither achievable nor desirable. Other possibilities for 
peaceful unification must be examined. 
The federal system is one of several major proposals for China's 
unification. "Federation" is a concept rooted in Western political sys-
tems, and in a general sense can be defined as: "a group of states 
united with one government which decides foreign and defense affairs; 
but in which each state can have its own government to decide its 
internal affairs. " 4 Hence, the federal system has two distinct charac-
teristics: First, there is a clear division of labor between the central 
and local governments in terms of administrative power; second, local 
governments have a high degree of autonomy with regard to internal 
affairs. 
In the contemporary world, there are many countries that have 
adopted the federal system, and it appears that the system is particu-
larly suitable to large countries, such as the United States, the Soviet 
Union, India, Canada, Australia, Germany, Pakistan, and Brazil 
(there are also smaller federalist countries such as Malaysia, Yugosla-
via, Argentina, and Switzerland). Countries choose the federal system 
primarily as a result of historical background, social structure, and 
political culture. Furthermore, there are different types of federal sys-
tems, for example, the federal system in the Soviet Union is different 
from that of the United States in terms of basic political and economic 
structures. 
There are several advantages to the federal system, the most obvi-
ous being the creation of an environment that will simultaneously en-
able a country to be a united political entity, while allowing for 
pluralistic development in the fields of politics, economy, and culture. 
This arrangement can best serve different political, ethnic, and cultural 
groups and areas, and promote evolutionary rather than radical 
changes in a society. 
A weakness of the federal system is that the power of the central 
authorities can be diminished by localism and separatist tendencies, as 
in the case of Canada, where Quebec has long struggled to achieve 
more autonomy (and sometimes even independence) from the federa-
3. Beijing has promised that it will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan moves 
towards independence. See further discussion later on this issue. 
4. See, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Essex, England: Longman 
Group, 1978, p. 401. 
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tion. Overall, however, the post-World War II development of most 
federalist countries (such as the United States) has demonstrated that 
the authority of the central (federal) government has not been weak-
ened, but strengthened. With proper handling, such as the accordance 
of adequate recognition to a local government's special interests, local-
ism and separatism can gradually be overcome. 
The suitability of a federal system for China depends on China's 
political and social reality. China's division into three parts - the 
Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao5 - was primarily due 
to foreign imperialism and the internal civil war of the 1940s between 
the CCP and the KMT. Future relations between the Mainland and 
Hong Kong and Macao are relatively clear, although many concrete 
issues remain unresolved. The future status of Hong Kong, for exam-
ple, has been set by the Sino-British Agreement of 1984. This agree-
ment covers the future of Hong Kong from 1997 until well into the 
next century. Portugal and China have also reached an agreement on 
Macao. By comparison, the status of Taiwan and Mainland-Taiwan 
relations are still very much uncertain. Where is China heading -
Will the division continue to exist well into the future, or is unification 
possible under certain arrangements, such as the federal system? 
These questions deserve special attention. 
Although the tradition of a single authoritarian central govern-
ment will be a major obstacle to the creation of a federal system, the 
idea of federalism is not new to China's political and intellectual lead-
ers. As early as 1894, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Repub-
lic of China, advocated the establishment of a "united government" in 
the new China. Sun's idea was influenced by his understanding of the 
federal system adopted by the United States. After the 1911 Revolu-
tion, Sun began to emphasize the idea of "local self-government," 
which was similar to federalism. 
Liang Qichao, a leading Chinese thinker in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, also looked at the federal systems of other countries as 
a reference for China's political reform movement. In an article pub-
lished in 1901 Liang examined the experience of Switzerland saying, 
"if there is a big country that could follow the example of Switzerland 
to adopt the federal system and to be democratic, then this country's 
strength and freedom will strike the whole world. This big country 
5. Although there is close linkage between the issue of Taiwan and the issue of Hong 
Kong and Macao, the two are different in nature. I will try not refer to the latter in great 
detail here. 
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will become an example for all the countries in the world. " 6 This "big 
country" in Liang's mind was China. 
During this period, many scholars and politicians in China partic-
ipated in discussions on the idea of federalism. Zhang Shizhao, for 
example, in his article published in 1915 discussed three points: 
"First, local state government can be organized after the establishment 
of the central federal government. Second, local state government is 
not an independent state. Third, to carry out a federal system, there is 
no need to conduct a revolution; what is needed is the influence of 
public opinion. "7 Other scholars who advocated federalism or "local 
self-government" include Zhang Taiyan, Hu Shi, Li Zhaonong, Xiong 
Xiling, and Zou Rong. 8 
Chinese communist leaders during the 1919 May Fourth Move-
ment also expressed support for federalist ideas. For example, Mao 
Zedong advocated self-government for Hunan Province. Chen Duxiu, 
the first CCP Secretary General, argued that, "We communists do not 
oppose federalist ideas, and support provincial self-government. What 
we are against is the division of the country."9 In 1922, the CCP made 
a clear statement in the communique of the second National Congress, 
that one of the goals of the CCP is to unify China through a free feder-
alist system, and to establish the Federal Republic of China. 
Obviously, all these discussions took place at different times and 
under different circumstances, and may not be suitable for the current 
situation. At present, leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not 
show any support for federalist ideas for China's unification. But this 
does not mean federalism should not be discussed. In order to clarify 
ideas and achieve a consensus on issues, it is necessary to discuss fed-
eralist ideas and their implications for China's political development 
fully. In fact, beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars proposed 
that the federal system may be an ideal way for China to achieve its 
goal of peaceful unification. 10 
6. Liang Qichao, "Rousseau xuean [The case of Rousseau studies]," Yinbinshi Quanji, 
Vol. 3, 1901, p. 110. 
7. Zhang Shizhao, "Xueli shang zhi lianbang lun [The theories of federalism]," Jiayin, 
Vol. 1, No. 5, 1915. 
8. For detailed accounts, see Qian Zhenming and Zhou Zidong, "Jindai zhongguo 
lianbangzhi sixiang de lishi kaocha [A historical examination on federalist ideas in modern 
China]," Zhengzhixue Yanjiu, Vol. 5, 1988. 
9. Chen Duxiu, "Liansheng zizhi yu zhongguo zhengxiang [United provincial self-
government and China's political development]," Xiangdao, Vol. 1, 1920. 
10. See, for example, Zhang Xin, "Lianbangzhi: zhongguo hepingtongyi zhi tu? [Is 
federal system suitable for China's peaceful unification?], Minbao Yuekan, July 1983; and 
Jiang Jingkuan, "Zhongguo tongyi zuilixiang de tujing - shixing lianbang gonghezhi [The 
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A new development in Beijing is worthy of attention. In 1991 
Beijing made it clear that it would support Kim 11 Sung's "federal 
system" idea for Korean unification, that is "one nation, one country, 
two systems and two governments." 11 In addition, it is believed that 
Beijing played a key role in Pyongyang's dramatic reversal of its policy 
on the issue of United Nations membership by seeking separate mem-
berships together with Seoul in May 1991Y Immediately after North 
Korea's announcement seeking separate U. N. membership, Chinese 
Premier Li Peng commented positively that this move was "an interim 
measure before the unification," and would be "welcomed by interna-
tional community, including China." 13 This fact has signaled Beijing's 
positive attitude toward the federal system idea and its possible appli-
cation to the course of national unification, at least in the case of 
Korea. 
UNIFICATION AND POLITICAL PLURALIZATION 
The second concern of this chapter is the impact that future 
peaceful unification will have on China's political development. My 
principal argument is that the unification policy of "one country, two 
systems" 14 proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of "one 
country, two (or more) parties."15 That is, the realization of unifica-
tion may become the starting point for a real multi-party system in 
China. There will be two major parties, the CCP and the KMT, and a 
few minor parties in China's political scene. This incremental devel-
opment will be, perhaps, an unintended consequence of unification. 
According to this model, unification will not be the simple process of 
combining two into one, but rather a process of social integration and 
interdependency of various political forces. 
In using the term "pluralism" I mean (1) there is no single source 
most ideal way for China's unification - the system of federal republic]," Zhongbao, 
March 12-13, 1984, p. 2. 
11. "China Backs DPRK Reunification Efforts," Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 20, May 
20-26, 1991, pp. 8-9. 
12. Damon Darlin, "North Korea Reverses Position on U.N., Seeks Admission Sepa-
rately From South," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 3, 1991, pp. 18 & 23. 
13. "Li Peng on Domestic and World Issues," Beijing Review, Vol. 34, No. 26, July 1-
7, 1991, pp. 24-29. 
14. See, Deng Xiaoping, "One Country, Two Systems," in Deng Xiaoping: Speeches 
and Writings (second edition), Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987, pp. 91-94. 
15. Political pluralization means a multi-party system, not necessarily only two parties. 
Later discussions concentrate mainly on the two big parties - the CCP and the KMT - in 
part this reflects the reality of the two major parties, but it also is used for the sake of 
convenience. 
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of authority; therefore there is no concentration of power in the sense 
of the absolutist state; (2) political and non-political groups have a 
legitimate right to exist and to influence the state; these groups may 
include, for example, "business organizations, trade unions, political 
parties, ethnic groups, students, prison officers, women's institutes and 
religious groups;"16 and (3) these groups must be "organized into an 
unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchi-
cally ordered and self-determined categories.'m 
Prior to the 1989 turmoil on the Mainland, there were far-reach-
ing political and economic changes under the banner of "openness and 
reforms," which began at the end of 1978. Market economy, as em-
phasized in 1987 by now-purged Party Secretary General Zhao 
Ziyang, became a "new economic mechanism." 18 Economic reforms 
covered a wide area and included the dissolution of the commune sys-
tem in rural areas and the establishment of the responsibility system; 
the opening up of free markets for agricultural goods; the development 
of private enterprise; the enlargement of the entrepreneurial base and 
the granting of additional power to managers; the revival of material 
incentive systems; the reduction of ideological intervention in the 
economy; the undertaking of price reforms and housing system re-
forms; the initiation of open-labor markets; and the dismantling the 
"iron rice bowl" system. Changes in the area of "openness" to the 
outside were also impressive: China joined the world (especially west-
ern) economic system; established special economic zones and opened 
coastal cities; encouraged foreign investment and joint ventures; ex-
ported labor abroad; developed tourist industries; and reformed its 
foreign trade system. 
In contrast to China's achievements in the area of economic re-
form, political reform on the Mainland has remained sensitive and tor-
tuous. The party elders who have controlled the decision-making 
power of the party and the government for the last four decades are 
still tremendously resistant to political changes. The government's 
military suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 
shows that the conservatives are willing to pay any price to preserve 
16. David Held, Models of Democracy, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1987, p. 189. 
17. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," in Philippe Schmitter, ed., 
Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 
1979, p. 15. 
18. Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteris-
tics,'' in Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987, pp. 10-11. 
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their own power and interests. The crackdown on the pro-democracy 
movement has delayed or even reversed the political reform of the 
Mainland, inevitably jeopardizing the process of unification with 
Taiwan. 
Internal changes in Taiwan are also notable. Taiwan's economic 
and political development has drawn world-wide attention. Ever since 
high-speed economic growth began in the late 1960s, Taiwan has been 
labeled one of the "four little tigers," or East Asian NIEs (newly in-
dustrialized economies), together with South Korea, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. As economic growth accelerated, the democratic move-
ment in Taiwan has progressed remarkably. The most well-known op-
position groups were called Dangwai- the non-KMT forces- which 
challenged the KMT's ruling position vigorously. The KMT's top 
leaders carried out a series of political reforms under intense pressure 
from both within and outside the island. 19 These reforms included 
repealing the thirty-eight-year old martial law in 1987, legalizing op-
position parties, allowing the news media greater freedom, and recruit-
ing native Taiwanese into the highest levels of the ruling circle, which 
reduced tensions between "the Taiwanese" and "the Mainlanders" on 
the Island. 20 The most striking sign of progress, as I will discuss later, 
is the change in policy toward the Mainland. 
In sum, economic modernization and political democratization 
- the two major goals for future development - will gradually be 
accepted by the majority on each side of the Strait. They will lay the 
foundations for future unification. The slow progress of internal polit-
ical development on the Mainland, however, means that unification 
will be a prolonged and incremental process. 
CHANGING MAINLAND-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
There have been significant changes in Mainland-Taiwan rela-
tions since 1979, when Beijing changed its Taiwan policy from "libera-
tion" to "peaceful unification," advocating "three links" (trade, 
transportation, and postal services) and "four exchanges" (exchanges 
between relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and 
19. See, Robert Sutter, Taiwan: Entering the 21st Century. Lanham and New York: 
University Press of America, 1988, pp. 45-60. 
20. "Mainlander" refers to those who moved to Taiwan from the Mainland after 1945, 
when Taiwan was returned to China from the Japanese colonial rule; and "Taiwanese" 
refers to those who were originally from the Chinese mainland, mostly from Fujian Prov-
ince, but have lived in Taiwan for many generations. In fact, this distinction comes from 
the people in Taiwan. The people on the Mainland do not really distinguish the "Main-
lander" from the "Taiwanese," but consider both fellow countrymen. 
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sports representatives). Development ofbilateral relations gained fur-
ther momentum in October 1987, when Taiwanese authorities made a 
dramatic move - allowing their citizens to visit Mainland relatives -
reversing the stubborn, long-standing "three nos" policy (no contact, 
no negotiations, and no compromise), A year later, in a much more 
limited manner, specific groups from the Mainland were allowed to 
visit the island. Bilateral contacts have since increased tremendously. 
At the beginning stage, the following groups of people from the 
Mainland were allowed to visit Taiwan: those whose relatives in Tai-
wan just died or have been seriously sick; those left on the Mainland 
in 1949 as soldiers of the KMT troops who were originally from Tai-
wan; and those who are invited (or selected) as "distinguished intel-
lectuals," such as scholars (including overseas students and scholars) 
and sports representatives. The policy on Mainland visitors is ex-
pected to be further relaxed. In August 1991, two news reporters from 
the Mainland visited Taiwan with formal arrangements by the Taiwan 
authorities. 21 
In 1988, right after the removal of the ban, more than 380,000 
people from Taiwan visited the Mainland, among those more than 40 
percent were not "Mainlanders" but "Taiwanese" who did not neces-
sarily have Mainland relatives. In 1989, the number of Taiwanese visi-
tors reached 500,000; exchange of mail exceeded ten million letters, 
encouraged by Taipei's decision to open direct telephone and mail 
links to the Mainland. Some 3,100 people from the Mainland visited 
Taiwan in 1989. In a highly publicized manner, a 12-member official 
delegation headed by Taiwan's Finance Minister Shirley Kuo visited 
Beijing in early May 1989, to attend the Asian Development Bank 
meeting. And in mid-1989 for the first time, the Taiwan authorities 
allowed their newspaper and television reporters to be based on the 
Mainland.22 Students from Taiwan have begun to enter graduate pro-
grams for advanced studies on the Mainland. In 1991, thirty-nine (in-
creased from 1990's twenty-three) Taiwanese students applied to 
Mainland universities - twenty six for master programs and sixteen 
for doctoral programs. 23 
The total value of indirect trade, mostly through Hong Kong, in-
creased more than ten times within one decade from US $300 million 
in 1980 to US $4 billion in 1990. Direct and indirect Taiwanese in-
vestment on the Mainland has also increased rapidly, despite the polit-
21. Renmin Ribao, August 13, 1991, p. 1. 
22. Carl Goldstein, "One, But Also Two," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 4, 1989, 
pp. 27-28. 
23. Renmin Ribao, February 25, 1991, p. 5. 
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ical turmoil of summer 1989. At the Guangzhou Trade Fair of spring 
1990, for example, more than 4,600 businessmen from Taiwan con-
ducted trade and investment negotiations with their Mainland part-
ners. By the end of 1990, the investment from Taiwan reached US 
$1.2 billion in Fujian Province alone, about one third of the province's 
total foreign investment. 24 
Since the late 1980s, Taipei has moved from its passive, defensive 
position to an active, pragmatic, and flexible policy, creating new chal-
lenges for Beijing. Since the end of the 1970s, when Beijing first raised 
proposals for peaceful unification, 25 the PRC has always actively cam-
paigned for unification, while the Taiwanese have long insisted on a 
"three-no" policy - no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise 
- a policy that appeared to be passive, rigid, and defensive. Starting 
in the late 1980s, however, Taipei launched a series of initiatives in its 
Mainland policy. In addition to legitimizing bilateral economic and 
cultural exchanges, Taiwan has also set up a top advisory group 
chaired by President Li Teng-hui - a thirty-member National Unifi-
cation Council - to bring about a consensus and to clarify long-term 
objectives in its Mainland policy.26 Under the Council, there is a pol-
icy-coordination working organ, the Mainland Affairs Commission 
(MAC). In November 1990, the Foundation for Exchanges Across 
the Taiwan Strait was established. At least half of the Foundation's 
funding comes from government sources, and the group is accountable 
to the Premier and the Legislative Yuan through the MAC. The 
Foundation hopes eventually to be allowed to open offices in Hong 
Kong and major cities on the Mainland.27 In April 1991, a delegation 
of the Foundation visited Beijing and held talks with Mainland offi-
cials, including Vice Premier Wu Xueqian. 
The Taiwanese authorities have also actively worked on their own 
formulas for unification. To counter Beijing's "one country, two sys-
tems" proposal, for example, Taipei raised its own proposal for unifi-
cation. In May 1990, Li Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, declared that, 
if Beijing can "implement political democracy and a free economic 
system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not 
24. Julian Baum, "Strait Expectations, Taiwan Businessmen Prepare for Direct Trade 
with China;· Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1991, pp. 40-41. 
25. "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" issued by the Standing Committee of 
China's National People's Congress, see Renmin Ribao, January 2, 1979, p. l. 
26. Julian Baum, "The Mainland Dilemma;· Far Eastern Economic Review, October 
18, 1990, pp. 29-32. 
27. Julian Baum, "Hands Across the Sea", Far Eastern Economic Review, December 6, 
1990, pp. 16-18. 
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interfere with our development of foreign relations on the basis of a 
one-China policy," then Taipei will be willing "to establish channels of 
communication, and completely open up academic, cultural, eco-
nomic, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges," and will discuss 
"national reunification [with Beijing] based on the common will of the 
Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." In June 1990, Shi 
Qiyang, Deputy Head of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, proposed the idea 
of "one China, two areas," advocating a "peaceful coexistence of two 
separate-but-equal regimes." Some Taiwanese officials further pro-
posed that Taipei should regard Beijing as a "politically competitive 
regime," preparing for the legalization of the status of the communist 
party.28 In return, Yang Shangkun, President of the PRC, suggested 
that once negotiations start, there is no need to clarify the issue of 
"central-local" (who is the central government and who is the local 
government).29 It is not beyond imagination that the time for holding 
official negotiations or even a summit on bilateral relations and the 
unification issue may eventually become mature in the foreseeable 
future. 
Other than unification with the Mainland, one possible path of 
development for Taiwan, according to some external and internal ob-
servers, is to become a legally independent state (or taidu in Chinese). 
Taidu is unlikely at the present time for the following reasons. First, 
the sense of Chinese nationalism and Chinese culture is deeply rooted 
on the island as well as on the Mainland. With the exception of oppo-
sition groups, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who 
openly demand "Taiwan's self-determination," there are few main-
stream politicians who can afford to become a /ishi zuiren (a person 
condemned by history) for splitting the nation. Second, the Mainland 
has persistently refused to give up using force against Taiwan if Taipei 
moves toward independence. Beijing has consistently opposed taidu 
and any other similar idea such as "one China, one Taiwan," or "dual 
recognition." A major criticism, for example, of Taiwan's "pro-
gramme for state reunification" are the concepts of Taiwan's "political 
entity" in the international community and diplomatic "dual recogni-
tion. " 30 The risk of war makes taidu an undesirable choice for 
Taiwan. 
28. Yang Liyu, "Cong yiguo liangzhi dao yiguo liang qi [From 'one country two sys-
tems' to 'one country two areas']," Zheng Ming, August 1990, pp. 76-78. 
29. See, Renmin Ribao, November 10, 1990, p. 1; for English version of Yang's talk, 
see, Beijing Review, Vol. 30, No. 48, November 26-December 2, 1990, pp. 11-17. 
30. See, Wu Daying, "On Taiwan Authorities' Programme," Beijing Review, Vol. 34, 
No. 27, July 8-14, 1991, pp. 33-35. 
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Third, the international community has looked on taidu with dis-
favor, ever since the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the 
United Nations in 1971. No major power in today's world would 
openly support a declaration of Taiwan's independence at the expense 
of breaking relations with the PRC and triggering a new crisis in the 
international community. In addition, the legal status of Taiwan as 
part of China has been accepted in a number of important interna-
tional documents, such as the Cairo Declaration of 1943 (signed by 
China, the United States, and Great Britain), the Sino-U.S. Shanghai 
Communique of 1972, and the statement establishing formal diplo-
matic relations between the PRC and the United States in 1979. All 
these internal and external conditions have made it extremely difficult 
for Taiwan to declare independence. 
On the other hand, as long as Taiwan maintains de facto separa-
tion from the Mainland, there will always be political forces from 
within and outside the island demanding taidu. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the longer the separation continues, the stronger Tai-
wan's tendency towards independence will become. This tendency 
will be further enhanced if there are major political setbacks on the 
Mainland, such as the Tiananmen incident. Under these circum-
stances, public opinion in the international community may become 
more sympathetic toward Taiwan. Therefore, while emphasizing the 
unlikeliness of taidu, one should not entirely rule out the possible 
evolution of Taipei toward independence. 
HOW UNIFICATION CAN PROMOTE CHINA'S 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
The unification process poses a series of questions regarding 
China's political development: How should the current political and 
economic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relation-
ship should exist between the political forces of each side, in particu-
lar, between the two ruling parties? Can the CCP and the KMT 
tolerate each other's activities under a federal system? Some of these 
questions have already been answered. Others remain unclear. 
The KMT's authority on Taiwan has been increasingly chal-
lenged by the DPP and other opposition parties. The CCP on the 
Mainland has also faced severe criticism from the pro-democracy 
movement and intellectual dissidents such as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, 
and Wang Ruoshui, who were openly expelled from the Party in early 
1987. Nevertheless, the present positions of the ruling KMT and CCP 
are the result of internal and external struggles that can be traced back 
to the 1911 Revolution or the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Based 
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on this historical background and on current conditions, the most 
probable development in the foreseeable future would be that the two 
parties will continue to play leading roles on each side. This assump-
tion only reflects the current situation and has nothing to do with the 
issue oflegitimate rule (that is broad-based popular support). One has 
to remember this when considering China's future choices. 
The influence of feudal monarchical rule that lasted over two 
thousand years in Chinese history still remains. The Soviet Stalinist 
political system has also had an influence, in varying degrees, on the 
two ruling parties. Neither side has yet reached a truly political insti-
tutionalization, a fact that is reflected in the uncertainty and abrupt-
ness of transfers of power at the highest levels - such as Hu 
Yaobang's sudden departure from his top position as General Secre-
tary of the CCP in January 1987, and the downfall of Hu's successor, 
Zhao Ziyang, in the wake of the 1989 crackdown on the Mainland. 
One key question has been around for several years and is still debated 
by scholars and politicians all over the world: Who will Deng Xiaop-
ing's real successor be and what will happen to China after Deng 
passes away (despite the propaganda campaigns that the new Party 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin has become the core for the "third 
generation leadership")? In Taiwan, the internal struggles for political 
leadership surrounding the issue of succession before and after the 
death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 also show an instability in 
power transfers. 31 Both examples demonstrate that the pattern of 
"strong man politics" is still influential on both sides. Taiwan's polit-
ical development during the past several years, however, has made 
greater progress than that of its Mainland counterpart. In fact, one 
may even argue that political pluralism may come to Taiwan well 
before unification. In tum, Taiwan's democratization will have a tre-
mendous impact on the Mainland, similar to the influence on East 
Germany exerted by the west prior to the Germany unification in 
1990. 
From the PRC perspective, the proposal of "one country, two 
systems" will only solve the external issue of "one China," not the 
internal issue of different social systems. Under the Mainland propo-
sal, for a long period (fifty years or more) after unification, the political 
31. Although the power transition in Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo's death was con-
stitutional in nature, and was consummated fairly swiftly, there were, however, serious 
internal power struggles with regard to KMT's chairmanship, involving such important 
political figures as Madam Chiang (widow of Chiang Kai-shek), Yu Guohua (Prime Minis-
ter), Li Huang (General Secretary of the KMT), Song Chuyu (Deputy Secretary of the 
KMT), and others. 
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and economic systems of each side will develop in their own direc-
tions. One can further argue that the political forces of each side will 
not be controlled by the other. The leading positions of the CCP and 
the KMT on the Mainland and Taiwan respectively will not be 
changed by unification. Therefore, unification will create a unique en-
vironment for China to start its own type of federal system. Exter-
nally, there will be a federal government that represents "one China." 
Internally, there will be two major political forces leading two areas 
(Beijing and Taipei), in roughly equal positions in the sense of political 
legitimacy, yet autonomous from each other. This reality will become 
the foundation for the model of "unification-led political 
pluralization." 
This model will be divided into two stages. The first stage can be 
called "cross-checking and mutual influence." During this period, im-
portant issues such as foreign and defense policies will be decided by 
the federal government led by Beijing in consultation with Taipei and 
other political forces. (Since the PRC has promised that Taiwan will 
be allowed to maintain its own armed forces after unification, Taiwan 
will reserve certain defense policy authority with regard to regional 
affairs, which in tum would involve some foreign policy considera-
tions. Beijing will not send its military forces, the People's Liberation 
Army, to Taiwan.) After consultation, new policies will be sent to the 
legislative and executive branches for approval and implementation. 
In this sense, the CCP will continue to be the ruling party; the KMT 
will switch to the position of non-ruling or opposition party. As a 
former high-ranking KMT official privately told me, "the KMT would 
not mind becoming an opposition party after unification, because the 
KMT's future is not on Taiwan, but on the Mainland." 
On the other hand, however, the internal affairs and external eco-
nomic relations of each side will be handled by their respective author-
ities, and will not intertwine. At this early stage, the two ruling parties 
and other forces will not deal with one another directly. Instead, they 
will send representatives to carry out various political functions, i.e., 
the KMT and opposition parties will participate in the leading bodies 
of the federal government in Beijing, whereas the CCP and the federal 
government will send representatives or liaison officials to Taiwan. In 
this sense, the KMT will continue to enjoy its ruling party position on 
the island, while the CCP will play the role of "opposition party" in 
terms of Taiwan's local politics, creating a seemingly symbolic yet 
very significant political structure. 
Non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean that mutual 
influence will not exist. Mutual political influence can be exercised 
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through the following four ways. First, representatives stationed on 
each side are entitled to raise suggestions and to criticize directly. Sec-
ond, since the news media will be, as now, controlled largely by the 
ruling party of its own side, the media coverage, style, and viewpoint 
of each side will still differ substantially (with control of news media, 
there is an asymmetry between the two sides. The Taiwanese news 
media has recently moved toward pluralism much faster and more ex-
tensively than its Mainland counterpart). After unification, it would 
be difficult to prohibit people from reading and watching the other 
side's news media (newspapers, periodicals, and TV programs). This 
will increase information sources in each society, and will effectively 
break the monopoly over the news media on the Mainland. Third, 
increasing exchange visits across the Taiwan Strait will open opportu-
nities for non-ruling party forces to exchange experiences and informa-
tion. These trends will bring further development to social and 
political groups in both societies. Finally, political reforms on both 
sides, growing in similar contexts and directions, will provide a chal-
lenge to each party, producing an environment of peaceful political 
competition. Any setback to the reforms will not only draw domestic 
and international criticism, but will slow, even stop, the unification 
process, damaging the interests of China as a whole. Conservatives of 
both sides will face tremendous difficulties "moving the clock back." 
The unique pattern of "cross-checking" has several implications. 
First of all, since the mutual influence is legal and independent, it will 
be difficult to stop even if the ruling parties attempt to do so. At the 
same time, however, this political checking will be rather limited. The 
checking itself is not a significant threat to the ruling parties' leading 
positions, thereby making it easier for the CCP and the KMT to toler-
ate each other. Furthermore, this limitation will slow the pluraliza-
tion process, thus avoiding political chaos and maintaining the stable 
social environment that is needed for continued economic growth and 
modernization. Cross-checking may also be welcomed by opposition 
parties and social groups because it will promote political pluralization 
and democratization. 
We have discussed the importance of mutual influence across the 
Taiwan Strait at this stage, but it would be wrong to assume that the 
CCP or the KMT could replace indigenous opposition forces on either 
Taiwan or the Mainland. Because the two have been separated for so 
many years, they have largely lost their roots on the other side. 
Hence, it will be easier for both sides to move toward pluralism if the 
new political forces are independent and indigenous organizations. 
In Taiwan, the opposition forces have obtained the right to form 
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political parties, and have begun to flourish in the past several. years. 
One may anticipate that as the current leadership on the mamland, 
which is composed of members of the older generation, passes away, 
new leaders from the younger generation may have to respond to the 
popular demand for more democracy. This has already been demon-
strated by the Lee Teng-hui administration in Taiwan. Under a fed-
eral system, both the ruling parties and citizens will likely become 
familiar with political competition, which will enhance conditions for 
both societies to progress towards a more plural and democratic stage. 
The experience of "cross-checking and mutual influence" will also 
greatly reduce or even eliminate hostile feelings and estrangement on 
each side and increase mutual understanding. Therefore, what I em-
phasize at the first stage is the limited "checking function" and "mu-
tual influence," which are different from "mutual penetration," or 
"real participation." After a long period (and it would be difficult to 
predict how long) of "cross-checking and mutual influence," the pro-
cess will move to the second stage. 
During the second stage, which I call "fair competition and plu-
ralistic politics," political forces of each side, including the two ruling 
parties, will be allowed to conduct political campaigns on the other's 
territory. These campaigns will be held under the principles of equal-
ity, democracy, and fair competition. This hypothetical development 
could only take place in the fairly remote future. No one can apply 
this idea to the current situation since the mutual suspicion between 
the two sides remains deep, and the internal conditions are not yet 
mature enough. By the time of the second stage, there will be a real 
co-existence of two major political parties and several small parties in 
Chinese political life. As various political forces continue to develop, 
it is not impossible that a third major party outside of the CCP and the 
KMT may emerge. Regardless of what kind of political situation ex-
ists during the second stage, the general trend towards political plural-
ization will continue. 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
Political change in general depends on various factors, including 
internal efforts, political and economic structures and their develop-
ment, historical and cultural background, and the international envi-
ronment. The political transformation of a society requires a period of 
preparation of the necessary conditions for such a transition. For a 
process as complex as "from an authoritarian government to a federal 
system," or "unification-led political pluralization," the following six 
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conditions will be necessary. Each of these conditions, if not met in 
the future, can give rise to obstacles in the unification process. 
First, the foundation of unification, or the federal system, is the 
formation of "one China" to include both the Mainland and Taiwan. 
The announcement of taidu (Taiwan's legal independence) would 
mean not only the cessation of the unification process, but could also 
mean the start of another civil war. As we discussed earlier, the Main-
land will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan asserts itself as 
an independent state. Since this is an important development in terms 
of the PRC's Taiwan policy, one would expect a full, high-level au-
thoritative confirmation from Beijing. As a first step, a formal bilat-
eral agreement containing phrases such as "no-taidu" and "no-use-of-
force" might be appropriate. This would help prevent taidu and cre-
ate a more relaxed atmosphere between the two. On the other hand, 
unification in which "the big one swallows the small one" would prob-
ably also lead to a civil war. This point must be remembered by the 
"big one." It is obvious that another civil war would seriously injure 
both the Mainland and Taiwan, and could constitute a major setback 
for political and economic development. 
Second, both sides will continue to develop their own political 
and economic strengths, which are the foundations for the principle of 
"one country, two systems." For quite a long time, each side will con-
tinue relatively independent operation of its internal affairs. This is 
what I call the stage of "cross-checking and mutual influence." This 
arrangement will give the CCP and the KMT, as well as the people on 
each side, enough room to prepare for the second stage - "fair com-
petition and pluralistic politics." Further reform and democratization 
within the ruling parties seems to be a key element for the future direc-
tions of political development. It is rational and logical to begin nego-
tiations when each side is healthy and strong both politically and 
economically. 
Third, there must be precise and feasible legal arrangements. 
This will become an important consideration once the negotiations 
open. The legal aspect is closely connected with the continued polit-
ical reforms on both sides. After the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo 
[who died in 1988] and Deng Xiaoping [who is still alive], "strongman 
politics" in both camps may gradually be phased out. It appears that 
in the future there will be a more institutionalized structure of political 
leadership. Under the influence of political and economic reform, 
"rule of man" will be replaced by "rule of law." In this regard, the 
future development of Hong Kong and Macao will serve as a touch-
stone for the reliability of the framework of "one country, two sys-
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terns.'' In fact, prior to the Beijing crackdown, the main trends 
already underway in Hong Kong were conducive to the realization of 
the model discussed in this article. With the military crackdown on 
the student demonstration, Hong Kong's confidence in Beijing was se-
riously damaged. Because Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as political 
insurance for each other, this loss of confidence in Hong Kong will 
inevitably have a significant impact on the people on Taiwan. It seems 
clear that the confidence of the Hong Kong population will not be 
restored until the eventual emergence of a new, more moderate leader-
ship after Deng Xiaoping. 
Fourth, economic and political reforms must be continuously 
pursued. The high-speed economic development and the rise in the 
standard of living on the Mainland may narrow the economic gap with 
Taiwan, facilitating unification. But, if development on the Mainland 
slows, the gap will widen and the unification process will likely be 
delayed. The current economic reforms on the Mainland, especially 
the establishment of "special economic zones" and open cities along 
the coast, have moved the Mainland markets from "potentiality" to 
reality. Meanwhile, Taiwan's enormous capital, advanced administra-
tive personnel, and its technologies in certain fields are increasingly 
needed by the Mainland. It is not difficult to predict that mutual eco-
nomic benefits, together with the close cultural and geographic con-
nection, will push bilateral private economic exchanges to a new level, 
well ahead of the official unification. More importantly, economic de-
velopment will increase each society's demand for political develop-
ment. This pressure is one of the basic foundations for political 
pluralization. 
Fifth, ideological considerations should be further cast off. On 
the issue of unification, national interests should precede all other con-
siderations. Other ideologies, such as "socialism," or "three principles 
of the people,'m are secondary. Therefore, under the principle of 
"one unified China" all issues should be negotiable, including a new 
name for the country and a new national flag and anthem. A simple 
name "China" (Zhongguo in Chinese), or "The Federal Republic of 
China,'' might be choices to replace both "The People's Republic of 
China" and "The Republic of China" that are currently used by the 
two sides respectively. Furthermore, one of the basic criteria for a 
32. It refers to Sun Yat-sen's three principles: nationalism, democracy, and "people's 
livelihood," used for the 1911 Revolution and the new republic. "Unifying China through 
the three principles of the people" is the official slogan of the KMT authorities in Taiwan. 
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democratic society is toleration of different ideologies. Freedom of 
thought and freedom of expression will be a basic law. 
Sixth, it is necessary for the cause of unification to have a peaceful 
and favorable international environment, especially in the Asia-Pacific 
area. That is to say, all major powers in this area- the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and Japan- should support, or at least not hinder, 
the process of China's unification. The current international environ-
ment is a favorable one. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Northeast 
Asia has remained relatively peaceful and stable. Both Mainland-Tai-
wan relations and relations between the major powers have improved. 
The international environment has also witnessed progress in 
other divided nations such as Germany and Korea, which will put 
additional pressure on the PRC's unification policy. The German 
model now has a new significance for other divided nations. It demon-
strates that national unification may be achieved through a long pro-
cess of peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition. The German 
experience shows that a temporary peaceful coexistence in the interna-
tional community may work better than open confrontation between 
two different regimes. This model is likely to facilitate national unifi-
cation, rather than lead to national division. South Korea's recent 
diplomatic breakthrough in its relations with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe has further isolated North Korea. In turn, the two 
Koreas have held several high-level (prime ministers) dialogues with a 
possible presidential summit in the future. Progress in Korea may 
place more pressure on Beijing. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this chapter is on the issues of China's unification 
and its prospects for the establishment of a federation system and 
political pluralization. It is a long transformation process from monist 
politics into pluralistic politics, yet there are growing demands for de-
mocracy throughout the entire East Asian area including the Main-
land and Taiwan. These demands are directly correlated with the 
high-speed economic growth of the area. The primary push for trans-
formation is from inside of each society. Influences from outside, for 
example from the West, are usually secondary. Patterns for the trans-
formation vary depending on historical background and economic and 
political conditions. Each individual state or area has its own pattern 
of development. In this sense, pluralistic politics is only a direction for 
political development. It does not, and cannot, provide concrete mod-
els for each society. 
In research on East Asian political development, I argued that 
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Japan developed into a democratic stage by adopting a model of "in-
formal pluralism." The model demonstrates that while Japan is simi-
lar to other democracies in terms of basic democratic structure, it has 
been able to maintain its own characteristics in political as well as 
economic development. 33 Therefore, "informal pluralism" has met Ja-
pan's strategic goals for development and met its own internal condi-
tions as well. 
It is not appropriate for a country to adopt another nation's polit-
ical development model without regard to domestic conditions. Obvi-
ously, the Chinese model will be similar to those of other countries in 
many ways, yet will keep its own distinguishing characteristics. The 
models of a federalist China and "unification-led political pluraliza-
tion" may be quite different from the patterns of other countries. One 
has to recognize China's political reality: Since 1949 there have been 
two opposing regimes under the leadership of two major parties, living 
in different political and economic systems across the Taiwan Strait. 
Separation has had a great impact on the political development of each 
side. In other words, the current political situation is not only the 
result of the internal development of each society, but is also heavily 
influenced by the lack of bilateral relations. As time has passed, ten-
sion across the Taiwan Strait has been sharply reduced. 
Progress in pluralistic development and the strong popular de-
mands for democracy and political freedom within both societies is 
even more significant. The pluralistic development in non-political 
(economic and cultural) fields will foster future political pluralization. 
Meanwhile, the development and consolidation of various political 
forces will provide favorable conditions for future political develop-
ment, which will lead to a gradual accommodation across the Taiwan 
Strait. This process makes the above models possible. 
I would like to emphasize that without the issue of unification, 
Chinese politics would still move towards democratization on both 
sides of the Strait. It is important to note that unification, although 
critical in nature, is only one of many important issues that the two 
sides have faced. Issues like internal politics, economic reform pro-
grams, and foreign policy are no less important than the issue of unifi-
cation. Political liberalization and reform in both Taiwan and the 
Mainland most likely will continue separately and autonomously in 
both societies for a long time to come. The push toward political de-
33. For the detailed elaboration of the model of Japan's "informal pluralism," see 
Quansheng Zhao, " 'Informal Pluralism' and Japanese Politics: Sino-Japanese Rapproche-
ment Revisited," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, summer 1989, pp. 65-
83. 
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velopment of each society is being led by indigenous forces. This has 
been demonstrated by the Tiananmen demonstrations on the Main-
land and the development of opposition forces in Taiwan. 
Nevertheless, the process of unification does have its unique func-
tion. It is true that neither the CCP nor the KMT could or should try 
to replace indigenous opposition forces on the other side. But, they 
may play largely symbolic roles at the beginning, such as the checking 
function. They will gradually move from the first stage of "cross-
checking and mutual influence" into the second stage of "fair competi-
tion and pluralistic politics." In this sense, unification will serve as a 
catalyst for China's political pluralization. "One country, two sys-
tems" may well develop into "one country, two (or more) parties" 
under a federal system - an unintended consequence of unification. 
Hence, it will become a peaceful and evolutionary process breaking the 
political monopoly of the ruling parties and integrating various social 
groups. In China's future political life, the CCP and the KMT, to-
gether with a few minor parties, will coexist peacefully for the first 
time since the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1940s. 
This is not to say, however, that unification will only have a posi-
tive impact on China's political development. There is a negative side 
of the possible development: After unification the new "federalist 
state" will pose a great challenge to leaders on both sides. As demon-
strated by the experiences of Germany and Vietnam, the stresses 
caused by the clash of different political and economic systems may 
grow. These stresses, if not handled properly, will produce new ten-
sions between the two sides, which may lead to another political crisis. 
Therefore, the feasibility of the model will depend largely on the reali-
zation of the six conditions that I have discussed. The whole idea is 
based on two assumptions - a deep-rooted sense of identity as "one 
China," and irreversible trends on both sides toward a more demo-
cratic society. The unification process will be in great danger if either 
of these conditions fails to be met. 
If Beijing really wants to prevent Taiwan from asserting indepen-
dence and wishes to achieve the goal of peaceful unification, it will 
have to learn to tolerate non-communist political forces including op-
position parties. It has to accept not only the concept of "one country, 
two systems," but also the notion of "one country, two (or more) par-
ties" leading two different areas under, possibly, a federalist system. 
On the other hand, if Taipei really hopes to unify with the Mainland, 
or at least, to maintain a friendly relationship with Beijing (thus a 
peaceful environment for the island), it will have to recognize the ne-
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cessity of finding a common ground (such as a federal system) with the 
Mainland. 

CHAPTER IV 
SOUTH KOREA AND THE POLITICS OF KOREAN 
REUNIFICATION 
George 0. Totten and Yung-Hwan Jo 
The fever for reunification, following the arbitrary division of the 
peninsula by the occupying powers of the United States and the Soviet 
Union in 1945, has risen and fallen with the tides of internal and exter-
nal events. It reached a new historical level when the Prime Minister 
of South Korea, Kang Young Hoon, met and shook hands with the 
Prime Minister of North Korea, Yon Hyong Muk, on Wednesday, 
September 5, 1990. Although no immediate "breakthrough" resulted, 
a new plateau had been reached in that both sides were implicitly rec-
ognizing the legitimacy of the other and they were calling each other 
by their official names, the South being the Republic of Korea (ROK 
or Taehan Minguk) and the North, the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (DPRK or Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk). 
SOUTH KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980 
It was in the 1970s, almost twenty years after the tragic Korean 
War, that the North and South Korean governments began to take 
some concrete steps toward peaceful reunification (which means show-
ing some willingness to compromise) without the intervention of the 
superpowers. In 1945 the Koreans had been unable to get their spon-
taneous attempt at creating a single government recognized by the 
American occupation forces in the South. In the next three years the 
Soviet and American occupying powers failed to get a coalition gov-
ernment formed, and they withdrew after their proteges had each es-
tablished their own separate regime, the South being the first to 
establish a government claiming to represent the whole country. 
With both sides calumniating the other as illegitimate and both 
justifying the use of force to realize their claims, the North's military 
move south on June 25, 1950, no matter how it may have been in-
duced, brought forth a United Nations condemnation and the inter-
vention of the United States, using the UN's authority to legitimize its 
military actions in concert with other supporting nations. This forced 
the North back to its former borders. However, instead of stopping 
(61) 
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there, the United Nations forces in hot pursuit crossed that border 
themselves and advanced north almost to the Chinese border at the 
Y alu River before triggering the intervention of Chinese "volunteers," 
who in turn forced the UN troops back to approximately the original 
border between North and South Korea. This line was later recog-
nized in a cease-fire agreement in 1953 which remains in force today, 
signed by the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the United States (as 
the representative of the United Nations). South Korea, however, 
under its President Syngman Rhee, refused to sign the accord. 
During the rest of the 1950s and the 1960s both the North and 
the South were licking their wounds. Their borders were tightly 
closed against each other. It was the high tide of the Cold War. The 
United States opposed "appeasement" of communism anywhere. But 
with the turn of the decade, President Richard M. Nixon did an unbe-
lievable thing. Through his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, he 
made secret, and then open, contact with the People's Republic of 
China, culminating in the February 27, 1971 communique with the 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in which the United States said in effect 
that there was just one China and that it was up to the Chinese to 
work out how a peaceful reunification could occur. By this time, the 
United Nations had recognized Beijing (rather than Taipei) as the gov-
ernment that represented China in the United Nations. 
Also by 1972 Park Chung Hee had been in power for a decade, 
had become President of South Korea in 1963, and was nearing the 
end of his constitutionally limited second term. A former military 
man, he had first come to power by a coup d'etat on May 16, 1961 
against the short-lived government that followed in the wake of the 
fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960. Now with over ten years' experience as 
leader of South Korea in which remarkable strides in an export-ori-
ented economy had been made, Park shocked the world almost as 
much as Nixon had, by imitating him. Park secretly dispatched his 
own "Kissinger," Lee Hu Rak, to North Korea to meet its Prime Min-
ister, Kim 11 Sung. The result was made public by both sides on July 
4, 1972, in a joint communique declaring that the reunification of Ko-
rea should be done through (1) independent Korean efforts "without 
being subject to external imposition or interference," (2) peaceful 
means, and (3) a greater national unity, "transcending differences in 
ideas, ideologies, and systems." When this communique was issued, 
hopes in Korea were raised that progress would be made. 1 
1. United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UN-
CURK), Report 1972, p. 39; for the North Korean version, see Foreign Broadcast Informa-
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President Park was able to use these hopes to argue that, if he 
were given greater powers and a secure tenure, he would be in a 
stronger position vis-a-vis Kim 11 Sung and thus be able to set in mo-
tion a process that would lead to peaceful reunification. He thus drew 
up what he called the Yushin (Revitalizing) Constitution and got it 
ratified in a referendum on November 24, 1972 by an overwhelming 
91.5 percent.2 But he never succeeded in getting very far with reunifi-
cation, even though the constitution gave him dictatorial powers and 
ensured his tenure for life. 3 
Park justified his slow pace on reunification by promoting "incre-
mentalism" as an approach in his 197_~ New Year's press conference. 
According to him, the North-South dialogue would have to develop 
steadily with mutual patience and sincerity, searching for the settle-
ment of the easier questions first. This could start out with removal of 
long-standing distrust and misunderstanding - what we can call 
"confidence-building measures" (CBMs). He argued that, although 
on the surface they looked as though they would take a long time, they 
were really short-cuts to the achievement of peaceful reunification.4 In 
other words, this was "reunification preceded by peace. "5 President 
tion Service (FBIS), Daily Report, 5 July 1972, IV, p. D2. For an analysis of the 
communique, see Young Whan K.ihl, "Korean Response to Major Power Rapproche-
ment," in Young C. Kim, ed., Major Powers and Korea, Silver Spring, MD: Research Insti-
tute on Korean Affairs, 1973, pp. 139-164. 
2. This was called his way of legitimizing his premeditated "coup in office" which did 
away with the Third Republic and replaced it by the Fourth Republic. Young Whan Kihl, 
Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 
and London, 1984, p. 61. 
3. Since Park was elected on December 23, 1972 by a handpicked constituency that 
virtually assured him the presidency permanently, Kim 11 Sung, the leader of North Korea, 
possibly believing he may have to deal with President Park very soon, drew up a new 
constitution himself with a strong presidency on December 27 and got himself elected Pres-
ident the next day, attaining the same official status, as head of state, as Park. Up until that 
time, since the founding of the DPRK in 1945, he had served as Prime Minister (and more 
importantly as Secretary General of the Workers [Communist] Party). For the significance 
of this change, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 269-276. 
4. The press conference is quoted and cited in K.ihl, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, 
p. 208. 
5. The Korean term "tong'if' is often translated as "unification," but in English 
"reunification" is more appropriate, since Korea was unified, except intermittently since 
668 A.D. Also in this connection "nampook" is translated as "north-south" rather than as 
"south-north" which is more literal but not good English. It is as bad as "'pooknam" would 
be in Korean. In English "north-south" is neutral; it does not mean that the speaker pre-
fers "north" to "south." In this book, "North Korea," the "North,'" and "South Korea" 
and the "South" are capitalized, but it is equally permissible to use lower case, since they 
are not proper names and the Koreans consider Korea as a single state temporarily divided 
64 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Park sought to institutionalize a relaxation of tensions, while keeping 
up a military guard, including the American forces. 
The American military forces played a dual role. They served as 
a safety shield in the eyes of the South Korean people, because they 
would deter an attack from the North. The North knew that any at-
tack on the Americans would bring the tremendous power of the 
United States into play on the peninsula again. 6 Secondly the presence 
of American forces gave the South Korean people the feeling that the 
United States approved of the South Korean government. This per-
ceived approval by the United States, which had the reputation of be-
ing the champion of democracy, rather than the stationing of troops 
per se, gave the government a certain amount of legitimacy. 
Finally, since the issue of peaceful reunification, or at least more 
friendly relations with the North, was very popular, it provided the 
leaders with political capital. Thus, Park, as well as his successors, 
have found it extremely important to appear to be sincerely pursuing 
the goal of national reunification. 
To sum up, the reunification policy of the South during Park's 
last years was (1) utilized for political purposes, (2) consisted of a step-
by-step approach, and (3) should start with tension relaxation vis-a-vis 
the North. This policy was already set when Park clarified it further 
at his press conference for the New Year held on January 18, 1974, by 
calling for a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea 
wherein (a) both sides would promise publicly that they would never 
wage armed aggression against each other, (b) both sides would refrain 
from mutual interference in the internal affairs of the other side, and 
(c) in all events, the existing armistice agreement would remain in 
effect. 7 
NORm KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980 
In North Korea, the DPRK. continued to champion the three ba-
sic principles of the joint communique of July 4, 1972, mentioned 
above. The first principle being that reunification is an internal prob-
by ideological differences and the remnants of superpower rivalry. Donald Stone Macdon-
ald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society, Boulder, CO and London: Westview 
Press, 1988, p. xi. 
6. This prospect, it can be argued, was confirmed by the Iraq War of 1990-91. Of 
course, North Korea takes the position that South Korea is not really a free and sovereign 
state, because the U.S. with its troops there calls the tune. 
7. These three policy principles subsequently became the "three basic principles for 
peaceful reunification," as enumerated by President Park in his National Day Address on 
August 15, 1974. 
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lem for Koreans to solve without outside interference. Therefore, it 
has since happened that the first demand the North Koreans have al-
most invariably made was for the withdrawal of American troops. 
The second principle of peaceful reunijjcation became compromised 
by the North Korean government's reluctance to deal with the "illegit-
imate" government of the South, especially in the early years of the 
Chun Doo Hwan regime, which had come to power through a coup 
d'etat in 1980. This means that instead of proposing "negotiations and 
dialogue" with the authorities in the South as the peaceful alternative 
to violence, the North simply left it as reunification by nonviolent 
means. And finally the third principle_ of greater national unity was 
interpreted by the North to mean that reunification talks should in-
volve representatives from all parties and social organizations, not just 
the "responsible authorities" in the South. 
The Northern leadership is well aware that the Southern leader-
ship - and this is truer today than ever before - has to deal with a 
vocal domestic opposition that wants to share power itself in the 
South. The North attempts to appeal to such political opposition and 
the radical student groups in order to put pressure on the leadership of 
the South. The government of South Korea takes this as "proor• that 
the North is trying to destabilize the government of the South, over-
throw it, and set up a "communist" regime that would submit to the 
North on all its terms. Thus, if the North wants to pressure the South 
into hurrying along with negotiations, this does not appear to be a 
very fruitful tactic. But it is one way of trying to paint the South 
Korean leadership as not being "democratic," because it keeps the 
control of negotiations exclusively in the hands of the top leader of the 
South and also because it uses the National Security Law against the 
opposition. (That law is directed against subversion by the North but 
it is so vaguely worded that it can be employed against a broad variety 
of opposition to the government in the South.)8 
During the 1970s neither side made proposals sufficiently attrac-
tive that the other side could not refuse. Nevertheless, the overall 
peace was maintained, despite a number of provocations, which are 
not taken up in this chapter, but which served to keep tensions high. 
One ray of hope flickered for six years and then went out. That was 
the Red Cross talks that began in 1971 to address the problem of the 
estimated ten million families that had been torn asunder by the Ko-
rean War. However, after 1973 these talks became stalemated for all 
8. For a discussion of this law and its early uses, see Chi-Young Pak, Political Opposi-
tion in Korea, 1945-1960, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1985, pp. 125-129. 
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practical purposes, although working-level meetings were held from 
time to time until December 19, 1977. Such an issue, of course, could 
not go away, and has reappeared. 
At the very end of the decade, renewed attempts were made to get 
negotiations on track again. President Park in January 1979 made a 
proposal to the North to resume discussions on all issues pending be-
tween the two sides "without any preconditions." The [North] Korean 
Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland responded 
by proposing a meeting in Panmunjom, which was held. Nevertheless, 
the talks soon became deadlocked. 
The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 
1979, changed the situation completely. North Korea quickly made a 
proposal for holding a meeting between the prime ministers of the two 
sides. Before this could get underway, the Chun Doo Hwan coup 
d'etat in May 1980, followed by the Kwangju uprising and its bloody 
suppression, occurred, all of which threw cold water on any rap-
prochement between the two sides. The North took the position that 
the government of the South was "illegitimate," and condemned the 
K wangju Incident as a massacre. 9 
After a great deal of preparation and fanfare the [North] Korean 
Workers Party held its Sixth Party Congress starting on October 10, 
1980. At that time it unveiled its proposal for the establishment of a 
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK). 10 
The use of the name "Koryo" was put forward to solve the prob-
lem of the two names then and still in use, as mentioned above, 
"Choson" for North Korea and "Hanguk" for South Korea. Koryo 
was the name of the dynasty in Korea (936-1392) when its borders 
approximated more closely the present borders of the country than 
those of the preceding Silla Dynasty. The Silla Kingdom had incorpo-
rated Paekche and Koguryo and in that sense was united in 668, but 
then the Parhae Kingdom came into existence in the North, taking 
over part of what was Koguryo, so, in that sense, Korea was not as 
united as during the later Koryo dynasty. Incidentally Koryo is the 
source from which the West gets the name which in English we write 
9. For a succinct description of this incident, see Koon Woo Nam, South Korean 
Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability, Lanham, MD; New York; 
London: University Press of America, 1989, pp. 221-224, 280-281. 
10. This proposal is quoted and analyzed in detail in Kihl, Politics and Policies, supra, 
note 2, pp. 214-230. For the official translation of the original text see, Kim II Sung, Report 
to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee, 
October 10, 1980, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980, especially "Let 
Us Reunify the Country Independently and Peacefully," pp. 59-81. 
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as "Korea." At the beginning of the dynasty, the capital was moved 
to what is the present-day Kaesong, which is more or less in the mid-
dle of the peninsula. The 38th parallel which divided Korea between 
1945 to 1948 ran north of Kaesong. Since the Cease-fire of 1952, the 
Demarcation Zone (DMZ) runs south of it. Because it is so centrally 
located, it could conceivably be made the new capital of the Confeder-
ation, as the North proposes a "reunited" Korea be called, or the 
Commonwealth, as proposed by the South. 11 
The DPRK proposal envisioned the establishment of a supreme 
national confederal assembly composed of an equal number of repre-
sentatives from the North and from the South plus some overseas Ko-
rean representatives (along the lines presumably of China). This 
assembly would create a standing committee to act as its executive and 
guide the existing governments of the North and the South. Each side 
would have its own government, presumably continuing the govern-
ments (and economic systems) that already exist. The reunited nation 
would be neutral or independent in foreign policy without foreign alli-
ances. The two states of the republic would presumably have the task 
of reducing and combining their military forces. 
As summarized by Young Whan Kihl, the confederal republic's 
national government would have the following functions: 
(1) adhere to independence in all state activities and 
follow an independent policy; 
(2) effect democracy throughout the country and in all 
spheres of society and promote great national unity; 
(3) bring about economic cooperation and exchange 
between the North and the South by ensuring the develop-
ment of an independent national economy; 
(4) realize North-South exchange and cooperation in 
the spheres of science, culture, and education by insuring 
uniform progress in the country's science and technology, 
national culture and arts, and national education; 
(5) reopen the suspended transport and communica-
tions between North and South, by ensuring free utilization 
of the means of transport and communications in all parts of 
the country; 
(6) ensure a stable livelihood for the entire people in-
11. For the history of these dynasties mentioned earlier in this paragraph, see, for ex-
ample, Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, translated by Edward W. Wagner with Ed-
ward J. Shultz, Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1984, Chapters 4-8. 
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eluding the workers, peasants, and other working masses by 
promoting their welfare systematically; 
(7) remove military confrontation between the North 
and the South by forming a combined national army to de-
fend the nation against invasion from outside; 
(8) defend and protect the national rights and interests 
of all Koreans overseas; 
(9) handle properly the foreign relations established 
by the North and the South prior to reunification, by coordi-
nating the foreign activities of the two regional governments 
in a unified way; and 
(10) as a unified state representing the whole nation, 
develop friendly relations with all countries of the world by 
pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. 12 
From this summary, it is apparent that the North was proposing 
a policy of "one nation and two autonomous regions." Moreover, this 
arrangement was to be considered "permanent" for the foreseeable 
future. 
Looking back at this plan from 1991, over ten years later, it seems 
a shame that so little has been accomplished by the two sides. The 
borders are still as tightly guarded as before. The suspension of trans-
port and communications as well as the bar on exchange and coopera-
tion in the spheres of science, culture, and education continue 
unabated. No direct trade took place until 1991. Still have been no 
reductions of the military on either side. The mere thought of combin-
ing the reduced military on both sides into one force for defense of the 
reunified country seems like a pipe dream. 
In contrast to the North's policy of all or nothing, that is, 
"reunification" in terms of a confederal system first- after the with-
drawal of American forces - and then the working out of the various 
problems, the South has called for a step-by-step approach. Its pre-
1980 position was basically incrementalist, calling for readjusting psy-
chological attitudes prior to gradually working out the easier and then 
the more difficult problems, culminating in reunification. The South's 
position, then, can be characterized as having as its goal "one nation, 
one government." 
12. Kih1, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, p. 215. This quotation has only been al· 
tered by capitalizing "North" and "South." 
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CHUN DOO HWAN'S POLICIES 
With the advent of former General Chun Doo Hwan as President 
of South Korea on March 3, 1981, greater emphasis was laid on a 
possible meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea, 
which he averred could create an atmosphere in which smaller 
problems could be worked out over time. On January 12, 1981, Presi-
dent Chun invited President Kim II Sung to visit Seoul without any 
preconditions and offered to visit North Korea himself, if invited. He 
followed this up by a proposal in January of 1982, calling for the two 
sides to jointly draw up a draft constitution. This would be done, he 
proposed, by a Consultative Conference for National Reunification 
(CCNR). 
Granting that this would be a giant step, Chun proposed that the 
two sides should first "normalize relations" by concluding a Provi-
sional Agreement on Basic Relations between North and South Korea 
containing seven provisions, conveniently summarized by Kihl, as 
follows: 
First, relations between South and North Korea shall be 
based on the principle of equality and reciprocity pending 
unification. 
Second, the South and the North shall abandon all 
forms of military force and violence, as well as the threat 
thereof, as a means of settling issues between them and seek 
peaceful solutions to all problems through dialogue and 
negotiation. 
Third, South and North Korea shall recognize each 
other's existing political order and social institutions and 
shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs in any way. 
Fourth, the South and the North shall maintain the ex-
isting regime of armistice in force while working out meas-
ures to end the arms race and military confrontation in order 
to ease tensions and prevent war on the Korean peninsula. 
Fifth, the South and the North shall facilitate free travel 
between the two halves of the peninsula, including the reun-
ion of separated families, and shall promote exchanges and 
cooperation in the fields of trade, transportation, postal ser-
vice, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education, 
culture, news gathering and reporting, health, technology, 
environmental protection, and so forth. 
Sixth, until unification is achieved, both parties shall re-
spect each other's bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
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agreements concluded with third countries, irrespective of 
differences in ideologies, ideals and institutions, and consult 
with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Ko-
rean people as a whole. 
Seventh, the South and the North shall each appoint a 
plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to 
head a resident liaison mission to be established in Seoul and 
Pyongyang. The specific functions of the liaison missions 
shall be determined by mutual consultation and agreement, 
with each party providing the liaison mission from the other 
party with all necessary facilities and cooperation to insure 
its smooth functioning. 13 
This proposal was followed up by many smaller concrete propos-
als that would bring Koreans from the North and the South together, 
including at the 1986 Asian Games and at the 1988 Summer Olympics 
later held in Seoul. However, the North found objections to all the 
proposals and the result was their non-participation in the Olympics. 
One offer by the North, however, was accepted by the South. It 
was the offer by the Red Cross of North Korea of September 8, 1984 
to provide relief goods for the victims of a flood in South Korea. 
Without asking how much was needed the North announced that it 
was willing to send 225,950 bushels of rice, 500,000 meters of fabric, 
100,000 tons of cement and various medicines. 14 It is no secret that 
one reason this was accepted was that the South thought that the 
North believed that South would not accept aid from the North and 
the South doubted whether the North could really deliver what was 
promised. Nevertheless, despite the South's saying this was not really 
needed and disputes about how the goods would be shipped, it turned 
out that the goods were duly delivered to South Korea's Red Cross. 
To upstage the North, the South took the occasion to send back as 
presents to the North packages of consumer goods including TV sets 
(that could receive South Korean broadcasts) altogether worth as 
much as, or more than, the aid that had been sent by the North. De-
spite the snide remarks made by both sides, this gesture did seem to 
improve the atmosphere in both the North and the South. 
North Korean attitudes, however, were extremely self-righteous 
and contemptuous of the South's leadership. In the North, the idea of 
13. As summarized by Kihl, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, pp. 219-20 on the basis 
of the account in the Korea Herald, February 2, 1982. 
14. These figures are from A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, published 
by the National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, December 31, 1988, p. 202. 
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the "Great Leader" Kim 11 Sung meeting with Chun Doo Hwan was 
ridiculed, on the basis that the former enjoyed great legitimacy, 
whereas the latter did not. All the South's rejections of North Korean 
reunification proposals were summarily denounced as measures to 
make de jure the North-South de facto division of the peninsula, inevi-
tably perpetuating "two Koreas." Also the North insisted that the 
rhetoric about respecting treaties with "third parties" was designed to 
keep American troops in the South. The North argued that the 
South's talk of humanitarian concern for the reuniting of families was 
contradicted by the South's pressuring overseas Koreans not to go to 
the North to visit relatives. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
The big issue that thereafter dominated the 1980s and became 
intertwined in the reunification issue was none other than the Olympic 
games. Ever since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 
September 1981, sitting in Baden-Baden, West Germany, chose Seoul 
as the venue for the 24th Olympic Games, North Korea was highly 
concerned. It first attempted to abort that decision. When it found 
that was impossible, it proposed co-sponsoring. This led to long and 
difficult negotiations in which the IOC attempted to get the two sides 
to work out some agreement. But the North in the end did not accept 
the concessions that the South was willing to make, and consequently 
boycotted the Games. The North promised not to disrupt the Olym-
pics in any way. The South nevertheless took tremendous precautions. 
But the North evidently kept their word and caused no trouble. 
The two sides did meet earlier, in 1984, to discuss the formation 
of a single team to send to the 23rd Olympics in Los Angeles in July of 
that year but North Korea joined the Soviets and others in boycotting 
the Games, although the People's Republic of China participated 
fully. 
The Seoul Olympics were relevant to the reunification process in 
several ways. Obviously any joint sports participation held the 
probability of confidence building on both sides. The "ping-pong di-
plomacy" ofthe Chinese and Americans that started in Japan in 1971 
and eventually led to normalization· of relations was on people's 
minds. While the Olympics did not open up North Korea, they did 
bring the Soviets and the Chinese as well as teams of Eastern Europe 
to Seoul, where great goodwill was demonstrated toward them. This 
led to the Soviets establishing an economic liaison office in Seoul and 
the Chinese setting up special economic arrangements between the 
Shandong region and Seoul. 
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The goodwill demonstrated by the Koreans toward the Russians 
at the Olympics led, two years later, to the surprise meeting between 
President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Roh Tae Woo in San 
Francisco on June 5, 1990. That meeting in turn made it just a matter 
of time before diplomatic relations would be established between the 
Soviet Union and the ROK. All this aided the South's strategy of 
"cross-recognition," whereby the Republic of Korea would be offi-
cially recognized by the Soviet Union and China and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea would be recognized by the United States 
and Japan. 15 At least South Korea was making contact with the So-
viet Union and China, North Korea's allies, but Pyongyang was mak-
ing little headway with Washington or even (until later) with Tokyo. 
It looked as though everything was going South Korea's way. The 
East European socialist states, starting with Hungary, established for-
mal diplomatic ties with South Korea, in the face of protests from 
North Korea. Only China was hesitant about more formal ties in con-
sideration for North Korea's feelings. 
The Seoul Olympics were significant in another respect. They 
served as a further incentive to the democratization of South Korea. 
Preparing the country for the games, both the government and the 
people wanted to project a good image when the eyes of the world 
would be on Seoul. They wanted South Korea to be seen as peaceful 
and democratic. One of the main causes for violence and dictatorship 
in South Korea had been the desire of Presidents Rhee and Park to 
hold onto power indefinitely. Just one year before the Olympics, poli-
tics in South Korea had reached crisis proportions with masses of peo-
ple joining with students in street protests. The issue was whether 
Chun Doo Hwan would actually carry out his pledge to step down 
after his seven-year term as President ended, in 1987, as he was re-
quired to, according to the Constitution, and, if he did, whether he 
would try to continue to rule from "behind the throne," by putting in 
a successor who was a puppet indebted to him. When he announced 
in May 1987 as his chosen successor another former general, Roh Tae 
Woo, who allegedly supported Chun in his decision to send troops to 
put down the uprising in Kwangju in 1980, the reaction against this 
was unexpectedly great and took the form of still wilder protests. 16 
15. "Cross-recognition" had originated with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 
1975 and at the same time he suggested that the South propose that both North and South 
be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously. See Byong-youn Choy, A History of the 
Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects, Peoria, IL: Research Committee 
on Korean Unification, Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, 1984, p. 141. 
16. For a fuller exposition of the significance of the Olympics as well as the argument 
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ROH'S DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOUTH KOREA 
However, what was even more unexpected by far was Rob's reac-
tion to the reaction. On June 29 he announced he was willing to ac-
cept all the demands of the opposition, including a presidential system 
with direct popular vote and the release of the many political prisoners 
as well as the restoration of full political rights to the chief opposition 
figure, Kim Dae Jung, who had gained great support for putting his 
life on the line in championing democracy and challenging both Park 
and Chun. While Rob's move toward democracy was unexpected, he 
probably had no other alternative. Only the military could put down 
the degree of opposition that had arisen, but the military had become 
neutralized by the rising tide of anti-Americanism that had its incep-
tion in the aftermath of the K wangju Incident of 1980 when troops 
were moved down from the DMZ to Kwangju in the very south of the 
country, because local troops could not be counted on to not sympa-
thize with the local people and the protesters were calling for Chun 
Doo Hwan to step down. People began to criticize the Americans for 
supporting Chun by allowing troops, all of whom were technically 
under U.N. (i.e., U.S.) command, to be used for political purposes. In 
order to counter this, the United States was watching to see that the 
military would not be used to suppress protestors calling for democ-
racy. In such circumstances, Rob's move was most logical and, as it 
turned out, successful. 
Thereafter, in collaboration with the opposition leaders, presiden-
tial candidate Roh drew up a new constitution, got it ratified by the 
people, ran under it and won. His victory, however, was only possible 
because Kim Dae Jung and the erstwhile co-leader of the democratic 
movement, Kim Y ong Sam, fell out with each other and could not find 
a formula for collaboration. In the voting for president, Roh Tae Woo 
won only by a plurality. His two liberal opponents stacked up more 
votes together than he got. His own vote was also eroded by another 
conservative, Kim Jong Pil, who had once been a right-hand man of 
the assassinated former President Park Chung Hee. Roh proclaimed a 
new Republic in South Korea, the Sixth. Because of its popular sup-
port and its creation in collaboration with the opposition, it gained 
greater legitimacy than any preceding regime. The image created 
helped make the Olympics perhaps the most successful ever held. 
Many were disappointed that the North Koreans did not partici-
on democratization that comes in the next section below, see George Totten, The Democra-
tization of South Korea and the Role of the Olympics in the Process, Occasional Paper 3, 
August 1988, Center for Pacific Asia Studies, University of Stockholm, pp. 14-16. 
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pate in the Games, but even under Chun a number of initiatives to-
ward the North had been taken. An important one of these resulted in 
renewed Red Cross talks for reuniting families. This occurred during 
the fall of 1984. On September 20-24 for the first time officially spon-
sored private-level exchange took place. Visiting groups of 151 mem-
bers reached Seoul from the North and the same number reached 
Pyongyang from the South. They included art troupes that presented 
performances in the host capitals. This was a moment of great joy for 
both sides of the divided peninsula. 17 
Economic talks also began and broke off during this period. Five 
meetings were held between November 5, 1984 and November 22, 
1985. The sixth was to be held on January 22, 1986 but was sus-
pended two days earlier by the North in protest against the joint exer-
cises of American and South Korean troops called "Team Spirit," 
which had been, and thereafter has continued to be, held almost 
annually. 18 
Even discussion about three-way talks on military issues among 
the North, the South, and the United States forces were taken up on 
North Korean initiative starting June 9, 1986. In the course of this, 
North Korea on July 23, 1987 proposed "multi-national arms reduc-
tion talks" to discuss phased arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. 
They called for reducing both the North and the South Korean forces 
to 100,000 each by which time the United States would withdraw its 
entire forces "including nuclear weapons." But the South proposed 
that the North should start first, since it has so many more arms than 
the South. Also the South insinuated that the North was making this 
proposal to divide public opinion in the South and was therefore not 
sincere. 19 
When former General Roh Tae Woo took over as President in 
January 1988, he gradually began to take a more positive position with 
regard to reunification. Most significantly on July 7, 1988 he made a 
"Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unifica-
tion and Prosperity."20 In this he called for promotion of exchanges 
between the people of North and South Korea and for opening the 
door to overseas Koreans to visit both the North and the South. 
It has since become clear that there is a contradiction between 
North-South exchange and the Anti-Communist and National Secur-
17. For the negotiations leading up to this and its realization, see A White Paper on 
South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra, note 14, pp. 201-263. 
18. See ibid., pp. 263-296. 
19. Ibid., pp. 359-362. 
20. The statement may be found in ibid., pp. 461-465 and discussed on pp. 381-90. 
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ity Laws, which have so far not been abolished.21 To overcome th~s, 
the South Korean government selectively gives permission to certam 
people to contact North Koreans, thus waiving the law in their cases. 
In this way President Roh and the South Korean government try to 
retain control on all contact, using the police and the legal system to 
arrest and sentence persons who make contact without prior govern-
ment approval. As for the overseas Koreans, however, they are no 
longer harassed by the South for visits to North Korea. 
In his July 7, 1988 declaration "For National Self-Esteem, Unifi-
cation and Prosperity," President Roh brought up six other items. 
The second was for arrangements to aid dispersed families to reestab-
lish communication with each other. The third was to begin North-
South trade. The fourth was for ending the South's objections over 
South Korea's allies having trade relations with North Korea for 
everything except military goods. The fifth item was the expression of 
hope for free inter-Korean contacts and cooperation in the world com-
munity. And finally the sixth was an expression of an intention to 
help improve North Korea's relations with South Korea's allies.22 
This last item was part of a new policy on the part of the South, 
namely, of ending North Korea's relative international isolation. This 
was a real turnabout. It also provided further justification for South 
Korea's attempts at rapprochement with Eastern Europe, the Soviet 
Union, and China. North Korea continued its policy of opposing 
"cross-recognition." Nevertheless, it was clear that North Korea was 
very interested in "contact" with the United States and Japan. 
In a step that allows for greater participation by the people of 
South Korea in the "policy making" of reunification, the South Ko-
rean government on September 3, 1988 made public its intention to 
roll back censorship of "communist" materials on a selective basis for 
selected people. For instance: The Rodong Shinmun (the main north 
21. This National Security (Gong'an Chongchi) law has been slightly amended from 
time to time, the latest as far as this chapter is concerned was on May 10, 1991. In order to 
try to lessen the pressure on Kim Dae Jung, in hopes he would not support the radical 
students, the law was revised so as to make it not a crime not to report someone going to 
the North. Kim Dae Jung had been accused of knowing about one of his party people 
making a trip to North Korea. By the change in the law, Kim would be let otf the hook. 
The government felt this would be a concession worth making to reduce somewhat the 
opposition in the streets, since Kim had joined demonstrations and even suffered from the 
tear gas used by the police to quell them. Korea Herald, May 11, 1991, pp. 12-14. 
22. Chong Sik Lee, "Coexistence, Revolution, and the Dialogue for Unification," paper 
presented at the Fourth Korea-US Conference on North Korea sponsored by the Korea 
Association for Communist Studies and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, August 8-10, 1989, p. 2. 
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Korean newspaper) and visual materials, it was said, "shall be open to 
the public on a selective basis. " 23 Also broadcasts which slander 
North Korea or its leader would be unilaterally suspended. Contacts 
with North Korea were initiated in August 1988 with a view to ar-
ranging meetings between North and South Korean parliamentarians 
to discuss relevant issues, an item that made a step in the direction of 
the wider contacts that had been called for by the North. 
President Roh's most dramatic appearance was his speech at the 
United Nations on October 18, 1988. Some people wonder why Presi-
dent Kim 11 Sung did not also accept an invitation to appear at the 
same time at the same forum in front of the nations of the world. It 
would be pointless to speculate other than to note that Kim 11 Sung 
may have felt it would be awkward to appear before the United Na-
tions while the U.S. "cover" was still being used by American troops 
poised against Kim's alleged threat to invade South Korea. As for 
Roh, this was a wonderful opportunity for him, while he was still 
basking in the afterglow of the Seoul Olympics (held September 17 to 
October 2), and he made the most of it. 24 
In his speech President Roh proposed to President Kim 11 Sung 
that Kim and he hold direct talks with each other at a summit meeting 
that could be held in Pyongyang or elsewhere and discuss issues such 
as the following: ( 1) a non-aggression pact, (2) problems of disarma-
ment, arms control, and other military matters, such as transforming 
the existing Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace arrange-
ment, (3) institutional structures for bringing about reunification, and 
(4) other types of exchange and cooperation. He also called for a "city 
of peace" to be built in the Demilitarized Zone. And he proposed 
setting up a consultative conference for peace composed of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan, as 
well as North and South Korea. 
Inside South Korea this U.N. speech and the earlier July 7 decla-
ration were aimed at assuring the people that the new Sixth Republic 
was more sincerely committed to reunification. These speeches were 
even designed in part to appeal to the increasingly radical and anti-
American students who were demanding direct contact with the 
North to hurry the process of reunification and the withdrawal of the 
American military forces. 
In the fall of 1988 following the Olympic Games the prospects for 
improving relations with the North appeared favorable. For instance, 
23. A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra, note 14, p. 399. 
24. For a copy of the talk, see ibid., pp. 478-90 and for a discussion of it see pp. 429-39. 
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the millionaire businessman (who had been born in North Korea bu~ 
since the war lived in the South), Chung Chu-Young of the Hyundat 
Group visited the North with the apparent permission of the South 
Korean government to talk about joint ventures, including tourism 
from the South in the Kumgang Mountains which are located in the 
North. 
NON-OFFICIAL REUNIFICATION ACTIVITIES 
In the spring, however, the atmosphere suddenly deteriorated 
again, with the unofficial visit of the Reverend Moon (Mun) Ik-hwan 
at the end of March 1989 to North Korea. Moon was a well-known 
critic of the government who had denounced Roh for suppressing de-
mocracy and going too slow on reunification. He was apparently in-
vited by President Kim 11 Sung along with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, 
Paek Ki-wan (a former presidential candidate), and the heads of the 
four political parties in the South (which included Roh Tae Woo as 
head of the Democratic Justice Party at the time). This was in line 
with Kim's call for a Joint Conference of political parties, social orga-
nizations, and leading personalities of North and South Korea in 1988 
and the North-South Consultative Conference in 1989. And this in 
turn was part of Kim's alleged concern to carry on a dialogue with 
more than just the incumbent South Korean leadership. However, in 
the South this strategy was considered to be "united front" tactics, 
aimed at seeking allies in South Korea and mobilizing radical elements 
there. The South Korean government perceived this as attempts by 
the North to "communize" the South. 
The Reverend Moon vehemently and frequently denounced Presi-
dent Chun on the questions of civil liberties and reunification. He 
took part in demonstrations. Now he made his way to North Korea 
allegedly without the knowledge of the South Korean authorities, in-
cluding the Agency for Security Planning (the organization that had 
replaced the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA]). 
Moon was welcomed by President Kim 11 Sung who met with him for 
some time. The Reverend issued a statement in which he praised Kim 
and criticized South Korean reunification policy, although he was not 
in complete agreement with Kim on a number of issues. 
As soon as his presence in North Korea was known through an 
announcement by the North, the South Korean media reported it in a 
sensational way. It was immediately claimed that he had breached the 
National Security Law in not getting permission from the South Ko-
rean government. And when he did return to the South, he was ar~ 
rested and later tried and sentenced for that transgression. 
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This incident was taken up by the Northern delegates at various 
meetings with South Korean delegations. For instance, the North uni-
laterally postponed the third preliminary meeting for arranging high-
level official talks, slated for Apri112, to April 26 and again to July 12 
and so on, while the South objected to the intrusion of political issues 
into what they called an "administrative matter. " 25 
Then during the summer of 1989 North Korea held the 13th 
World Festival for Youth and Students in Pyongyang starting July 1. 
Young people came from many countries, both developing and indus-
trially developed, with views ranging from left to center, most repre-
senting youth organizations to which they would report their 
experiences. The South Korean radical Chondaehyop (Association of 
National Student Representatives), a federation of student groups 
from various universities in South Korea, secretly sent a female stu-
dent from Hankook (Hanguk) University of Foreign Studies in Seoul 
to the Festival as a representative claiming to represent the youth of 
South Korea. Her name was Lim Soo-kyong (lm Su-kyong). She had 
been able to get there, since she was staying in East Berlin. It turned 
out that she was a Catholic student, who had been very much involved 
in student protest. She was a type not much seen in North Korea, 
where girls are more bashful and where there is no vocal opposition. 
As such, she was said to be very impressive to North Korean youth. 
She was an experienced speaker, self-confident, capable, and beautiful. 
Being the only student from South Korea, she was the center of atten-
tion not only for the authorities in the North but also the students 
from all the other countries. She denounced the South Korean au-
thorities for not allowing South Korean students to attend the 
Festival. 
The South Korean government was furious, especially when a 
Catholic priest, Father Moon (Mun) Kyu-hyon, a Korean resident in 
the U.S., went to Pyongyang to escort her home, saying they would 
arrive at Panmunjom, as a gesture to break down barriers, and enter 
South Korea that way. This they did, and they were arrested, tried for 
violating the National Security Law, and sentenced.26 This prompted 
protests from the North Koreans' Committee for Peaceful Reunifica-
25. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 048, Seoul: International Cultural Society of 
Korea, December, 1989, p. 73. 
26. The South Korean government did originally look into the situation and considered 
allowing or even promoting South Korean student participation in the North Korean affair. 
A year before the Festival on July 15, 1988, the South Korean North-South Student Ex-
change Promotion Committee proposed a meeting with the North to discuss South Korean 
student participation. The North, however, rejected the overall exchanges and approached 
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tion of the Fatherland, to which in tum the South Korean National 
Reunification Minister, Lee Hong Koo, retorted that the North should 
not be interfering in South Korean political affairs and especially not 
condoning unlawful acts. 
In recounting these events it might appear that North Korea was 
eager to open up wide contacts with the South, while the South feared 
contacts with the North. The irony of the situation was that the 
North was probably more fearful of the exposure of its people to the 
affluent South, being well aware of the way the East Germans came to 
envy the West Germans. The South Korean government was cogni-
zant of this, but they evidently feared losing internal control more 
than what they might gain from subverting the North. 
PRESSURES PUSHING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER 
The fact that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were becom-
ing more friendly with South Korea and were eager to do business 
with it was putting pressure on North Korea to carry out some "glas-
nost" and "perestroika" of its own. 
In the eyes of its own people, the North Korean government, es-
pecially Kim 11 Sung, must continue to be seen as leading the move-
ment towards reunification of the fatherland. It should not be 
perceived as afraid to lose some of its power for the higher purpose of 
reuniting the country, but that is logically and understandably the 
prospect of what opening the country would entail. This probably 
goes a long way to explain the stop-and-go tactics by the North. 27 
The picture one gets of 1988 and 1990 is that both the North and 
the South are being pushed toward each other by the trend of world 
events, even while trying to outwit each other. They each want to 
appear to be the one more eager for reunification, while the other side 
is the one being unreasonable and sabotaging the effort. Despite all 
this, to an outsider it does appear that they are inching towards a 
reunification in which both sides continue to exist and maintain their 
own positions and but find the mere presence of the other unsettling 
and the prospect of having to share decision-making alarming. 
During these last two years contacts have continued to increase in 
number in several areas. While talks go on to prepare for some sum-
mit conference in the future, intergovernmental contact becomes more 
the Chondaehyop student group directly to represent all South Korean students. For a 
fuller explanation, see ibid., pp. 120-123. 
27. Kong Dan Katy Oh, "South Korea: The View From the North,'' paper presented 
at the Fourth Korean-US Conference on North Korea, August 8-10, 1989, pp. 5-29. 
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frequent. There are discussions on the parliamentary level. More in 
the limelight are endless contacts and meetings on sports. For exam-
ple, the first successful joint North-South Teams were those for the 
41st World Table Tennis Championships held in Japan in April 1991 
and the planned 6th World Youth Soccer Championships. 28 But more 
significant by far is the fact that South Korea imported US $162,000 
worth of items between October 1988 when indirect trade was first 
approved by both sides and January 199U9 
Closer to the hearts of still grieving families are the Red Cross 
working-level delegates contacts, holding out the glimmer of hope that 
some may yet live to see long-missed loved ones and relatives. While 
war appears more remote than ever, the glint of the steel of military 
weapons reminds people that the terrors of war are close at hand ready 
at the push of a button in anger, or fear, or by mistake. 
The inter-Korean parliamentary talks have borne some fruit. 
Before the beginning of 1990 some nine such meetings had taken place 
since their initiation in August 1988. The two sides mutually agreed 
to include a declaration of mutual non-aggression and pledges of in-
creased exchange and cooperation in the agenda of future meetings, 
but the North reserved the right to suspend them, unless the Team 
Spirit military exercises were suspended. The lOth preparatory con-
tact for the proposed North-South parliamentary talks took place in 
the newly constructed Peace House in the Southern sector of 
Panmunjom on January 24, 1990. This was built by the Seoul govern-
ment in a little more than a year, as a symbol of its dedication to the 
cause of reunification. 30 
The 6th preliminary meeting to prepare for the proposed North-
South High-Level Officials Talks, i.e., prime ministers' talks was held 
in the Unification House in the Northern sector of Panmunjom. This 
led to the historic first meeting of the prime ministers of both sides 
that took place on September 5, 1990 in Seoul when the South's Prime 
Minister Kang Young Hoon introduced the North's Prime Minister to 
President Rob Tae Woo. A month later on October 18, Kang shook 
hands with President Kim 11 Sung in Pyongyang. The eventual goal of 
28. The agreement on these events was first mentioned in The Pyongyang Times, 
March 9, 1991, p.l. 
29. FordS. Worthy, "Can the Koreas Get Together?", Fortune Magazine, Vol. 123, 
No.3 (February 11, 1991), pp. 126-132; seep. 131. During the same period South Korean 
chaebul (such as Samsung, Saangyong and Daewoo) spent about US $ 35 million on im-
ports such as zinc, iron ore, fish and cement, which should whet the appetite of the North. 
30. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 049, Seoul: International Cultural Society of 
Korea, 1990, pp. 31-38. 
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these meetings was to organize a summit meeting when President Roh 
would meet with President Sung. During the last year or so there 
have been rumors that Kim II Sung would step aside as President and 
hand over that office to his son, Kim Jong II. Since that did not hap-
pen, there was speculation that Kim II Sung himself may "conde-
scend" to meet with Roh, if that would either "bless" or consummate 
the founding of a "confederal" republic. 
President Roh's proposal made on September 11, 1989 for a 
"commonwealth" is surprisingly close to Kim 11 Sung's "confedera-
tion." Actually, the Korean word "yonbang" is used to translate both 
of these words. In that speech Roh used the word "gongdongche," 
which literally means "common entity," but it was translated as "com-
monwealth" in English. With this idea, Rob associated the three long-
standing basic principles for reunification, namely, "independence, 
peace, and democracy." 
This formula suggests that, while expanding openness, exchanges, 
and cooperation, and building mutual trust through North-South dia-
logue, a Korean National Charter should be adopted (through a sum-
mit meeting between the two Koreas). This charter would contain a 
comprehensive package of agreements covering a basic scheme for at-
taining peace and reunification, mutual non-aggression arrangements, 
and the founding of a Korean commonwealth, as an interim stage to-
wards reunification. 
In characterizing this as an "interim stage," Rob was actually 
going back to a position Kim 11 Sung had abandoned. Kim had 
changed this in 1980 to say that he considered the "confederal" repub-
lic to be a permanent arrangement and thus "reunification" itself. 
Now Roh has said that this "commonwealth" could be a transi-
tional arrangement. The commonwealth, he suggested, should have a 
Council of Presidents as its highest decision-making organ, a Council 
of Ministers as the executive organ, a Council of Representatives as 
the legislative body, and a joint Secretariat. 
This Council of Representatives, he further proposed, should 
draft a constitution for a reunified Korea. This would provide for a 
new unified legislature and a single central government for a demo-
cratic republic. 31 
31. South-North Dialogue in Korea, No. 048, supra, note 25, pp. 32-35; and Kwang Soo 
Choi, "Korean Reunification: Its Problems and Future Prospects," in Hyung K. Jin (ed.), 
Korea in the 1990's: Prospects for Reunification, Pomona, CA: Industrial Research Institute 
for Pacific Nations, College of Business Administration, California State Polytechnic Uni-
versity, April 1990, p. 34. 
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Another front on which North Korea is inching forward is in 
contact with the United States. Consular level contacts between 
Americans and North Koreans began taking place in Beijing. 
America nevertheless still carried on its economic embargo and policy 
of diplomatic non-recognition, vis-a-vis North Korea. Also the North 
Koreans considered that the U.S. was letting too few North Koreans 
into the U.S. So they decided to cut down on visits to North Korea of 
South Koreans living in the U.S. The U.S. bad made an earlier con-
cession to North Korea in 1988 by slightly amending the Trading with 
the Enemy Act to allow American exports of much needed humanita-
rian items, such as foodstuffs and medicines. 
It is in the academic field where perhaps the most hopeful signs 
for improvement have appeared. 32 A symposium took place on July 5-
7, 1990 in San Francisco. It was jointly sponsored by Stanford's 
Center for International Security and Arms Control, together with the 
Center for International Studies of Seoul National University and the 
Peace and Disarmament Institute of North Korea. Delegates included 
Professor Chung Chong-uk, Director of the Center for International 
Studies, and Professor Han Sung-Joo of Korea University from the 
South. The main organizer on the American side was Dr. John W. 
Lewis of the Department of Political Science at Stanford. Delegates 
from the North included Song Yo-gyong, Director of the Peace and 
Disarmament Institute. 
At that symposium scholars from the North appeared to be tak-
ing the talk of confidence-building measures (CBMs) seriously, for ex-
ample, cuts in the military forces on both sides of the border. 
Representatives from both the North and the South seemed to have 
reached a consensus on trimming down and eventually stopping the 
arms race, which is still going on between North and South Korea. In 
fact, the North Korean scholars were even willing to accept the con-
cept of joint inspection in a process of arms reduction. 
NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS 
The first North Korean scholars to come to the Los Angeles area 
were Kim Byong Hong, Vice Director, Institute for Disarmament and 
Peace, DPRK, and Chong Yon Gap, Researcher, from the same Insti-
tute. This meeting took place on January 22, 1991 and was arranged 
by Tony Namkung for the Asia Society in connection with the Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles where the meeting took place. At 
that talk Mr. Kim interrupted Mr. Chong, when the latter translated 
32. See George Totten, "Developing Contact with North Korea," in ibid., pp. 58-67. 
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incorrectly what Mr. Kim said. Mr. Kim did not call for the "imme-
diate" withdrawal of American troops but a "phased" withdrawal, ac-
cording to three-way agreements. Mr. Chong was so used to saying 
"immediate" that he had forgotten the policy had changed. 33 At that 
meeting the scholar from the South was Kim Hakjoon, who was serv-
ing as Chief Assistant to President Roh for Policy Research. 
The South Korean view has been that the military and political 
confidence-building measures should proceed gradually and incre-
mentally. The North's position has been that the presence of the enor-
mous amounts of military hardware on the peninsula causes tensions 
and saddled both sides with enormous economic burdens; large-scale 
reductions of armaments would alleviate this. This means that the 
North holds arms reduction as the first measure. Namely, confidence-
building would be ineffective until some concrete evidence of arms re-
ductions takes place. 
The South from the beginning has called for nation-wide elec-
tions. The North has been skeptical of this, because the population of 
the South is twice as large as that of the North and the North feared 
they would be outvoted. In view of this perspective, the North's de-
mand for a confederal system of two equal states is easily understanda-
ble. The South has accepted the concept of equality, for without that 
nothing could be accomplished. 
In the words of a North Korean, "[The Democratic Confederal 
Republic of Koryo] is not for a certain specific class or section but for 
the entire Korean people; it is a form of a unified state in the interest of 
both, without causing damage to either side. The regional autonomy 
of the DCRK is designed to provide independence of each part within 
the framework of effecting national unity and reunification."34 There-
fore, the DCRK concept seeks "an equal number of governmental rep-
resentatives from the north and the south." True to this concept, the 
North insists on equal representation in all its negotiations with the 
South. 
In 1990 the North Korean approach towards reunification has 
33. This was noted by Totten who was present at the seminar which was titled some-
what misleadingly "China in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy." Significantly there was 
also a scholar from Vietnam, Dao Huy Ngoc, Deputy Director, Institute of International 
Relations, Hanoi. There was some discussion as to whether Hanoi or Pyongyang would be 
first in gaining American recognition. The impression was that it would be Hanoi. 
34. Appendix H (Text of the Opening Address by Kim Jong Su, Deputy Director, 
Institute of International Affairs, DPRK), Dialogue With North Korea: Report of a Seminar 
on "Tension Reduction in Korea", New York: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1989, p. 72. 
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become somewhat more defensive, probably brought on in part by the 
increasingly aggressive stance of the South, demanding national inte-
gration, and in part by the perception in the South that the North was 
becoming increasingly isolated in the context of what might be called 
the emerging "new international order."35 This scaling down of 
Pyongyang's demands into accepting the DCRK framework as the 
end product of reunification and the coexistence of the two "equal" 
parts is consistent with the DPRK's Ninth Supreme People's Assem-
bly held in late April 1990. 
Some of the other policies that the Assembly adopted also re-
vealed a growing change in perspective, notably the following: 
(1) Tension reductions and the creation of a peaceful 
international environment. 
(2) Removal of all obstacles separating the North and 
the South- such as the "concrete wall," that runs along the 
southern side of the Demilitarized Zone, and the National 
Security Law, which forbids unauthorized contact with 
North Korea- which hinder free human interaction and 
movement. 
(3) Adopting policies by both sides, particularly for-
eign policies, that will not hinder the independent and peace-
ful reunification of the motherland. Here one can see the 
underlying assumption that historically Korea has been 
overly influenced by outside powers to its detriment, the 
present division of the country being only the latest tragedy. 
In line with this way of thinking, separate membership in the 
United Nations would only play into the hands of those who 
wish to see the continued condition of division. Therefore, 
there should be just one foreign policy. 
North Korea does not want any of its neighbors, including the 
Soviet Union and China, to be able in any way to pursue a "two 
Koreas" policy. That is why North Korea continued to oppose "cross 
recognition." 
Despite the North's wishes, however, Eastern Europe has now 
recognized South Korea, China has established semi-formal trade ties, 
and the Soviet Union has, in addition to an economic liaison mission 
in Seoul, established formal diplomatic ties. 
While unable to stop the Soviet Union, especially after the sur-
35. This was the impression Yung-hwan Jo received when he attended a pro-North 
Korean symposium held in Osaka, Japan, in July 1990. 
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prise meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President 
Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 4, 1990 and again on Chejudo 
on Gorbachev's return home from Japan on April 23, 1991, North 
Korea has continued to be successful in temporarily halting China's 
move toward full diplomatic recognition of South Korea. 
Nevertheless, when Japan made clear its intention to begin rap-
prochement, after a year and a half of feelers, North Korea could no 
longer refuse. It welcomed Japan's "king maker" Shin Kanemaru, 
when he arrived with a bipartisan delegation in Pyongyang on Septem-
ber 24, 1990. Kim II Sung listened to an apology for the "agony and 
damage" that Japan inflicted during its occupation of Korea. That 
was expressed by Kanemaru on behalf of the head of the Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party of Japan, Toshiki Kaifu, which means it was not exactly 
an official Japanese government act, but after all Kaifu was the Prime 
Minister. This was accompanied by Kaifu's recognition of North Ko-
rea's right to demand war reparations. Kanemaru met with President 
Kim three times. Kim raised the question of diplomatic recognition in 
a positive fashion but also demanded compensation for the 45 years of 
division since Japan's withdrawal in 1945.36 
The question of American contact and even recognition of the 
DPRK is also being discussed in Washington. In the Spring 1991 is-
sue of Foreign Affairs, Admiral William J. Crowe, until recently 
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for the elevation of 
talks in Beijing to higher levels in order to prepare for the normaliza-
tion of relations between North Korea and the U.S. Specifically, he 
suggested linking the U.S. call for an international inspection of the 
North Korea nuclear facilities with the North's demand for removal of 
U.S. nuclear deployments in South Korea and a U.S. pledge not to 
use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He also advocated that the 
North should pledge not to attack the South and not to develop nu-
clear weapons. 37 In order to prepare the atmosphere for such talks, 
Washington could unilaterally end the annual "Team Spirit" military 
exercises in South Korea. In any case, it appears that cross recogni-
tion is proceeding inexorably. 
Whether this will impede or facilitate the "reunification" of the 
two Koreas is still not clear. But in view of the German case, even 
having two separate seats in the United Nations as separate states did 
36. See, Sam Jameson, "N. Korea Gets Apology From Japan Delegation," Los Angeles 
Times, September 25, 1990, p. A4 and also "Japanese Back N. Korea Bid for Compensa-
tion," Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1990, p. A4. The South Korean reaction was that, 
if North Korea gets any compensation for the years after 1945, the South should get it, too. 
37. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 133-134. 
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not prove to be an obstacle to the country's reunification. The fact 
that West Germany "swallowed" East Germany and is staggering 
under the tremendous economic burden of East Germany with its 
comparatively backward economy provides a sobering warning con-
cerning Korean reunification. 
"REUNIFICATION" SCENARIOS 
In the light of this example, one can imagine at least three possi-
ble scenarios in North Korea concerning Korean "reunification." 
(1) North Korea could collapse like East Germany, or Rumania for 
that matter, following a popular revolution against the government. 
This would place South Korea in the position of paying huge amounts 
of money to integrate the North Korean economy into that of South 
Korea. Not being as comparatively strong as West Germany, this 
might well bring South Korea to the point of collapse or beyond it. 
(2) The North Korean government could carry out a controlled open-
ing of its doors to the outside world in a selective manner, while at the 
same time engaging in its own version of "perestroika," if not "glas-
nost." The attempt would be to avoid the "spiritual pollution of West-
ern bourgeois liberalism," of the kind that led to the Tiananmen 
Square Incident in China. This would maintain the North as a viable 
institution, able to take care of itself in collaboration with the South 
during a period of transition. (3) The North Korean government 
might be overthrown by a coup d'etat of progressive minded military 
and party people, who would carry out changes learned from the ex-
periences of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and then negotiate 
and collaborate with the South. This would mean that the South 
would have to pay more for the realignment of the economy of the 
North than under condition (2) above but a lot less than under condi-
tion (1). 
Variations of the above scenarios can easily be imagined. But 
clearly a collapse of the kind that happened in East Germany - and 
that may have weighed on the minds of perceptive thinkers in South 
Korea and even in the North in recent years - would not be in the 
interests of South Korea. 
Despite all the talk of the "economic miracle" of South Korea 
and statistics that purport to show that it has a Gross National Prod-
uct (GNP) four, five, or even ten times larger than that of the North, 
South Korea does not have the economic strength in comparison to 
North Korea that West Germany had to East Germany. Even in 
terms of population, East Germany with less than 20 million was only 
one-third the size of West Germany with its almost 60 million, 
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whereas North Korea with about 20 million is about one-half the size 
of South Korea. In land mass North Korea is approximately the equal 
of South Korea and in terms of the potential of mineral wealth it is 
superior. 
Finally the political legitimacy of East Germany was highly com-
promised by the stationing of Russian troops there for so many years. 
East Germany did not champion the reunification of the motherland, 
as has North Korea. In addition North Korean independence vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union, thanks to the proximity of the People's Republic 
of China, is much greater than East Germany's. And finally no matter 
how exaggerated are the tales of Kim II Sung's participation in the 
Korean resistance to Japan, that gives him a legitimacy never enjoyed 
by the East German leadership. 
One can also imagine various scenarios taking place in South Ko-
rea that could affect reunification. 
(1) Increasing anti-government riots in South Korea demanding 
the resignation of President Rob Tae Woo, which might result in some 
faction of the army taking over again as has happened in the past. If 
that happened, it would slow down the process of reunification, be-
cause it would probably use the anti-Communist National Security 
Laws to crack down on the students and others. But this scenario 
seems unlikely, given the present world situation and the widespread 
attitudes against military intrusion in politics both internally and 
abroad. 
(2) The South Korean government may make concessions to the 
anti-government protestors by abrogation or significant revision of the 
National Security Laws. After all, the government on Taiwan in May 
1991 abrogated the Law on Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. 
If Taiwan that is so small compared to mainland China can do this, 
how about South Korea? This could lead to a more democratic ap-
proach to reunification in that the government would not be able to 
monopolize the process of reunification, as it has so far. 
One cannot predict what will happen, but it is ironic in the light 
of the past that the South and the North may gradually start to col-
laborate for extending the life of the North Korean regime for the sake 
of a more peaceful and orderly transition than that which occurred in 
Germany. 
East and West Germany had years of closer contact than North 
and South Korea have today. That included communication, travel 
and trade. In the case of the Koreas, the first direct trade between the 
two parts was initiated when a South Korean freighter left Mokpo on 
July 27, 1991 for Nanjin in North Korea loaded with 5,000 tons of 
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South Korean Tongil (Reunification) variety rice, grown in the South 
in 1988. It had been arranged that payment would be made in coal 
and cement. 38 This was the first trickle in what bids fair to become 
torrent in both directions in time. 
On the international political level contact was growing fast also. 
Seeing that its two staunchest allies would no longer keep South Korea 
out of the United Nations, North Korea reversed itself on full U.N. 
membership and then on July 8, 1991, handed in its own application 
for membership in the U.N. Assembly. A month later when South 
Korea had submitted its application, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted a resolution recommending both North and South Korea be 
granted entry simultaneously. 39 
Thus, the challenge to both North and South Korea is the same 
-find a way (or many ways) to work together for the mutual benefit 
of both the North and the South, for the future generations of Korea 
as a whole, and for regional and world peace and prosperity. 
38. Korean Newsreview, Vol. 20, No. 31 (August 3, 1991), pp. 12-13. 
39. Ibid., Vol. 20, No. 32 (August 10, 1991), pp. 4-5. 
CHAPTER V 
PEACE, COOPERATION, AND REUNIFICATION IN KOREA 
Byung-Joon Ahn 
PEACE AND COOPERATION BEFORE REUNIFICATION 
Despite movement toward reunification by China, and the unifi-
cation of the two Germanies - Korea remains a divided nation. The 
cold war continues on the Korean peninsula, both politically and 
militarily. 
North-South Korean relations are moving from confrontation to 
negotiation. Dialogues on political and military issues have begun, but 
no substantive progress will be seen in the immediate future. North 
Korea continues to guard its political system under Kim 11-Sung, de-
spite strong external pressure for change. When the North Koreans 
deliberately transform the political structure, then the North and 
South will achieve peace, cooperation, reconciliation, and eventually 
reunification. 
Five conclusions may be drawn from the status of North-South 
Korean relations: 
First, the international trend toward detente and interdependence 
is forcing the two Koreas to move toward peace and cooperation. The 
impact of international changes will encourage direct dialogues be-
tween the two sides, which in tum will "Koreanize" their relationship 
and normalize diplomatic relations, ultimately resulting in 
crossrecognition. 
Second, the South has achieved democratization at home and 
greater international acclaim for having successfully hosted the 1988 
Olympics. As a result, the South is in a position to normalize relations 
with socialist countries through its Nordpolitik initiative. In conjunc-
tion with its diplomatic initiative, the South has begun to pursue a 
policy of building a Korean commonwealth with the North. 
Third, although North Korea's economy is stagnant and the 
Northern government has made efforts to improve relations with the 
South, the U.S., and Japan- the present Northern leadership is com-
mitted to preserving the current political system. 
Fourth, North-South relations are shifting into an era of recogni-
tion. Militarily and politically, the South is in a more favorable posi-
(89) 
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tion than the North, which has been reluctant to negotiate for 
domestic reasons. The main issues of negotiation will, therefore, be 
arms control and economic cooperation. 
Fifth, though little will be achieved from North-South dialogues 
in the next few years, both sides anticipate that negotiation will bring 
peace, cooperation, and reunification. To achieve these goals, the two 
Koreas will need the support of the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet 
Union. 
The following elements affect the current status of North-South 
Korean relations: 1) the international situation, 2) the situation in 
South Korea, and 3) the situation in North Korea. The South Kore-
ans and the international politics favor negotiation, while the North 
Koreans remain ambivalent. 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL 
DETENTE AND DE JURE CROSSRECOGNITION 
The changing international environment reveals a clear trend to-
ward global detente, which in tum is transforming the relationship 
between the two Koreas from de facto to de jure crossrecognition. 
Among the changes that have a substantial impact on the Korean pe-
ninsula are the end of the cold war, the thrust toward German unifica-
tion, political shifts in Eastern Europe, normalization of Soviet-South 
Korean relations, the U.S. strategic view toward Asia, and the rise of 
Japan as a global economic power. 
1. The End of the Cold War and the Advent of German 
Unification 
The multitude of changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe 
signal the end of the cold war, as the NATO leaders at the London 
summit declared in July 1990. German unification also changed with 
its currency reunification on July 1, 1990. More than anything else, 
the (so far) successful merging of two economies in Germany acts as 
persuasive pressure on North Korea to modify its rigid stand on unifi-
cation. The resurrection of civil societies - along with the resurgence 
of pluralism and market forces- in Eastern European countries is 
making North Korea an international outcast, even among the social-
ist states. 
After Gorbachev changed the Brezhnev Doctrine into the Sinatra 
Doctrine, the Soviet Union decided to pull troops out of Eastern Eu-
rope, virtually ending the cold war. After its ideology is challenged 
and war is no longer a viable state plan, communism will inevitably 
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collapse, as demonstrated so graphically by the Romanian incident. 
The assertion of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union is threatening 
to break apart this communist empire. The Warsaw Pact seems to 
have become defunct, and a unified Germany is a foregone conclusion. 
At the sixth U.S.-USSR summit in June 1990, Presidents Bush and 
Gorbachev renewed their commitment to the new detente with their 
agreements on START nuclear weapon reductions and new trade 
relations. 
2. Normalization of Soviet-South Korean Relations 
The Soviet Union is gradually normalizing its diplomatic rela-
tions with South Korea in the midst of these changes. It is remarkable 
that Moscow has began to separate the Korean question from its 
global rivalry with the U.S.- and even from its alliance with Pyong-
yang. Gorbachev signaled this to Kim Young Sam when they met in 
the Kremlin on March 22, 1990.1 
North Korea is interested in securing as much economic coopera-
tion as possible from South Korea; it is also engaged in a diplomatic 
game - playing South Korea against Japan in an attempt to prod 
Japan into changing its policy. At the same time South Korea hopes 
to use its leverage over North Korea, so that the latter can emulate the 
examples of Eastern European countries by initiating reforms and 
greater opening to the world community. 
Moscow is applying its New Thinking and Glasnost to Asia in 
general and Korea in particular. Thus, Moscow has begun to take up 
the issue of divided Korea in its bilateral talks with Washington. On 
record, it is urging both Seoul and Pyongyang to resume dialogues and 
reduce tensions. The Soviet press accurately reported and openly 
characterized North Korea as Kim 11 Sung's personal museum.2 For 
this reason Alexander Shebin, a veteran correspondent based in 
Pyongyang for seven years, was expelled from North Korea in May 
1990.3 Nevertheless, since establishing a consular department in Seoul 
in January 1990, Moscow has been seeking a "two-Koreas" policy by 
diplomatically recognizing the Republic of Korea. The summit meet-
ing of Presidents Rob and Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 5, 
1990 marked the culmination of this process, which will have far-
reaching impact on North-South Korean relations. 
With its relations with Washington steadily improving, Moscow 
I. Korean Herald, March 31, 1990. 
2. Yomiuri Shimbun, April I, 1990. 
3. International Herald Tribune, May 25, 1990. 
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is interested in applying pressure on Pyongyang to sign the safeguard 
agreement regarding the nuclear reprocessing facilities in Y oungbyun. 
Moreover, Moscow has made it clear that establishing peace and sta-
bility on the Korean peninsula takes precedence over accomplishing 
unification. Thus, its view on security and economic matters have 
been edging toward Seoul's. 
3. The U.S. Strategic Review: Troop Reduction and Arms Control 
Mter conducting a strategic review of the presence of American 
forces in Asia and Korea, the U.S. plans to reduce troops in its for-
ward deployment. As the U.S. plans to reduce troops stationed in 
South Korea (in pace with North Korea's willingness to take measures 
to build confidence), this review should encourage arms control nego-
tiations between the North and the South. 
Under the Nunn-Wamer Amendment, the Bush administration 
has submitted a report concerning this review to Congress, which en-
visages a future transition where South Korea assumes "a leading 
role" and the U.S. "a supporting role" in South Korea's defense. Ac-
cording to Paul W olfowitz, who explained the report, the U.S. would 
play the role of "a region balancer, honest broker and an ultimate se-
curity guarantor" in Asia.4 As for Korea, the report provide a flexible 
timetable outlining three stages for both the reduction of American 
troops and the sharing of the financial burden. During the first phase 
in 1991-93, the U.S. will reduce American forces by 7,000 persons, 
including 2,000 Air Force personnel and 5,000 noncombatants. 
Washington has asked Seoul to appoint the chief delegate to the Mili-
tary Armistice Commission and to increase South Korea's burden of 
maintaining American troops to $ 1.3 billion. 
During the second stage in 1994-95, the U.S. will reexamine the 
North Korean threat, the state of North-South relations, and improve-
ments in South Korea's military capabilities - and then consider fur-
ther U.S. military restructuring. At this stage, the U.S. can transfer 
operational control over land forces to a Korean general. Finally, dur-
ing the third stage in 1996-2000, the U.S. expects South Korea to take 
the lead role in defense. 5 
It is evident that this report is prompting Seoul to increasingly 
4. The text of Paul Wolfowitz's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
on April 19, 1990. 
5. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century, 
the Report of the Defense Department to the Congress on the military presence on the 
United States in Korea, April 1990, p. 17. 
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assume responsibility for Korea's own defense. Equally clear is the 
assumed linkage between American troop reduction and North-South 
arms control possibilities, because all U.S. forces will be withdrawn 
from Korea only when the North and the South agree on a confidence 
building measure that can assure peace and stability. 
4. Japan as a Global Actor: A Regional Political Role 
The relative decline of the U.S., and the Chinese and the Soviet 
preoccupation with their own domestic problems have helped to 
change the status of Japan from a "free rider" to a global actor. With 
growing economic and technological power, Japan has begun to reas-
sert a regional political role in Asia. 
While the U.S. continues to play a balancing security role, Japan 
is being asked to play more important roles in economic matters. 
Since Japan does not have many friends in Asia, it has eschewed from 
assuming security roles. But Tokyo is currently aiming at asserting its 
political role commensurate with its economic clout by increasing its 
international activities. Evidence of this trend is indicated by Japan's 
resumption of credit to China, for which Prime Minister Kaifu sought 
President Bush's approval at the Houston Summit in July 1990. By 
inviting President Roh in May 1990, Tokyo provided Emperor Akih-
ito with a chance to apologize to South Korea by saying that he felt 
the deepest regret for the suffering of Koreans caused by his country 
during the colonial period.6 Besides these gestures, Tokyo is planning 
to use the Emperor's visit to South Korea and other Asian countries as 
a means to enhance Japan's image abroad. In this symbolic manner, 
Japan is attempting to play a stabilizing role in Korea and throughout 
Asia. 
It should be clear from the analysis below that South Korea has 
become an active global participant. In contrast, North Korea has 
alienated itself by rejecting the global trends toward political pluralism 
and economic interdependence. 
THE SOUTH KOREAN SITUATION: STABILITY AND 
SELF-CONFIDENCE 
The propitious development in the international system coupled 
with the democratization and economic development at home has ena-
bled South Korea to project a measure of stability and self-confidence 
in its foreign policies and unification efforts. This can be discerned 
from Seoul's Nordpolitik diplomacy and the idea of a Korean Com-
6. Korea Herald, May 25, 1990. 
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monwealth. The merger of three parties into one large ruling party 
does hold some political uncertainty, but it is being regarded as a prep-
aration for the coming era of negotiations with the North. 
1. Economic and Political Development 
Although the South Korean economy is facing a sluggish phase 
now with the rising prices of land, goods, services, and labor, South 
Korea has demonstrated its potential by hosting the 1988 Olympics. 
If it achieves a successful structural adjustment to overcome current 
difficulties, South Korea could become one of ten leading trading 
countries by the end of this century. 
In addition, South Korean politics have experienced democratiza-
tion since June 1987 when Rob Tae Woo agreed to accept demands for 
the popular election of the president. Elections and party politics have 
been restored; human rights and an independent judiciary have also 
been reactivated. As a result, the old pattern of authoritarianism is 
being transformed into a new pattern of pluralism. Although politi-
cians have failed to elicit public support, the overall trend of democra-
tization seems to be irreversible. As institutions of democracy set their 
roots in the State and society, there will emerge an optimal balance 
between economic development and political stability in South Korea. 
2. Nordpolitik: Crossrecognition 
Seoul's diplomatic success in Nordpolitik, i.e., its policy toward 
China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, has been quite 
spectacular. Since South Korea established diplomatic relations with 
Hungary in February 1989, South Korea has similarly done so with 
Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Mongolia. On 
October 20, 1990, South Korea and China signed a treaty establishing 
trade offices on each side's capital and promoting normalization of for-
eign relations. 7 It is also on the verge of establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. It is currently engaged in negotiations for 
this diplomatic purpose with Vietnam and the other remaining social-
ist countries. 
South Korea's economic relations with these countries have rap-
idly expanded. In 1989, trade with these countries exceeded $ 4 bil-
lion, making South Korea their fourth largest trade partner: about $ 3 
billion with China, $ 600 million with the Soviet Union, and $ 400 
7. Shih-chiehjih-pao (World Journal), October 20, 1990. 
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million with Eastern European countries. Its investment and cultural 
relations are also likely to expand in the years to come. 
3. A Korean Commonwealth 
Against the backdrop of these developments, President Rob an-
nounced a plan in September 1989 for building a Korean Common-
wealth. The key to this new proposal is to institutionalize ministerial 
meetings, summits of the highest authorities, and consultations of rep-
resentatives from the two legislatures as an interim forum before ac-
complishing reunification. 
It is important to note that the South pledged itself to treating the 
North as a partner in the process of building a national community. 
In so doing, the South accommodated much of the North's conten-
tions for equal representation and addressing military and political is-
sues first. By embarking on programs to build confidence and 
facilitate economic cooperation, this proposal seeks to lay the ground-
work for reunification which will be achieved by peaceful agreement. 
4. Party Realignment for a Grand Ruling Party 
On January 22, 1990, Rob Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim 
Jong Pil reached a dramatic agreement to merge their parties into the 
new Democratic-Liberal Party, which enabled them to enjoy an over-
whelming majority in the National Assembly. One motivation for this 
move was to restore unity and stability in preparation for negotiations 
with the North. 
This merger served to end the political stalemate that had 
plagued Korean politics since Roh was elected as president with only 
37 percent of the popular vote. The outbreak of infighting between 
Kim Young Sam and Roh, however, has disappointed the public. 
Faced with economic and social malaise, the leaders are trying hard to 
preserve a united front. 
Whatever happens to their struggle for political succession, it is 
inescapable that this new party will be primarily responsible for gov-
ernance and for devising policies toward the North. 
From a comparative perspective, the South Korean situation has 
improved a great deal. Hence, the South is in a position to accommo-
date most of the North's demands with a sense of self-confidence, ex-
cept for those attempts at military or revolutionary provocation. 
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THE NORTH KOREAN SITUATION: ISOLATION AND 
DEFENSIVENESS 
North Korea is isolated, because it is defensive against the demo-
cratic revolution rising in its erstwhile allies. North Korea is bent on 
keeping socialism by consolidating the existing system under Kim 11 
Sung. New ideas in the North are not so much in the substance of 
politics and policy as in the style. An example of such a change is 
found in Pyongyang's deliberate efforts to improve relations with 
Washington and Tokyo. 
1. Diplomatic Isolation 
It is evident that North Korea is isolated, even from the socialist 
countries. Pyongyang has recalled most of its students from the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European countries. After its ambassadors to 
these countries had an emergency meeting in January 1990, Pyong-
yang halted verbal attacks on those countries which established diplo-
matic relations with the South. 
China is one of the few countries still friendly with North Korea. 
In March 1990, Jiang Zemin paid a formal visit to Pyongyang and 
promised to defend socialism with North Korea. But China's reforms 
and open-door policy are at odds with North Korea's rigid central 
planning and self-reliance policy. Most devastating of all is 
Gorbachev's summit with Rob which hit at the heart of Kim 11 Sung's 
political legitimacy. He has lost support from those on which he could 
rely as a source of strength. 
2. Economic Stagnation 
All indicators show that the North Korean economy is stagnat-
ing. The lack of infrastructure, incentives, and proper policy accounts 
for this. The bulk of the North's industrial production depends on 
plants and technologies from the Soviet Union. Over one half of its 
trade has been with the Soviet Union. Apparently, both China and the 
Soviet Union have decreased supplies of energy and goods to the 
North in recent years. 
Since Pyongyang has defaulted on its payments for foreign debt, 
it cannot successfully invite trade and investment from the West. The 
rule of diminishing returns seems to be further limiting its productiv-
ity. Most serious of all is the shortage of food and necessities. This 
picture is really far from the North's official depiction of itself as a 
paradise on earth. 
CHAPTER V 97 
3. Internal Consolidation 
Faced with external isolation and economic difficulties, North 
Korea has chosen to consolidate the political system in the mold of 
Kim 11 Sung's cult of personality and long-held philosophy. The 
Ninth Supreme People's Assembly was formed in April 1990, six 
months ahead of schedule to consolidate "the people's regime." Con-
trary to expectations, Kim 11 Sung was reelected as president to a fifth 
term at the first session in May; he further pledged to uphold his brand 
of socialism. He put some of the old military guards in positions of 
power and appointed his son Jong-il as the second ranking Vice Chair-
man of the National Defense Commission. One third of the new 687-
member parliament are newcomers who are allegedly followers of 
Jong-il. Interestingly enough, about six percent of them are non-com-
munist party members. Also noteworthy is the fact that most provin-
cial governors are members of the Central People's Committee, while 
premier Yong Hyong-muk of the State Council is not a member. 8 
4. A Softer Stance Toward the South, the U.S., and Japan 
In his speech to the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim 11 Sung 
revealed a somewhat softer stance toward the South, the U.S. and Ja-
pan. In a five-point statement on unification, he reaffirmed the famil-
iar calls for a peace agreement with U.S., for free movement of people 
by removing "concrete walls" between the North and the South along 
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), for abrogating anti-communist laws, 
for building an international environment conducive to unification, for 
resuming dialogues not only between authorities but also between so-
cial groups and political parties, and, finally, for forming a national 
united front involving all Koreans at home and abroad. 
The only new aspect in this speech was revealed when he said: "If 
the North and the South are to join the U.N. before Korea's reunifica-
tion is achieved, they must not hold two separate seats but enter it 
jointly as one member."9 This is designed to forestall the South's uni-
lateral entry into the U.N. 
The way in which Kim 11 Sung departed from his previous 
speeches is that he avoided attacks on the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, 
North Korea returned the remains of five American soldiers killed in 
the Korean War to the United States at Panmunjom on May 28, 1990 
as a humanitarian gesture. This is only a tiny fraction of the 8, 172 
8. Nodong Shinmun, May 24, 1990. 
9. The Text of Kim II Sung's Speech to the First Session of the 9th People's Supreme 
Congress, May 24, 1990. 
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military personnel listed as missing in action [MIA] that are still unac-
counted for since the Korean War ended in 1953. By offering further 
returns, Pyongyang is calling upon the U.S. to upgrade the level of 
negotiations that have been held at the consulate level in Beijing to an 
ambassadorial talk at some other place. 
Clearly, Pyongyang is signalling a willingness to improve its rela-
tions with Washington. Yet Washington has insisted that Pyongyang 
stop supporting state terrorism, resume dialogues with Seoul, stop dia-
tribes on the U.S., sign the safeguard agreement on nuclear facilities, 
and expand confidence building measures in addition to further ac-
counting for U.S. MIA's. Unless there is real progress in these areas, 
Pyongyang's approaches to Washington are likely to remain fruitless. 
What concerns the North Korean leaders most is how to keep 
their system intact in the face of serious challenges from abroad. 
Their priority lies in justifying their continued rule to their domestic 
audience. By tightly controlling channels of communication, they are 
trying to minimize the impact of foreign inputs and find their own way 
to survive politically. Should they allow reform as did many Eastern 
European countries or as did the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, their 
own power will be in jeopardy. They have little choice but to opt for 
the Chinese model of defending their political stakes while allowing 
some economic reforms. This is why they refuse to change. Hence, 
they have become defensive by displaying a soft flexible stance at least 
in style, if not in substance, toward the outside world. 
NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS AT A CROSSROAD 
North-South Korean relations are at a crossroad between con-
frontation and negotiation. The diplomatic and economic race has 
been won by the South, and even the military and political race seems 
to be shifting that way. But the North relies primarily on the so-called 
"Juch'e" ideology of unification which refuses to recognize the South 
Korean system, whereas the South is diversifying the sources of its 
political legitimacy by achieving democratization, economic develop-
ment, social welfare, and internationalization. 
Confrontation seems inevitable as long as the two different sys-
tems struggle for legitimacy and security. Negotiation is also neces-
sary for survival and coexistence. Settlement of pending issues, such 
as economic cooperation and arms control can be achieved only 
through dialogue. Substantial differences in the way that the two sides 
approach these issues still exist. 
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The North and the South have been struggling for political legiti-
macy. The North has attempted to legitimize itself via the Juch'e ide-
ology and by applying it to the South through advocating unification 
before peace. The South, however, has been trying to engage the 
North in dialogues so that peace can be assured before unification, 
which should be reached through mutual agreement. The very nature 
of the North Korean political system compels Pyongyang to seek a 
united front strategy against the South to justify its own political legit-
imacy to its domestic audience and to some sympathizers in the 
South. 10 
This struggle is a distinctive aspect of North-South Korean rela-
tions. Unlike the two Germanies, both sides are technically at war, 
with hostilities abated by an armistice, creating a zero-sum game with 
a high quotient of distrust and hostility. 11 In this sense, political and 
military conflicts are combined. The North still refuses to recognize 
the South as a legitimate entity while the South is ready to accept the 
North as a partner for a North-South Commonwealth. 12 
2. Military Balance: Quantity v. Quality 
The military balance along the DMZ favors the North at least in 
quantity because it has about one million troops, whereas the South 
has only 600,000. Given the size of South Korea's GNP, which is 
almost eight times that of North Korea's, and the level of the South's 
technology, the balance should soon shift in the South's favor in terms 
of quality. 
Because the North has deployed 60 percent of its forces along the 
DMZ and because Seoul is only 35 miles away from the DMZ, the 
North has reduced the warning time for attacks to only 24 hours. The 
American troops between Panmunjom and Seoul serve as the most 
effective deterrent to a possible North Korean invasion. For political 
reasons, Pyongyang has consistently demanded the South's with-
drawal and replacement of the armistice with a peace agreement with 
10. Byung-joon Ahn, "North-South Korean Relations and the U.S.," in Robert 
Scalapino and Hong-koo Lee, eds., U.S.-Korea Relations, Berkeley, California: Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986, p. 159. 
11. Byung-joon Ahn, "North-South Korean Relations and the Major Powers," in Rob-
ert A. Scalapino, Seijaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security 
Issues, Regional and Global, Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1988. p. 198. 
12. Ibid., p. 199. 
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Washington - which could be accomplished through a tripartite 
agreement. 
3. Dialogue: Between Social Groups or Governmental Authorities 
Thus far, there have been three rounds of dialogue since 1971_13 
From January 1988 through July 1990, there were thirty-five contacts 
at Panmunjom: nine preliminary sessions preparing for a senior level 
political and military talk, eleven preliminary sessions preparing for a 
parliamentary talk, fifteen sessions of sport talks preparing for a single 
team for the Asian Games in Beijing, and seven sessions of working 
level Red Cross talks preparing for resumption of family visits and 
exchanges of art troupes. Just before "Team Spirit 1990" got under 
way, the North unilaterally suspended all of these dialogues. Even 
after the South called for their resumption after the exercise was over, 
the North showed a negative reaction, complaining that the South had 
refused to accept revolutionary plays. Suddenly in June 1990, how-
ever, the North called for resumption of high level parliamentary 
talks, and the South welcomed this. 
In principle, Pyongyang wants to have a dialogue, but insists on 
having political consultative meetings of leaders from various social 
groups and political parties, in addition to the talks between the two 
authorities. For example, Pyongyang has extended an invitation to 
President Roh not as the president of the Republic of Korea, but as 
the ruling party - along with others, including dissident leaders. 
Seoul also wants to have talks with Pyongyang. Preferring gov-
ernmental talks, the South is committed to blunting any attempt by 
Pyongyang to capitalize on the divisiveness within the South Korean 
society. Since August 1989, Seoul has added democracy to peace and 
self-determination as principles for unification, while calling upon 
Pyongyang to improve its human rights record. 
4. Military Settlement v. Economic Cooperation 
Another difference in the approach is the degree to which each 
authority places emphasis on military settlement as its first priority 
and calls for the withdrawal of American troops. Seoul favors having 
economic, social, and cultural cooperation first - and moving onto 
the more difficult military and political settlement later in order to 
relax tension and to restore trust. Since October 1988, when President 
Roh said at the U.N. that he would go to Pyongyang to discuss any 
13. Ibid., pp. 200-205. 
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issues raised by Kim 11 Sung including those on the non-aggression 
declaration and arms control, Seoul has been trying to accommodate 
Pyongyang's calls for military talks as well. 
Since Seoul set out to accommodate Pyongyang's preference for 
political and military issues at high level talks in July 1990, both sides 
agreed to convene prime minister level talks in September and October 
1990. Hence, this round of dialogue has raised hopes for opening a 
new era in North-South relations. 
Indeed, there are emerging some areas of convergence as Seoul is 
ready to take up military issues and Pyongyang is interested in eco-
nomic cooperation. For example, the North invited Chung Ju Young, 
honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, in January 1989, and per-
suaded him to sign an agreement for the development of a tourist at-
traction around Mount Kumgang. But when Mr. Chung wanted to 
deliver some vehicles and equipment before his second visit, Pyong-
yang rejected the offers in May 1990. 
It should be noted here that Seoul can make concessions on eco-
nomic cooperation and Pyongyang on military settlement. If the two 
sides are seriously interested in probing each other's interests, they can 
find some common ground. It is significant that Pyongyang made a 
proposal for arms control right after the plan for the Roh-Gorbachev 
summit was announced. The proposal called for a direct meeting be-
tween the North and the South for the first time, even though it re-
vealed almost no new substance. 14 
PROSPECTS: PEACE, COOPERATION AND 
REUNIFICATION 
Considering the changing international environment and the 
North-South Korea situation, a long term and gradual development 
should involve first peace, then cooperation, and finally reunification. 
International political changes and the South Korean situation augur 
well for making such a shift from military confrontation to political 
negotiation. North Korea seems to be hesitating mainly for domestic 
reasons. But even the North cannot go against the mainstream of his-
tory forever; it has little choice but to accept dialogue, crossrecogni-
tion, confidence-building measures, cooperation, and reunification by 
mutual agreement. 
14. Korea Herald, June 2, 1990. 
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1. Dialogue 
Resuming dialogues between the two governments is the surest 
way to build trust and peace. Once Seoul and Pyongyang resolve to 
settle their differences through negotiation, it will be easy for them to 
reach agreement on issues such as crossrecognition, arms control, eco-
nomic cooperation, and reunification on the basis of common interests. 
Logically speaking, there is no reason why Presidents Rob and 
Kim could not have a summit for this purpose, given that the Roh-
Gorbacbev summit was realized. Even without such a summit, the 
responsible authorities should negotiate pending issues. It is unrealis-
tic that they can be resolved through meetings of social groups, as the 
North is demanding. The first priority in the North-South relation-
ship, therefore, should be to resume a series of dialogues between the 
two governments for the purpose of probing each other's real interests 
on the basis of self-determination for all of Korea, instead of rehashing 
the propaganda of the past. This is the essence of what is meant by the 
"Koreanization of the Korean question." 
2. Crossrecognition 
The surrounding powers should render assistance and urge both 
sides to have dialogues. To do so requires that they normalize rela-
tions with the North and the South. China and the Soviet Union 
should normalize their relations with South Korea, and the United 
States and Japan should normalize their relations with North Korea. 
It must be emphasized that this should only be a provisional state of 
diplomatic relations until the Korean peninsula is completely reunified 
(provided, of course, that North Korea and South Korea remain 
peaceful in the meantime). 
The North's contention that such crossrecognition is a device to 
perpetuate the Korean division bas been discredited by the German 
reunification. By no means is crossrecognition an end in itself; it is 
only a means to reduce tension and encourage cooperation. Also, the 
North seems to change its position on crossrecognition, demonstrated 
by the fact that the North is cooperative in applying for one-vote U.N. 
membership with the South - although it is unrealistic to imagine 
how these two states can function together with only one vote if both 
are admitted to the U.N. 
3. Confidence-Building Measures and Arms Control 
Now that the North bas indicated a willingness to have direct 
military talks with the South, there is a possibility that the two sides 
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can have constructive negotiations concerning anns control and confi-
dence-building. In fact, many points in Pyongyang's recent proposal 
coincide with what Seoul has consistently advocated. Among these 
are operational measures like informing each other of military exer-
cises and making the DMZ a truly demilitarized zone. 
It is significant that Pyongyang proposed placing confidence-
building measures and the need for the reduction of forces on both 
sides before the withdrawal of American troops and other items. In 
addition, it did not specify a timetable for such withdrawal in this new 
proposal. This comprehensive proposal contains important measures 
to build political confidence and improve Korea's image, which should 
precede other operational and structural anns control steps, as was 
similarly done in European negotiations. No less important is that 
Pyongyang has indicated its serious willingness to negotiate confi-
dence-building and anns control with Seoul bilaterally. 
To realize a structural anns control measure like the reduction of 
anned forces and disengagement of forward deployment from the 
frontline necessarily requires long and hard bargaining. This is why a 
political talk should precede a military talk in Korea. It can contrib-
ute to restoring some measure of trust, economic cooperation, and 
other exchanges which might be considered confidence-building meas-
ures. Most important of all, given the tense military situation along 
the DMZ, negotiating a disengagement of troops and offensive equip-
ment by both sides to a rear area is essential to assure deterrence, as a 
one Soviet anns control expert has proposed. 15 
After the North and the South reach some agreement on these 
matters, other concerned parties can be involved in guaranteeing their 
implementation. From this perspective, linking progress in anns con-
trol to the reduction of American forces is necessary, not only to facili-
tate political dialogue, but also to encourage military talks between 
North and South Korea. After the two sides conclude a peace agree-
ment, the U.S., China and other concerned powers can discuss the 
issue of ending the armistice and endorsing the peace agreement. 
4. Peace, Cooperation and Reunification 
In conclusion, a realistic prospect for North-South Korean rela-
tions is a scenario of peace, cooperation, and reunification. If the 
15. Alexei Arbatov, "Pacific Vortex: Arms Control and Related Security Problems for 
the Far East," a paper for the conference, "In Search of a New World Order in East Asia" 
sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley ~d 
Dong-a Ilbo, Seoul, South Korea, February 3, 1990, Santa Barbara, California. 
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North decides to accommodate such a process or experience some 
structural transformation as have other socialist countries, the poten-
tial time span of this prospect of unity will be shortened. Translating 
such a scenario into action accords with the goal of diffusing the Ko-
rean cold war and of sustaining the global detente that is becoming 
universal. Seen in this light, there seems to be no more important task 
than keeping peace and stability on the Korean peninsula which has 
become an island of the cold war in contemporary international 
relations. 
CHAPTER VI 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECfS FOR PEACE AND 
UNIFICATION IN KOREA 
Sung-Joo Han 
INTRODUCfiON 
Since the three-year Korean Confiict ended 37 years ago, there 
has not been a war on the Korean Peninsula. But the peace has been 
an uneasy one, often punctuated by incidents and clashes that could 
have escalated into a major conflict. Both North and South Korea 
have lived with the fear that the other side might be inclined to pro-
voke a war. The arms buildup on both sides and the alliance relation-
ships that have evolved to date can be traced directly back to the war 
and the resultant anxiety and sense of insecurity. Thus, it has been a 
precarious peace, maintained by a balance of defense and deterrence 
capabilities. 
Today, in 1990, the Korean people on both sides of the demarca-
tion line, have an historic opportunity to make that peace more dura-
ble and to make the unification of their divided country a reality. The 
objective circumstances, both domestic and international, allow the 
two sides to begin to build bridges of exchange, open channels of com-
munication, and devise means of cooperation that will make the rela-
tionship less dangerous and more productive, as well as more 
conducive to peaceful unification. However, this can only happen if 
the two sides transform their old ways of confrontation and rivalry 
into new approaches of accommodation and cooperation. They must 
learn to refrain from mutual recrimination and accusation, from at-
tempts to take advantage of each other's internal political dynamics 
and from the creation of artificial obstacles and preconditions to con-
structive talks and exchanges which could otherwise lead to coopera-
tion and peace, and ultimately to unification. 
The international situation today is ripe for a breakthrough in the 
North-South Korean situation. Increasingly, members of the interna-
tional community are placing greater importance on economic ad-
vancement rather than on political or military goals. All this is 
evidenced not only by improvement of the major power relations, but 
also by the actual and prospective improvement of relations between 
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traditional rivals in the area. This means that as the North and the 
South are undergoing a major change from confrontation to accom-
modation, both in form and in substance, other countries are not likely 
to object to, or obstruct, the development of constructive and produc-
tive relationships between them. 
Furthermore, during the past several years, South Korea has 
gone through rapid political change and economic development that 
would make it necessary and ready to start to expand exchanges and 
cooperation with North Korea. Indeed, South Korea has undergone a 
political transformation that makes it receptive to any reasonable pro-
posals about improving North-South Korean relations that North Ko-
rea can offer. Economically, South Korea, which has had double-digit 
growth during the past years, is becoming a major power. This 
presents both North and South Korea with an extraordinary opportu-
nity to cooperate for the common prosperity of all the Korean people. 
As they cooperate, work together, freely travel in each other's terri-
tory, and conduct economic, cultural, sports and other exchanges, the 
chances of peace and of unification will ultimately be enhanced. 
In order to achieve permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, 
unification of the country would be the best way. Even as Koreans 
strive for peaceful unification, however, they have to recognize that it 
is not going to be an easy and quick task, considering the mutual dis-
trust that pervades the relationship between the two sides, as well as 
differences in ideological orientations, socio-economic structures and 
political systems. However, there is no reason to leave all forms of 
exchange and cooperation until the day when unification is achieved. 
Thus, in order to promote peace and the unification of Korea, the 
two Koreas should adopt a gradual and simultaneous approach. As 
they work on the grand design of unification, they can also work for 
the gradual reduction of tension, through arms talks and confidence-
building measures. At the same time, they can and should try to build 
a structure of peace based on an agreement between North and South 
Korea - which one might call a peace agreement - which will re-
place the present armistice structure. 
In short, what is most urgently needed is the building of confi-
dence, which has been lacking between the North and South ever since 
the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in 1950. Rather than simply talk-
ing about the results of tension, such as the weapons systems and de-
terrence capability, they have to go to the causes thereof, which are 
intentions and anxieties. As confidence and trust build up, it will be 
possible to restructure the security arrangements that North and 
South Korea have with their respective allies. 
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THE STATE OF NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS 
Twice since 1953, when the Korean War ended with the signing 
of an armistice, both North and South Korea were engaged in serious 
dialogues to improve their hostile relationship, with a third occasion 
yet to come. The first dialogue took place during the 1972-73 period, 
when the North-South Korean Red Cross met to discuss the possibil-
ity of reuniting family members separated between the two areas. Sub-
sequently, the two sides agreed to establish a North-South 
Coordinating Committee to discuss reconciliation and reunification. 
The dialogue was discontinued in 1973 because of Pyongyang's refusal 
to deal with the Seoul government. The second period of North-South 
Korean dialogue was between 1984 and 1985. At that time, North-
South Korean talks were divided into four different subjects - Red 
Cross/family reunion, economic cooperation, political discussion be-
tween the parliamentarians, and sports. By examining why the concil-
iation talks of the mid-1980s failed to produce any positive results, we 
can diagnose the problems of today's North-South Korean relation-
ship and prognosticate its future. 
In 1984, hopes of North-South reconciliation arose when North 
Korea made, and South Korea accepted, an offer of relief supplies to 
aid victims of the flood in September of the same year. That gesture 
opened the way for the economic talks- the first between high-rank-
ing representatives of the Pyongyang and Seoul governments since the 
division of the country, as well as meetings to discuss issues related to 
family reunion and possible North Korean participation in the 1988 
Olympics. The Red Cross talks in 1985 led to an exchange of meet-
ings in Seoul and Pyongyang, and also to visits by 50 separated family 
members from each side to the "other area" where many of them had 
reunions with their kin and relatives. 
Pyongyang apparently concluded that talks with Seoul would be 
a necessary step in establishing ties with Western powers, particularly 
with the United States and Japan. It also saw talks with Seoul as a 
necessary means of realizing its proposal for "tripartite talks" among 
the United States and North and South Korea, inasmuch as the 
United States was insisting that direct inter-Korea talks should pre-
cede any possible multilateral negotiation on the Korean issue. 
North Korea probably had an economic motivation as well for 
opening the various channels of dialogue with South Korea. Recog-
nizing that it was lagging behind the South economically, it wished to 
move out of its political and diplomatic isolation and regain its ability 
to borrow from abroad and trade with other countries - an ability 
that had been seriously damaged by previous debt defaults. By start-
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ing dialogues with South Korea, Pyongyang hoped to open the possi-
bility of starting or otherwise expanding economic exchanges with 
noncommunist countries such as the United States, Japan and the 
countries of Western Europe. 
The South Korean government had its own political motives for 
welcoming Pyongyang's willingness, although shortlived, to engage in 
talks with the South. As the host country for various major interna-
tional events, including the Olympic Games that were to come, it was 
eager to secure North Korean acquiescence, if not cooperation. At the 
same time, the improvement of North-South Korean relations was 
seen by Seoul as a necessary step to open its own relations with the 
Soviet Union and China. Seoul also hoped that the North-South Ko-
rean dialogues and exchanges and improving relations with the 
"northern neighbors" would promote peace and the possibility of uni-
fication in Korea. 
Renewed exchanges in the mid-1980s led nowhere, as several ob-
stacles kept Pyongyang from seriously pursuing accommodation with 
South Korea. Pyongyang was constrained by its own ideology and by 
political requirements. For Pyongyang, dealing directly and officially 
with South Korean "authorities" was tantamount to accepting the 
"two Koreas" formula, which it had opposed all along. Furthermore, 
it did not have any intention of making it easy for Seoul to stage the 
1988 Olympic Games successfully, as it was understandably unhappy 
that the potential participation of North Korea's allies in the games 
would enhance South Korea's prestige. 
Under these circumstances, when the South Korean domestic 
political scene became increasingly volatile and unpredictable, Pyong-
yang decided at the end of 1985 to suspend all talks, ostensibly in pro-
test of the U.S.-R.O.K. "Team Spirit" military exercise. Inasmuch as 
the exercise had been a regular annual event, it was clear that North 
Korea concluded that the dialogue had to be suspended until after the 
political situation in South Korea, as well as in North Korea itself, was 
sorted out. North Korea was undergoing a process of succession and, 
hence, one could not rule out the possibility of a policy debate within 
its leadership. 
In the final analysis, the second period of North-South Korean 
dialogue came to an end because neither side had a genuine interest in 
a productive outcome from the exercise. Pyongyang was afraid of 
"conferring legitimacy" on the South Korean government and also of 
facilitating South Korean expansion of relationships with its own al-
lies, particularly the Soviet Union and China. It saw the possibility of 
the South Korean policy collapsing under the weight of its own inter-
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nal division, a lack of legitimacy and political instability. On the other 
hand, the South Korean government was afraid of a false sense of se-
curity that might result from superficial reconciliation with the north-
em adversary, and which might, in tum, lead to the weakening of the 
U.S. security commitment to Korea. Both protagonists recognized the 
usefulness of the status quo and the absence of a major breakthrough 
in inter-Korean relations, at least for the time being. In short, inter-
Korea talks between both Pyongyang and Seoul were not likely to be 
seen as a means to achieve a genuine improvement of relations be-
tween them. Thus, it came as no surprise that the talks produced no 
positive results. 
North Korea refrained from participation in the Seoul Olympics 
altogether, and instead concentrated on staging a successful Interna-
tional Youth Festival, which was held in June 1989. South Korean 
student activists were invited to the event. The South Korean govern-
ment, for its part, insisted that the visits and exchanges should be un-
dertaken within a framework agreed upon by Seoul and Pyongyang. 
Pyongyang, however, intended to bypass the Seoul government and 
take advantage of the pluralistic nature of the South Korean polity. 
Unproductive as they were, talks nonetheless continued in a sporadic 
fashion between both North and South Korea for a while in several 
areas, holding out a slim hope that one day a breakthrough in North-
South Korean relations might take place. Even those talks have been 
suspended completely since 1989. 
Meanwhile, Seoul and Pyongyang continued to exchange unifica-
tion proposals. In response to Pyongyang's call for a Washington-Se-
oul-Pyongyang tripartite meeting to discuss military matters and the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops, Seoul proposed a North-South Korean dis-
cussion on a peace agreement, credibility-building measures, and arms 
reduction. In addition, South Korea has shown much eagerness to 
open economic and trade relations with the North. As a means to 
encourage economic exchanges, the Seoul government removed re-
strictions on inter-Korean trade, making it possible for South Korean 
companies to engage in direct transactions with North Korea and to 
import North Korean goods .. 
NEW ELEMENTS IN NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS 
In the second half of the 1980s new domestic and international 
developments have given the North and the South policy dilemmas as 
well as options that could bring about a change in their relationship. 
In the international arena, the most notable and important develop-
ment was a new detente between the United States and the Soviet 
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Union, which resulted from Gorbachev's new political thinking and 
accommodation policy. It not only led to the signing of an new Inter-
mediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty between the two superpowers, 
but also caused a reassessment of U.S. strategic requirements and 
plans in both Europe and Asia. As the United States is gradually per-
suaded that both Soviet military might and the threat that it poses are 
actually decreasing, there is a weakening of U.S. conviction that it 
needs to counter the Soviet Union militarily throughout the globe and 
on all levels. A change in the U.S. perception of the Soviet military 
threat and challenge also affects the U.S. view concerning the strategic 
value of the Korean Peninsula, as well as the presence of U.S. troops 
in Korea. 
The Soviet Union is extending its conciliatory hand, not only to 
the United States, but also to its allies. For South Korea, which has 
been seeking the establishment and expansion of relationships with the 
socialist (or formerly socialist) countries, the Soviet initiative 
presented a welcome opportunity to accomplish that goal. Improve-
ment of the relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea 
can also serve as an incentive for the United States to seek an improve-
ment of its relationship with North Korea. 
Another element that would have an important bearing on U.S. 
policy toward South Korea is the enormous double deficit - in budget 
and trade- that the United States has been experiencing for several 
years. Facing a critical need to cut (or at least slow down the increase 
of) its defense budget, the United States has been emphasizing "bur-
den-sharing" by its allies in Asia as well as Europe. The temptation to 
resort to "burden-sharing" grows as the deficit continues to place seri-
ous political and financial burdens on the United States. Ironically, 
the countries who oppose this policy are those with whom the United 
States has the largest trade deficit- Japan, West Germany and South 
Korea - where the United States maintains large overseas cont-
ingents. These facts combined may very well lead to a reduction of 
U.S. military presence in those countries. Many Americans are begin-
ning to wonder whether the United States should continue to assume 
the main defense rol~ for countries which maintain a large trade sur-
plus with the United States at a time when U.S. strategic interests, 
particularly in relation to military rivalry with the Soviet Union, seem 
to require reassessment. 
While so many changes have taken place in and around the Ko-
rean Peninsula, North Korea manifests essentially the same rhetoric 
and goals that it has maintained for over four decades. Although the 
changed environment has not caused North Korea to initiate a major 
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change in its domestic and external policies, it does present a seri~us 
policy dilemma to Pyongyang, which has to choose between openmg 
up the country and reconciling with South Korea, on the one hand, 
and maintaining the existing stance at the cost of further lagging be-
hind in its economy and international standing on the other. The lack 
of progress in North-South Korean relations, at least until now, 
presents Seoul with a dilemma of its own in that it has to maintain a 
strong military posture while everything else points in the opposite 
direction. At the same time, however, the fluidity of the situation 
presents both the Seoul and Pyongyang governments with policy op-
tions that were not available before, offering the possibility of a signifi-
cant change of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. 
POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS 
The most critical policy question for Pyongyang is whether to 
open up the country- even partially, to the outside world, at consid-
erable political risk - and thus to forego its time-old goal of driving 
the South Korean government out of existence. So far, it has shown 
virtually no indication of doing so, although such a policy choice 
could be made in the future. Pyongyang can still choose between sev-
eral alternatives on other more concrete and specific issues concerning 
its relations with South Korea and the United States. 
Pyongyang's existing policy consists of three key elements: a pro-
posal for a confederation between North and South Korea, namely the 
Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo; a call for a tripartite con-
ference of the two Koreas and the United States; and a demand for the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops. [(On May 31, 1990, in the wake of a sum-
mit meeting between South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and So-
viet President Gorbachev, Pyongyang proposed arms control talks 
with South Korea.)] As preconditions for its implementation, the con-
federation proposal calls for the signing of a peace agreement between 
North Korea and the United States and the withdrawal of foreign 
(U.S.) troops from Korea. From Pyongyang's point of view, it is a 
useful proposal, not only because it will be to the political advantage of 
monolithic North Korea in the unlikely event that the confederation is 
actually realized, but also, and perhaps more relevantly, because it 
preserves the propaganda value of Pyongyang's desire for peaceful 
reunification, as well as a means of putting pressure on the United 
States to withdraw its military presence in Korea. 
Pyongyang's proposal for a tripartite conference calls for discus-
sion among the three parties- the United States, North Korea, and 
South Korea- of the withdrawal of U.S. "military force," arms re-
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duction by North and South Korea, and the verification of U.S. with-
drawal and Korean arms reduction. According to the proposal, 
bilateral negotiations will be held concurrently between the United 
States and North Korea for a peace agreement, and between North 
and South Korea for a non-aggression declaration. When Pyongyang 
first proposed the tripartite format in 1983, it probably did so, at least 
in part, in response to Beijing's urging that Pyongyang moderate its 
adamant stance on the exclusion of Seoul as a negotiating partner. 
Pyongyang probably also expected discord between Washington and 
Seoul. It could very well have expected that the United States would 
favor such a format. Both South Korea and the United States, how-
ever, rejected the tripartite proposal, instead suggesting a four-party 
format which would include Beijing. 
The removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons has been a long-
standing demand of Pyongyang, ever since the end of the Korean War. 
Until recently, their immediate and total withdrawal was presented as 
the key pre-condition for any settlement of the Korean question. 
However, in 1988, Pyongyang began to demonstrate some flexibility 
on this issue as it indicated a willingness to accept the possibility of a 
phased withdrawal of troops to follow other measures such as a peace 
agreement with the United States, and a non-aggression declaration 
between North and South Korea. It is understandable that the North 
Korean leadership has been so insistent on the U.S. troop withdrawal. 
It was the U.S. intervention that prevented the military conquest of 
the Korean Peninsula in 1950, and it was the presence of U.S. troops 
in the South that kept North Korea from launching another "war of 
liberation" against South Korea. Pyongyang may be convinced that 
the South Korean government is so dependent upon U.S. support that 
a substantial reduction or withdrawal of its troops from Korea would 
cause the collapse of the government and of the polity itself. Pyong-
yang may actually even feel threatened and insecure, given the U.S. 
military presence in South Korea. 
Regardless of whether or not North Korea actually wants U.S. 
troops out of Korea, it will continue to demand their withdrawal, per-
haps more for political than for military reasons. However, a unilat-
eral reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to be looked upon 
by Pyongyang with mixed feelings. In any case, it will not be inclined 
to make significant concessions in terms of a reciprocal arms cuts or 
confidence-building measures in order to induce a complete with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Korea. For Pyongyang, establishing finan-
cial and economic ties with the United States should have higher 
priority than the troop withdrawal issue. 
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Even as Pyongyang may be hoping gradually to increase contacts 
and exchanges with the non-socialist world, it may be reluctant to 
come to terms with South Korea. The successful conclusion of the 
Pyongyang International Youth Festival in 1989 must have given it 
confidence that contacts with the outside world can be conducted 
without serious political risks. On the other hand, events in China and 
political upheavals in Eastern Europe must have served as a warning 
that the political risk of opening up the country to the outside, particu-
larly to South Korea, remains quite high. Apprehensions over such 
risks, coupled with Pyongyang's perception (or misperception) of 
South Korean political vulnerability, could serve as a disincentive on 
the part of North Korea to change the present stance in any significant 
way. 
Seoul's main policy dilemma is how to keep its security posture 
intact while actively pursuing its "northern policy" and seeking ac-
commodation with North Korea, while attempting to implement the 
July 7th (1988) declaration, aimed at promoting exchanges with North 
Korea. Seoul's northern policy is aimed at improving relations with 
the socialist and previously socialist countries, including the Soviet 
Union and China. The Seoul Olympics in 1988 provided a timely 
boost to northern diplomacy. Seoul's active approach toward the so-
cialist countries, which did not recognize the South Korean govern-
ment, has shown rather dramatic results. The Soviet Union and 
Eastern European nations sent large contingents of athletes and offi-
cials to Seoul for the Olympics. Talks on trade and other economic 
exchanges have flourished. Trade offices and new lines of communica-
tions have been opened up. Major trading companies have opened for-
mal liaison offices in major cities in China, the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. All Eastern European countries, except Albania, 
have established full diplomatic relations with South Korea. South 
Korea has exchanged consular offices with the Soviet Union. In Asia, 
Mongolia has normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. To-
gether with the July 7th Declaration which called for active promotion 
of exchanges between North and South and an end to competition and 
confrontation between them internationally, successful implementa-
tion of South Korea's northern policy has produced unexpected and 
perhaps unwarranted euphoria in the Korean public about North-
South Korean relations, thus fostering a false sense of complacency. 
Change in the nature of Korean politics has been another source 
of dilemma for South Korean policy makers. Democratization has not 
only brought about an explosion of nationalistic sentiments among the 
people, but has also made the government much more sensitive to pub-
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lie opinion and attitude. In matters ranging from trade to burden-
sharing, the government is under enormous pressure to be more asser-
tive and unyielding. Both within and outside of the government, those 
who emphasize national self-respect tend to prevail over the 
pragmatists who try to place reason and interest before emotion and 
pride. 
All of this would be fine if the Korean security problem had van-
ished as a result of the East-West thaw and South Korea's successful 
northern diplomacy. But, in view of the existing military situation on 
the Korean Peninsula, Seoul feels that South Korea still needs U.S. 
security support and its military presence. Herein lies the major pol-
icy dilemma for South Korea: How to maintain a security posture and 
stable alliance while the circumstances under which that alliance was 
formed have undergone significant changes. 
SEOUL'S NEW UNIFICATION FORMULA AND INTER-
KOREAN RELATIONS 
Ever since Korea was divided after World War II, Koreans in 
both parts of the country, North and South, have been preoccupied 
with developing a formula that would bring them together again as 
one state and one nation. Pyongyang's proposal for a "Democratic 
Confederal Republic of Koryo" calls for a dual structure of govern-
ment with a unified governing body and two separate governments for 
North and South. For its part, until recently Seoul advocated a "na-
tional unity, democratic government" formula which called for coop-
eration and exchanges between the two Koreas to facilitate ultimate 
reunification. 
Both proposals were incomplete and unrealistic. Pyongyang's 
formula only provided for the end product of unified Korea without 
elaborating how it would be achieved. By contrast, the South Korean 
proposal focused primarily on the process by which the two sides 
would re-establish contact and common identity without specifying 
what kind of a unified state was being envisaged. 
Pyongyang's proposal for a confederal republic is problematic be-
cause it is predicated upon a degree of trust and cooperation that do 
not exist at present between the two sides. Pyongyang's refusal to rec-
ognize the governmental authority of the South contributes to mutual 
distrust and lack of progress in mutual dialogues. Pyongyang's highly 
publicized proposal also fails to provide ways and means of getting to 
the confederation, except to argue that both sides should simply accept 
the formula. It does not provide a process for the realization of the 
confederal republic. 
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The confederal proposal is also incomplete and unlikely because 
Korea as a nation would still have two governments with their respec-
tive autonomous jurisdictions, and socio-economic systems. Since, 
under this plan, the two separate governments would be joined by a 
supra-government which is to handle over-arching matters such as ex-
ternal and military affairs, the confederation, if formed, will immedi-
ately face serious differences of interests and views with no 
institutional mechanism to maintain harmony and unity. 
Apart from the merits and demerits of the Pyongyang proposal, a 
unification "formula," no matter which side offers it, has an intrinsic 
difficulty of its own. In today's context of North-South Korean rela-
tions, when such a formula is proposed by one side, it is taken by the 
other as a propaganda ploy at best or as a recipe for subjugation. The 
past South Korean proposals more often than not were in fact defen-
sive responses to North Korean initiatives, rather than the product of 
a well-thought-out blueprint for unification. 
Even a balanced, systematic and realistic formula would have 
only limited usefulness, as peaceful unification, by definition, requires 
the mutual willingness and cooperation of both sides. Indeed, it is not 
the absence of such a formula that has prevented progress toward uni-
fication. One may even argue that, if one side is sincere about bringing 
about unification, the most useful and effective steps and measures can 
be taken unilaterally while awaiting a more positive and constructive 
response - internal and external - from the other side. 
A dramatic breakthrough in North-South Korean relations lead-
ing to mutual adoption and realization of a peaceful reunification plan 
will be difficult to achieve, given the mutual antagonism and vested 
interests of both sides. Even if an agreement is reached on reunifica-
tion, there will be numerous difficulties and obstacles in implementing 
it. Nonetheless, it is important that the two sides continue to have 
dialogues and try to agree in principle on the process and direction 
they would take for peace and unification of their country. The recent 
proposal by South Korea offers a realistic alternative approach. 
With democratization in South Korea, there has been a virtual 
explosion of interest in the unification issue and of the expectation that 
something can and should be done to improve relations with North 
Korea that will ultimately lead to unification. The "unification fever" 
has presented the South Korean government with both the opportu-
nity to initiate and conduct public discussion on the issue and the need 
to come up with a plan addressing itself to what many Koreans still 
consider to be the most urgent national task. In particular, the gov-
ernment found it both possible and necessary to seek a semblance of 
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consensus - that a comprehensive unification formula is necessary; 
that it should address not only the question of where the Koreans 
want to go, but how to get there; that it should be a realistic and bal-
anced one; and that it should take account of the changing external 
environment and internal development of both North and South 
Korea. 
The new unification formula can serve still another purpose. 
Even though there is only a slim possibility that Pyongyang will actu-
ally accept any significant part of the South Korean proposal, it will 
serve the important function of informing the South Koreans them-
selves - both the government and the people - of what they can and 
should do alone and of what they can do and should do with the 
North Koreans in order to improve North-South Korean relations and 
to promote unification. Until some kind of agreement, formal or in-
formal, is reached and some degree of confidence and trust is estab-
lished between the two sides, the only practical approach for South 
Korea is to prepare unilaterally for the eventuality that North Korea 
will finally recognize the reality of South Korean existence and agree 
to set aside ideological and political goals in favor of mutual accept-
ance and cooperation. 
Finally, Seoul's new unification formula will inform the North 
Koreans of what the South Koreans consider to be the realistic and 
acceptable goals, ways, and processes of unification. It is possible that, 
sometime in the future, the external and internal circumstances will be 
such that Pyongyang will find it necessary to respond positively by 
making substantive changes. Furthermore, the fact and the existence 
of South Korean willingness and desire to initiate a process of accom-
modation, exchanges, and cooperation, coupled with the efforts at uni-
fication expressed by the new plan will help North Korea to move 
from dead center toward both social and political changes. 
The new South Korean proposal, known as "the Korean National 
Community Unification Formula," is essentially a dual track plan. It 
calls for the reuniting of the Korean people who have been divided 
since 1945 on the one hand, and the ultimate restoration of a unified 
state on the other. It is chronologically a two-step proposal in that the 
reuniting of the people will precede the restoration of a unified state. 
Thus, the "Korean Commonwealth," with all its related organiza-
tional paraphernalia, is intended to promote the reunification of the 
people. On the other hand, the plan envisages the eventual establish-
ment of a "unified democratic republic," preceded by the adoption and 
promulgation of a constitution. 
This is in fact a development that would most closely resemble 
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the "German Formula," although the Germans themselves never had 
an explicitly agreed-upon plan such as has been proposed by Seoul. 
While this has been the scenario most preferred by Seoul, it is also the 
one which has been rejected, indeed denounced, by North Korea. In 
view of the German experience, in order for the scenario to become a 
reality, certain preconditions must be met. 
Pyongyang refuses to consider the "German Formula." How-
ever, developments in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Germany, 
should put to rest the criticism that the German method would perpet-
uate national division. Koreans on both sides of the barbed-wire fence 
should realize that what is known as the "functional approach" to the 
unification question, by which the two Koreas recognize each other's 
existence and start cooperating in non-political areas such as humani-
tarian, cultural and economic relations, is in fact the only and the 
shortest way to bring the two Koreas together into one. 
CONCLUSION 
For the peace and reunification of Korea, it is the Korean people 
and their governments that should play the leading role. But in this 
effort, they will also need help from other countries, in particular, ma-
jor powers such as China, the Soviet Union, the United States and 
Japan. They can help, not only by serving as intermediaries, but 
equally important, by responding positively and taking initiative to es-
tablish and expand multifaceted contacts and exchanges, especially in 
the economic area. The major countries surrounding Korea have an 
obligation to see to it that peace develops in Korea and that Koreans 
achieve unification. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must 
share blame for the 1945 division of Korea. Japan must bear there-
sponsibility of subjecting Korea to Soviet and American occupation 
after the end of World War II, following its 35-year long colonial rule 
of Korea. Now it seems that Korea's neighboring powers are prepared 
to help the Koreans resolve their differences and problems. All the 
Koreans of both North and South have to do is to take advantage of 
the circumstances that seem favorable to establish peace and the basis 
of unification. 
In the Korean Peninsula, as perhaps everywhere else, peace must 
be a matter of the highest priority. The Korean Conflict of the early 
1950s was destructive and tragic. It caused several million casualties 
and virtually reduced the country, both North and South, to ashes. 
Today, there are more than twice as many people living on the Korean 
Peninsula as were living then. There are more than 1.5 million men in 
arms. Both sides have arms and firepower that are several times more 
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destructive and awesome than before. The havoc and tragedy from a 
renewed conflict in Korea would be enormous and unimaginable. 
There will be no winners, only losers - the Koreans. A war on the 
Korean Peninsula would also have devastating effects on its neighbor-
ing countries and seriously disturb regional and international peace 
and order. This is why everybody, Koreans and their neighbors alike, 
have to make absolutely certain that war does not break out in Korea 
either by miscalculation, misunderstanding, accident or design. That 
is why communication, exchanges, confidence-building measures and 
cooperation are necessary not only between North and South Korea, 
but also between them and all other countries. They must move away 
from and out of this wasteful and dangerous rivalry and start building 
a durable structure for peace. 
CHAPTER VII 
DIMENSIONS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION 
Dirk Verheyen 
INTRODUCI'ION* 
Events in 1989 and 1990 put the German Question back near the 
top of the international agenda, right where it was when the war ended 
in 1945. After 40 years of division in a shifting context of East-West 
Cold War and tentative detente, the astounding rapidity of change in 
Central and Eastern Europe confronted the world once again with the 
future of a united Germany in the heart of Europe. 
Developments have been occurring so rapidly that any analyst 
faces monumental difficulty in seeking to get a firm grasp on the ulti-
mate direction of what is transpiring in this turbulent age. The impli-
cations of recent and current events in Europe are truly far-reaching. 
A new European order is emerging more quickly than most would 
have predicted even a few years ago. 
Western Europe is fully embarked on its ambitious "1992" pro-
gram. Communist rule has collapsed in one Eastern European coun-
try after another, while Soviet troops are beginning to leave the 
erstwhile "satellites." And the Soviet Union, with Gorbachev still at 
the helm, continues to struggle on the twin paths of glasnost and per-
estroika in a context of social unrest, economic stagnation, intra-party 
upheaval, and nationalist ferment in several of its republics, raising 
questions about its ability to affect or manage the sudden dissolution 
of its former Warsaw Pact empire. 
Taken together, these developments are clearly signalling the end 
of the postwar order in Europe. The continent's division into Cold 
War spheres of influence has lost its former rigidity and coherence. 
The future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, symbols of Europe's East-
West division, is becoming an unavoidable issue. And perhaps most 
• The material used in this essay draws heavily upon my book, The German 
Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration, Dirk Verheyen, 1991, by 
permission of Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. I wish to thank the University Research 
Committee at Loyola Marymount University for generous research assistance provided 
during the summer of 1990. 
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importantly, the unification of the two German states (again) signals a 
fundamental recasting of European and broader international patterns 
of power and policy. 
A proper understanding of the German Question requires that we 
place it in its historical context and that we examine its constituent 
dimensions. In the pages that follow, I will suggest that the German 
Question consists of three interrelated dimensions: German identity, 
German unity, and the management of German power (tied to Ger-
many's role in international affairs). Too often the German Question 
is simplified into a matter of German (re)unification, although that is 
understandable in view of the spectacle currently unfolding in Central 
Europe. Yet, I hope to show that this is a misleading approach, and 
perhaps even dangerous. We shall see that the issue of German unity, 
rooted in a clear sense of German identity, must be kept connected 
with a consideration of Germany's power and its consequent role and 
position in the Europe of tomorrow. 
Broadly speaking, the essay's argument has two major compo-
nents. First, we shall venture into an admittedly selective interpreta-
tion of modem German history, in order to delineate the principal 
ways in which the German Question has evolved. We shall examine a 
selection of developments in general culture and domestic politics in 
the first section, and aspects of modem German foreign policy in the 
second section. Second, we shall look closely at the turbulent events 
of 1989-90 in the last three sections, surveying the major issues and 
events, and evaluating the current status of the German Question as 
Europe moves into the next phase of its history. 
GERMANY, A DIFFICULT FATHERLAND: A NATION IN 
SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND UNITY 
Central to any discussion of the German Question should be a 
consideration of what is German and what is Germany. Closer exami-
nation will show that the answers to this question are by no means 
obvious. It is a question that is not only relevant to an analysis of the 
divided Germany of the postwar era, but also to an understanding of 
Germany's historically complex search for identity. 
Integrally linked to the problem of German identity is the issue of 
profound historical discontinuity in the German experience, and its 
consequences. Richard Lowenthal has noted "a very special lack of 
chronological continuity, geographic unity and spiritual form and co-
herence." He notes the crucial discontinuity of both state and nation 
in the German historical experience and concludes that "[t]his lack of 
unity across time, in space, and in spirit is in fact the central problem 
CHAPTER VII 121 
- or if one wishes, the central secret - of German history." 1 
The identity problem acquired additional significance due to the 
fact that much of pre-1945 German society and culture were charac-
terized by a basic ambivalence, if not enmity, vis-a-vis many of the 
revolutionary ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries that shaped most 
other Western nations. According to Lowenthal, we should remember 
"that Germany in the age of the French Revolution was the great 'de-
veloping country' ofthe West."2 The new ideas and discoveries of the 
new age that came to Germany from outside at that time induced a 
fundamental German ambivalence regarding the process of moderni-
zation in culture and politics. The weak or incomplete impact of the 
Enlightenment on Germany had historical consequences. According 
to George Bailey, 
[h]istorians generally hold that German national resistance 
on [sic] the Napoleonic invasion unfortunately evolved into 
German nationalist rejection of the Enlightenment. It was 
as if the whole ethical corpus of the Enlightenment had 
stumbled into the line of fire and suffered mortal wounds. 
The Prussians - and indeed the majority of Germans awak-
ened into some sort of national consciousness by the French 
invasion -threw out the Enlightenment with the invader 
and persisted in rejecting most of what the Enlightenment 
involved because it was French and therefore anti-German. 3 
The German reaction to the Enlightenment became most clearly 
embodied in Romanticism.4 The differences between the two cultural 
and philosophical movements were (and still are) profound. The En-
lightenment gave expression to an optimistic sense of progress, wor-
shiped human individuality, stressed a rationalist and empiricist 
approach to life and its problems, and focused on human rights and 
freedoms, as well as questions of basic human equality. The Roman-
tics, however, were animated by a greater sense of pessimism and trag-
edy. At times such attitudes could be joined to a strong sense of 
terror, excitement, and foreboding. Instead of rationalism and empiri-
I. Richard LOwenthal, "Geschichtszerrissenheit und Geschichtsbewusstsein in 
Deutschland," Gesel/schaftswande/ und Kulturkrise, Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1979, pp. 240-42. 
2. Lowenthal "Geschichtszerrissenheit und Geschichtsbewusstsein in Deutschland " 
ibid, p. 247. See also Gordon A. Craig, The Germans, New York: G.P. Putnam's So;s, 
1982, p. 26ff. 
3. Bailey, Germans, New York: Avon Books, 1972, p. 188. 
4. See, Craig, The Germans, supra, note 2, chapter 9, and also Hans Kohn, The Mind 
of Germany, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, chapter 3. 
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cism, Romantics tended to stress the irrational, the metaphysical, the 
mysterious or mythical,· and the poetic. 
The importance of the Romantic epoch for the historical German 
world-view cannot be understood when divorced from the quest for 
German unity and identity. Disunity and a lack of clear identity have 
been mutually reinforcing aspects of the German experience. Bailey 
suggests that 
[i]dentity has always been the main aspect of the German 
Problem. The Germans have shown a remarkable lack of the 
sense of identity: they have fought each other in full enmity 
down the ages. They have banded together with foreigners 
against other German tribes as often as they have allied 
themselves against foreigners: Germans have always been 
more than willing to fight Germans. They have never been 
united in the sense that the classic nation-states of Europe 
were and remain united. 5 
Initially, Romanticism was a largely cultural and intellectual phe-
nomenon, and fairly apolitical in orientation. However, the Napole-
onic wars caused a clear politicization of Romantic thinking. National 
unity and identity were increasingly sought along Romantic lines. 
Emphasis was placed on the importance of the Volk, a concept that 
implied a mixture of "nation," "race," and "people." Insofar as a 
sense of German identity was sought that was felt to be distinct from 
the modernizing neighbors to the West, an often ill-defined, anti-mod-
ern, and "anti-Western" notion of Deutschtum ("Germanness") devel-
oped. The idea gradually took hold that Germany, as "land of the 
middle," bearer of a higher form of Kultur, had the exceptional histor-
ical destiny of being either the bulwark against or the bridge between 
the (decadent) West and the (uncivilized) East.6 In this Central Euro-
pean geographic area, where the liberal bourgeoisie was particularly 
conspicuous in its weakness, the mere achievement of national unity 
became more important than the political nature of the regime that 
would govern the new realm. This was especially true in the years 
following the failed 1848 revolution. 7 
5. Bailey, Germans, supra, note 3, p. 341. 
6. Ibid., pp. 361-62, 425. 
7. Discussions of 19th and early 20th century German history have in recent years 
been influenced by the debate over modem Germany's alleged Sonderweg ("special path"), 
that is, whether Germany's developmental flaws (including the political failures of its bour-
geoisie) ultimately helped prepare the country for the Nazi disaster. I discuss this issue 
more fully in a forthcoming book on the German Question. Interested readers may wish to 
consult David Black bourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, Oxford/ 
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But the sense of German identity, as it developed in the 19th cen-
tury, was fundamentally flawed, which itself had crucial consequences 
for the German world-view. There were rather clear elements of artifi-
ciality, self-deception, and unreality in the search for identity. Na-
tional unity was to be imposed on regions that had often markedly 
different historical experiences, and that were by no means fully cul-
turally homogeneous (language aside). Fundamental inspiration was 
derived from the old ideal of the Reich, particularly the Holy Roman 
Empire. Unfortunately, that ideal was as much (if not more) based on 
fiction as on fact. Moreover, the Reich could never be a mere nation. 
It stood for a larger vision. And even if it meant something more than 
a nation, its geographic boundaries ·were fundamentally ambiguous. 
Moreover, when it finally came, in 1871, national unity was achieved 
along "small-German" (klein-deutsch) lines (that is, excluding the 
German-speaking parts of the Austrian empire) and had little in com-
mon with the old Holy Roman Empire. 
Thus unity was not achieved on the basis of an integrative na-
tional experience such as revolution, but rather in large measure by 
force, conquest, and imposition. The problem of identity was never 
fully resolved, and continues to play a central role in German politics 
and culture to the present day. Bailey concludes: 
This is the German Problem: what, where, and when is, was, 
or will be Germany? "Germany" was never more or less 
what it should have been; it was always less or more than it 
should have been. The "Germans" have always been more 
than a nation and therefore always less than one. They were, 
in fact, many nations and tribes, but the whole was always 
less than the sum of its parts. 8 
Germany was late in achieving national unity, compared with 
most other Western countries. Having come late as a nation-state and 
sensing a continued degree of artificiality in their national identity, 
many Germans developed some notable traits in their world-view. 
There was a pervasive sense of failure. Bailey calls this the "almost 
factor" in German history. "Except for Bismarck's half-century, Ger-
man history is an unbroken chain of failures-by-a-hair, of maddeningly 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1984; Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past, Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, especially chapter 4; Thomas Nipperdey, 
Nachdenken iiber die deutsche Geschichte, Miinchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1986; Richard J. 
Evans, Rethinking German History, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, especially chapter 3. 
8. Bailey, Germans, supra, note 3, p. 340. 
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near misses and no cigars. "9 Many Germans acquired an image of 
their own history marked by a high degree of discontent and dissatis-
faction. According to Alain Clement, "from the very beginning the 
Germans were dissatisfied with Germany and, therefore, with them-
selves. From century to century drags this oppressive feeling, that 
Germany falls short of its developmental potential, short of its duty of 
self-determination." 10 One finds considerable evidence of pervasive 
self-pity and a deep sense of inferiority. 11 At the same time, as we 
shall see more fully below, much of German foreign policy came to be 
marked by a compensatory nationalism, a desire to acquire the power 
and status in international affairs that was felt to accompany Ger-
many's rightful "place in the sun," as the Kaiser put it. 
Aspects of this traditional preoccupation with German identity 
and the country's place in Europe and the world at large remained 
after 1945, and were, if anything, enhanced by the traumatic Third 
Reich experience and the subsequent division of the nation. 
The discussion thus far clearly suggests that problems of identity 
and unity in the context of the general German Question center on the 
problematic idea of nationhood in the German historical experience. 
The uncertainty of what is and is not Germany, the persistent mys-
tique of the Reich, and the delayed national unification of Germany 
are issues that have shaped the destiny of the German-speaking peo-
ples in the center of Europe. 
Nationalism is probably the most decisive ideology in modern his-
tory. The impact of nationalist fervor on domestic political life and 
foreign policy has not by any means been unique to the German expe-
rience. Yet there are aspects of traditional German nationalism that 
clearly differentiated it from developments in neighboring Western 
European nation-states. 
In Germany, conservative, authoritarian nationalism prevailed, 
and German national unity was established by means of warfare, 
under the auspices of illiberal, reluctant Prussia. Germany's delayed 
national unification separated the idea of nationhood and nationalism 
from the Enlightenment. 12 The idea of the nation-state was gradually 
9. Ibid., p. 32. 
10. Gibt es ein deutsches Geschichtsbild?, Studien & Berichte der Katholischen 
Akademie in Bayem, Heft #14, 1961, p. 17. 
11. See, Fritz Stem, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley /Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1963, pp. xi-xxx and 267-98. 
12. See, Helmuth Plessner, Die verspti'tete Nation, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 
1959; Kohn, The Mind of Germany, supra, note 5, chapter 4. 
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emptied of any modern political connotations and infused with cultur-
ally anti-modern and anti-Western sentiments. 
Ideologically, this resulted in a nationalism with a decidedly illib-
eral political content, implacably opposed to competing political ideol-
ogies, such as Liberalism or Socialism. It was a cultural nationalism 
that stressed the purported virtues and mission of the German Kul-
turnation, leading to political intolerance towards those who were con-
sidered (potentially) un-deutsch. Also, as noted above, it was a 
compensatory nationalism, dedicated to seeking Germany's rightful 
"place in the sun." Together with the political irredentism of the in-
complete Reich (especially after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire 
in 1919) and the assertive messianism of the Kulturnation ideology, 
this compensatory nationalism was a driving force behind Germany's 
increasingly aggressive diplomatic behavior in the first half of the 20th 
century. 
The traumas of Nazism and World War II in numerous ways 
produced a break with the past. After 1945, there was a widespread 
desire to escape from history and its painful burdens. The old nation-
alism was one of the prime casualties of the war. It became a thor-
oughly discredited ideology, and a liability for a new West Germany 
that sought reconciliation with victims and enemies, and acceptance in 
the Western community of nations. 13 This does not mean, of course, 
that nationalism has completely disappeared from German political 
life. 
However, the question of nationalism in today's Germany ought 
to be seen in the broader context of the problem of German identity 
after World War II. 14 Although identity crises have been experienced 
by most, if not all, nations in our rapidly changing 20th century envi-
ronment, Germany has faced (and still faces) some unique problems. 15 
There have been three general and important aspects to the German 
identity question since World War II. 
First, German identity has been burdened by the traumas of Ger-
13. See, Louis L. Snyder, Roots of German Nationalism, Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1978, chapter 13. 
14. See, Craig, The Germans, supra, note 2, chapter 13. 
15. There is a massive quantity of literature on this question. See, for example, Werner 
Weidenfeld, ed., Die Identitiit der Deutschen, Bonn: Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale ftir 
politische Bildung, 1983; Karl Morsch, Sind wir denn eine Nation? Die Deutschen und ihr 
Vaterland, Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1982; Steffen Kiiser, ed., "Denk' ich an Deutsch-
land . .. ": Grundlagen eines Dia/oges beider deutscher Staaten, Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 
1987; Die Frage nach der deutschen Identitti't, Bonn: Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale ftir 
politische Bildung, 1985; Harold James, A German Identity, 1770-1990, London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1990, especially chapters 8 and 9. 
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man national historical experience. The desire to leave behind the past 
has produced a harmful, and some would say dangerous, "loss of his-
torical consciousness."16 Could it be that much, if not most, of Ger-
man history has lost its functional utility for the creation of a modem 
German identity? This may especially be the case because the tradi-
tional German approach to nationhood was so suffused with illiberal, 
anti-Western elements. Certainly a national identity for a liberal-dem-
ocratic, Western-oriented Federal Republic could only with great diffi-
culty be rooted in such a heritage. 17 
In the case of the German Democratic Republic, the "loss of his-
torical consciousness" took another direction. 18 After its creation in 
1949, the East German regime, controlled by the Communist SED 
(German Socialist Unity Party), presented the new state as the logical 
culmination of all progressive and revolutionary strands in German 
national history, such as the anti-Hitler resistance. The official East 
German interpretation of German history thus became noticeably se-
lective, often serving the regime's consolidation and legitimation inter-
ests. In contrast to a West Germany allegedly controlled by ex-Nazis, 
nationalist revanchists, and capitalist reactionaries, the GDR was de-
fined as the vanguard of a future socialist and democratic Germany. 
The East German regime then proceeded to disclaim any and all sense 
of shared German responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era. 
Yet no complete German identity could emerge in either German 
state if national historical experiences were to be ignored or avoided, 
while an attempt to focus on purely cultural aspects of German na-
tionhood would only lead to an incomplete sense of identity, because it 
would tend to be devoid of any firm political foundation. 19 What is 
more, a preoccupation with a German Kulturnation could resuscitate 
16. Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, Frankfurt: Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981, pp. 130-47; Christian Grafvon Krockow, "Tradition und Ges-
chichtsbewusstsein im sozialen Wandel," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 25 April 1981. 
17. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, supra, note 16, pp. 34-44. 
18. See, Hermann Rudolph, "Wie sieht das Selbstverstandnis der DDR-Gesellschaft 
aus?," in Weidenfeld, ed., Die ldentitiit der Deutschen, supra, note 15, pp. 193-209; Giinther 
Heydemann, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichtsverstandnis in der DDR seit 1945," 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 28 March 1987, pp. 15-26; Ronald Asmus, "The GDR and 
the German nation: sole heir or socialist sibling?," International Affairs, Vol. 60, #3, Sum-
mer 1984, pp. 403-18; Karl-Ernst Jeismann, "Die Einheit der Nation im Geschichtsbild der 
DDR," A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 13 August 1983, pp. 3-16; Ralf Dahrendorf, Society 
and Democracy in Germany, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979, chapter 26. 
19. See, the argument made by M. Rainer Lepsius, "Die Teilung Deutschlands und die 
deutsche Nation," in Lothar Albertin and Werner Link, eds., Politische Parteien auf dem 
Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland, Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1981, 
pp. 417-49. 
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foreign concerns regarding culturally based political irredentism and a 
new German unity-before-freedom mentality. 
Second, the question of German identity was made even more 
complicated by the nation's division into two ideologically competitive 
republics.20 The ideological hostility between the FRG and GDR 
meant that any attempt to have both states share in a purportedly 
common German Kulturnation would end up begging many political 
questions. Yet, the Federal Republic was hesitant to claim to be a full-
fledged German Staatsnation (nation-state). The West German self-
understanding after 1949 was explicitly "provisional." The Federal 
Republic claimed to be the legitimate successor of the old German 
Reich, but destined to be dissolved once all Germans regained their 
national unity. The preamble to the West German state's Basic Law 
enjoined all federal governments to strive for the restoration of Ger-
man unity. Attempts to eliminate this preamble in the face of the bit-
ter reality of two independent German states were met by a mixture of 
vigorous protest and deafening silence. This provisional West German 
self-understanding produced an elaborate array of legal principles and 
fictions that played a central role in the Federal Republic's foreign 
policy. Unfortunately, as the French have reminded us, "il n'est que 
le provisoire qui dure." As a result, a fairly explicit West German 
Staatsbewusstsein ("state consciousness") did emerge (before 1989). 
In a prominent study published in the 1970's, Gebhard 
Schweigler noted that, although traditional national sentiment was 
still quite pronounced in the 1950's, important shifts in public opinion 
occurred during the 1960's. He suggested that popular expectations of 
reunification had declined, and that the willingness to recognize the 
GDR and the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland had increased. He 
argued that one could notice a strongly reduced sense of an all-Ger-
man Staatsnation, and a growing national consciousness focused more 
exclusively on the Federal Republic. However, he did not (yet) see 
this increased West German Staatsbewusstsein translated into an ex-
plicit form of nationalism. He made a similar argument about devel-
opments inside the GDR. 21 
In the years that followed Schweigler's important study, many 
observers evinced considerably greater skepticism regarding an .actual 
decline of all-German national consciousness, coupled with a rise of a 
more distinct West German (and East German) sense of identity. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Nationa/bewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR, Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann Univer-
sitatsverlag, 1973. 
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Most suggested that the German identity question remained wide 
open, pointing, for example, at the noticeable interest in Prussia, Lu-
ther, Bismarck, and other facets of German history in both the FRG 
and the GDR.22 Furthermore, the increasing closeness between the 
two states in the age of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik in the 1970's 
and 1980's could only serve to heighten the sense of a shared German 
security interest, particularly under circumstances of renewed East-
West Cold War tensions during the first Reagan administration. The 
rush toward unity after November 1989 obviously rekindled a sense of 
political German nationalism, but it is too early to know the likely 
domestic and diplomatic consequences of this "new" German nation-
alism, although later sections of this essay will present some of the 
speculations and concerns. 23 
Third, postwar German identity has, to an important extent, been 
dependent on the ebb and flow of world affairs in general and, in the 
case of West Germany, on European integration in particular. A 
product of the Cold War in many ways, and animated by a strong 
sense of anti-Communism, due to the proximity of its East German 
opponent, the Federal Republic's sense of identity was far more sensi-
tive to changes in the international environment than any other West-
em country. West Germany's identity today depends for a great deal 
on the country's membership in and acceptance by the Western alli-
ance and the general community of Western nations. The fear of being 
the ultimate victim of an East-West political and military bargain pro-
duced a persistent strain of anxiety and insecurity, thereby heightening 
the uncertainties of identity. 
For much of the postwar period, it seemed that the Federal Re-
public's participation in the process of European integration would 
provide it with an "ersatz," European identity. Many Germans ea-
gerly supported this hopeful opportunity. Whenever the hopes of a 
united Europe faded, however, and nationalist sentiments in Europe 
showed their staying power, the Federal Republic's identity problems 
returned. At the risk of generalization, it is possible to argue that 
West Germany's quest for identity between 1949 and 1989 involved an 
22. See, Martin Greiffenhagen, Die Aktualitiit Preussens, Frankfurt: Fischer Tas-
chenbuch Verlag, 1981; Rudolf von Thadden, "Preussen - Ein Weg in die Modeme?," 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, December 26, 1981, pp. 3-11; Robert F. Goecke!, "The 
Luther Anniversary in East Germany," World Politics, Vol. 37, #1, October 1984, pp. 112-
33. 
23. The overall development of both West and East German identity is discussed at 
greater length in my book on the German Question than can be done in this essay. 
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attempt to focus on both the democratic values shared with the West 
and the continued sense of German-ness shared with East Germany. 
GERMANY, A POWERFUL FATHERLAND: DILEMMAS 
AND TEMPTATIONS IN DIPLOMACY AND 
SECURITY 
Thus far, our focus has been primarily on the dimensions of iden-
tity and unity in the general German Question, with particular empha-
sis on their domestic consequences in modern German history. Yet it 
is impossible to grasp the ultimate international significance and ur-
gency of the German Question without connecting the twin issues of 
identity and unity with Germany's search for a role in world affairs 
and the resulting problem of German power. This implies a full shift 
to an analysis of modern German foreign policy. 
As a great power, Germany in the 19th and early 20th century 
was a late-comer. It entered an international arena in which estab-
lished powers had already staked out dominant positions, and in 
which the new force of nationalism was adding dynamic vigor and 
emotion to classical inter-state competition. Consequently, German 
foreign policy after 1871 was frequently characterized by what may be 
called a "compensatory" style or mentality, especially during the Wil-
helmine era. A desire to conquer Germany's "place in the sun" led to 
self-overestimation, excessive imperial dreams, and a constant preoc-
cupation with German prestige and status. Gerhard Weinberg speaks 
of an "adolescent assertiveness," a militant, bullying, and unpredict-
able style. Gordon Craig notes a tendency toward diplomatic mal-
adroitness, amateurism, and parvenuism. 24 The role played by 
warfare in Germany's unification, together with the militancy of Ger-
man nationalism and the rather aggressive ethos of a powerful Ger-
man military caste, produced unmistakable militarism in German 
foreign policy. 
One factor in German foreign policy of which virtually all Ger-
man diplomats and politicians have been acutely conscious is Ger-
many's central-European location. As we saw earlier, geographic 
factors have played a crucial role in the problem of German identity: 
cultural and political boundaries have never really coincided, and a 
24. Weinberg, "National Style in Diplomacy: Germany," in Erich Angermann and 
Marie-Luise Frings, eds., Oceans Apart?, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pp. 146-60; Craig, 
"Germany and the United States: Some Historical Parallels and Differences and Their 
Reflection in Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," in James A. Cooney, Gordon A. Craig, 
Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Fritz Stern, eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United States, Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 16-33. 
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sense of fluidity (and inherent political revisionism) characterizes the 
German sense of nationhood. Throughout modem history, this cen-
tral continental location, conducive to feelings of vulnerability, insecu-
rity, and lack of choice in foreign policy, has been a constant and 
prominent factor in German diplomacy. There has been a persistent 
fear of diplomatic isolation, a Bismarckian "nightmare of coalitions." 
The power dimension of the German Question is rooted in the 
unfortunate timing of Germany's development and unification. The 
consolidation of German power in the center of Europe had a pro-
foundly destabilizing effect on the 19th century balance of power, and 
served to enhance the risk of conflict on the continent.25 A frag-
mented Germany had served as a useful buffer zone among various 
powers, but now that "vacuum" had turned into a new competitor 
with compensatory ambitions. All these various factors have histori-
cally contributed to the problem of Germany's role and position in 
international affairs, a problem that runs as a red thread through Ger-
man diplomatic history. 
The sense of geographic weakness and comparative disadvantage, 
the fear of isolation and encirclement, combined with mounting polit-
ical ambitions and often romanticized dreams of empire, over time led 
to the increasing popularity of geopolitical perspectives in German for-
eign policy.26 To many Germans, the geopolitical perspective seemed 
particularly suited to their country's political and economic predica-
ment, and also compatible with the organic-biological and anthropo-
morphic conceptions of the State that had been popular in Germany 
ever since the days of Herder and Hegel. 
The political and ideological prominence of Geopolitik increased 
after World War I in an atmosphere of revisionist anger and dreams 
during the Weimar years. Particularly popular became the vision of a 
German-dominated Grossraum in central Europe (the so-called Mit-
teleuropa idea), which mixed geographic considerations with eco-
nomic, political, and cultural factors. Eastern Europe, seen as a 
Teufe/sgiirtel (devil's belt) of unstable states that separated Germany 
from the crucial Eurasian Heartland, was more and more considered 
to be Germany's Schicksalsraum (area alotted by fate): hence the leg-
endary German Drang nach Osten (push toward the East). Such anti-
Slavic and (in time) anti-Soviet imperialist Lebensraum ideas, mixed 
25. This forms the core of the argument made by David Calleo, The German Problem 
Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
26. Geoffrey Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the 20th Century, London: 
Croom Helm, 1985, chapters 2 and 5. 
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with explicitly racial elements, played a central role in Nazi foreign 
policy. 
As was true for many facets of German foreign policy thinking, 
realist and romantic ingredients were combined in most geopolitical 
visions: Macht (power) and military hard-headedness went hand-in-
hand with dreams about German Kultur and the old Holy Roman 
Empire. Defeat in World War II and the subsequent division of Ger-
many, plus the rise of the two superpowers, did much to eliminate any 
and all ideas of Mitteleuropa in West or East German foreign policy. 
This does not mean, however, that geopolitically based revisionism 
was entirely absent from the Federal Republic's foreign policy debates 
during the Cold War years. 
Altogether, World War II turned into a watershed event in the 
development of Germany's approach to foreign policy, as we shall see 
presently. It ended the militarization of foreign policy and the illiberal 
ideological aspects of the Realpolitik tradition, while giving rise to su-
pranational visions that would have been unthinkable in the golden 
age of Germany's nationalist foreign policy orientation. 
In sum, factors of power, geography, identity, and developmental 
timing have historically combined to tum the question of Germany's 
place in the international arena into a fundamental problem for Ger-
man foreign policy. In terms of its power, Germany has tended to be 
either too weak to alleviate the perennial security fears that permeate 
German foreign policy thinking, or too strong to leave wary neighbors 
reassured about their own safety. Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger 
have suggested that the historical "awkwardness" of German power 
led to a lack of experience in dealing with international equals and a 
profound uncertainty with respect to Germany's proper role in world 
atfairs. 27 
Since the 1860's, German foreign policy thinking has contained a 
variety of strategic visions aimed at dealing with the problem of power 
and role. 28 A consideration of these visions points up some interesting 
elements of continuity and change in German foreign policy. 
27. Deutsch and Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1959, p. 17ff. 
28. See, Renata Fritsch-Boumazel, Andre Brigot, and Jim Cloos, Les Allemands au 
Coeur de /'Europe, Paris: Fondation pour 1es Etudes de Defense Nationa1e, 1983, esp. "La 
permanente quete d'une identite"' by Fritsch-Boumazel, pp. 253-59; Waldemar Besson, 
"The Conflict of Traditions: The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy," in 
Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., Britain and West Germany, London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1971, pp. 61-80; Walter F. Hahn, Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik, Beverly 
Hills/London: SAGE Publications, 1975, chapter 1. 
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One vision, historically associated with Chancellor Otto von Bis-
marck, and to a lesser extent with Gustav Stresemann during the 
1920's, had as its point of departure the realization that Germany is 
first and foremost a central-European state (Land in der Mitte; land in 
the middle) in many ways located between East and West.29 From 
this vantage-point, Germany was seen at times as a "bridge" between 
East and West, an entity with a balancing and mediating role. Close 
attention was paid to the maintenance of a European balance of power 
and the legitimate interests of other powers. Insofar as revisionist in-
tentions entered German foreign policy, they were pursued with cau-
tion and considerable respect for the existing status-quo. Gern'lany 
tended to avoid overly rigid alliances, aimed at keeping diplomatic op-
tions open. 
While much of the Bismarck vision of Germany's position and 
role in international politics was rendered obsolete in the context of 
the Cold War and Germany's division, its influence could still be 
noted in the postwar era. The idea of Germany as "bridge" between 
East and West, as developed by (among others) the Christian Demo-
crat Jakob Kaiser in the late 1940's, comes to mind.30 One might also 
consider the various plans that were developed by the Social Demo-
crats and the Free Democrats in the course ofthe 1950's, aimed at the 
reunification of Germany based on German military neutrality, Euro-
pean military disengagement zones, and the creation of an all-Euro-
pean collective security system.31 In addition, there was the idea of a 
special German Sicherheits- or Friedenspartnerschaft (partnership for 
security and peace) involving FRG and GDR, in the shadow of super-
power bipolarity, as it emerged in the context of Ostpolitik and 
Deutschlandpolitik during the 1970's and 1980's.32 However, these vi-
sions were largely at odds with the Federal Republic's dominant for-
eign policy orientations, however. They were frequently denounced as 
a dangerous revival of an obsolete German tradition of Schaukelpolitik 
("switching policy") between East and West, based on the illusion of 
some positive German Sonderweg ("special path") in international 
affairs. 
29. Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'' supra, note 28, pp. 63-70. 
30. Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage, Rei-
nbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981, pp. 76-80. 
31. For illustrations, see Brandt and Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage, 
ibid., pp. 132-34, 161-65, 177-78, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Otto Stenzl, eds., Deutsch-
land und die Welt, Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1964, pp. 116-25, 132-37, 
144-57. 
32. Brandt and Ammon, eds., Die Linke und die nationale Frage, supra, note 30, pp. 
280-87. 
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Another foreign policy vision, associated with the militant great 
power politics of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his entourage and the much 
more extreme racial/geopolitical imperialism of Adolf Hitler, shared 
with the first vision an essentially nationalist focus on Germany's posi-
tion and role in international politics. However, the problems of Ger-
many's international situation were not solved by cautious 
revisionism, an avoidance of diplomatic isolation, and due regard for 
the balance of power and the proper interests of others. Instead, there 
was an aggressive revisionism, reckless power politics, and an expan-
sionist behavior, all of it aimed at breaking the fetters imposed on Ger-
many by geopolitical encirclement and disadvantage. The German 
Sonderweg disintegrated into imperialism and war. Hitler stood 
outside the German diplomatic tradition insofar as the racial elements 
in his policies were of an entirely new kind and different magnitude 
than anything that had existed in German foreign policy before. Fun-
damental philosophical rejection and lack of opportunity after 1945 
rendered obsolete all these militant, imperialist perspectives, in spite of 
repeated charges of "revanchism" levelled at the FRG by its various 
neighbors to the East during the Cold War. A slight revival might 
have occurred by means of some more extremist "roll-back" and "lib-
eration" ideas at the height of the Cold War, but these never consti-
tuted a realistic option. 
A third vision for German foreign policy has developed after 
World War II, and is particularly associated with the legacy of Kon-
rad Adenauer in the FRG's foreign policy.33 The emergence of this 
vision cannot be separated from the international setting in which 
West German foreign policy had to be pursued. It is a setting that was 
characterized by defeat and occupation, the division of Germany, the 
integration of the two German states into Cold War alliances, West 
German security dependence on the West (especially America), and 
revisionism regarding the East European status-quo. The FRG could 
only be understood as a product of the Cold War and as the rehabili-
tated opponent of a not-so-distant past: these two factors combined to 
circumscribe the Federal Republic's diplomatic room for maneuver in 
many decisive ways, often forestalling choices and imposing particular 
needs. In addition, defeat, occupation, and subsequent security depen-
dence in the Cold War made the FRG into a uniquely "penetrated" 
political system, susceptible and sensitive to outside influences that 
deeply affected policy conceptions and directions. 
Any consideration of West Germany's role and position in post-
33. Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'" supra, note 28, p. 70ff. 
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war international relations, while dependent on an understanding of 
Germany's historical predicament and fate, cannot be separated from 
the fate and destiny of Europe either. World War II and the eruption 
of the Cold War had at least five fundamental effects on virtually all 
(Western) European states. 
First, the "displacement of the world power center from Europe," 
led to the rise of the two superpowers and the development of Cold 
War bipolarity. Second, the "dismantling of the European empires," 
which became highly symbolic of Europe's reduced international role. 
Third, a "European incapacity to guarantee their own national secur-
ity,'' which led to the development of more Europeanist and/or Atlan-
ticist perspectives on national defense, the creation of NATO, and a 
profound dependence on the American security guarantee. Fourth, a 
"European incapacity to promote their own national prosperity," 
which was conducive to the development of visions, plans, processes, 
and institutions aimed at increased European economic cooperation 
and integration. Fifth, a "European 'crisis of confidence'," which was 
the cumulative result of the other four developments. 34 
Although these five effects were strongest in the immediate post-
war period and were to some extent "softened" by subsequent recov-
ery and integration successes, and a mitigation of the Cold War, the 
fundamental changes in Europe's international role and position to 
which they point were quite decisive. The sense that the traditional 
European nation-state is no longer an adequate framework for secur-
ity, economic prosperity, and effective prestige and identity persists, 
despite a partial resurgence of nationalism since the Gaullist 1960's. 
At most there resulted a vacillation in policy between more Atlanticist 
and/or Europeanist, and nationalist frames of orientation. 
It is against this German and European postwar background that 
one must evaluate two key facets of Adenauer's Westpolitik: the 
"supranationalization" and the "westernization" (Verwestlichung) of 
West Germany's foreign policy.35 Supranationalization implied a ba-
sic abandonment of the almost exclusively nationalist thinking in ear-
lier German foreign policy. The new West German state became a 
leading champion of schemes for European and Atlantic integration. 
34. See, the discussion in Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 1969, p. 50 and chapters I, 2, and 10. 
35. See, Josef Joffe, "Von Adenauer bis Schmidt: Grundziige der Aussenpolitik," in 
Eckhard Jesse, ed., Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik, 
Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980, pp. 151-59; Klaus Epstein, "The Adenauer Era in Ger· 
man History," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe?, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1964, pp. 105-39; Besson, "The Conflict of Traditions,'' supra, note 28, p. 70ff. 
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In the context of the Cold War, these integration visions, whose pur-
suit was the result of a mixture of choice and necessity, were in unmis-
takable tension with the simultaneous pursuit of reunification, a fact 
that led to bitter debate between Christian Democrats and Social 
Democrats during the 1950's. 36 The interplay between national and 
supranational perspectives constitutes a central theme in West Ger-
many's postwar foreign policy. 
"Westernization" aimed at a basic reconciliation of the historical 
alienation between Germany and the West. The Verwestlichung 
("westernization") of German foreign policy was aided by a number of 
important factors, rooted in ideology and environmental compul-
sion.37 Among West German political parties, the CDU in particular 
was animated by what may be called an Abend land ("Western civiliza-
tion") ideology, stressing the political, philosophical, and religious be-
liefs and values that Germany was felt to share with the West. 38 There 
was a strong Catholic and Carolingian component in the thinking of 
Adenauer and many of his supporters. The Cold War division of Ger-
many led to the creation of a Weststaat that contained regionally based 
traditions of Liberalism and anti-nationalism, both of which were cru-
cial for the supranationalization and westernization of German foreign 
policy. In a Cold War environment marked by international ideologi-
cal polarization, the FRO's security dependence on Western allies was 
complemented by strong anti-Communism, pro-Europeanism, and 
pro-Atlanticism. 
Just as the supranationalism of Adenauer's Westpolitik consti-
tuted a sharp break with past nationalist traditions in German foreign 
policy, so did the reorientation effected by Germany's westernization 
imply an abandonment of older central-European geopolitical perspec-
tives. In the context of the Cold War, Germany became the divided 
heart of Europe, whereby each German state turned into the outer 
rampart of its respective alliance system. Adenauer's Westpolitik was 
animated by a persistent "Potsdam complex," based on the fear of 
great power agreements at Germany's expense. 39 Only Western inte-
36. See, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, 
pp. 129-46. 
37. Frank R. Pfetsch, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik. 1949-1980, Miinchen: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1981, p. 43ff. 
38. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Die westdeutsche Aussenpolitik - Historische Lektionen 
und politische Generationen," in Walter Scheel, ed., Nach Dreissig Jahren, Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta Verlag, 1979, p. 164ff. 
39. The term "Potsdam Complex" refers to the 1945 Conference of World War II 
victors in this small town west of Berlin, where important decisions about the future of 
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gration would prevent Germany from becoming or remaining a mere 
pawn or object in international politics. Ideological inclinations and 
environmental constraints combined to lead to the failure of reunifica-
tion ideas offered by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats 
based on some form of German neutrality. Growing numbers of West 
Germans backed Adenauer in his rejection of new attempts at a Ger-
man Schaukelpolitik between East and West. There was certainly in 
many Western states a distinct "Rapallo complex," fed by fears re-
garding Germany's diplomatic and ideological reliability, although, as 
Fritz Allemann tried to point out in the 1960's, the Cold War setting 
differed so strongly from the 1920's that a new "Rapallo" was never a 
real option in FRG foreign policy.40 In the next sections, I will turn to 
a discussion of the re-emergence of some basic questions about Ger-
many's diplomatic course generated by the unification of the FRG and 
the GDR. 
Even a divided Germany, with two states firmly committed to 
their respective "camps," was not able, however, to escape the geopo-
litical logic of its central-European location or the older, national 
framework of thinking. The decisive problem here was, of course, the 
issue of reunification. Both West German supranationalism and west-
ernization had to be considered conditional to the extent that they had 
to be reconciled with unavoidable nationalist, central-European West 
German revisionism. In the era of the Cold War and successful West-
ern integration, the inherent contradiction was "solved" through the 
assumption that reunification would result from a Westpolitik based on 
strength, although that assumption was attacked by many critics. 
Increased detente after the late 1950's and a lack of progress 
(even backsliding) in Western integration undermined earlier orienta-
tions and increased the FRG's uncertainty about its international role. 
A resurgence of West German consciousness with respect to Ger-
many's central-European fate, combined with fear of increased West 
German international isolation, generated a considerably more active 
Ostpolitik as a counterweight to the passive and rather negative 
Ostpolitik that had accompanied the previous Westpolitik. 
At the same time, these new openings in the East greatly helped 
vanquished Gennany (especially the country's division into zones of occupation) were 
made. 
40. Allemann, "Rapallo: Myth and Reality," in Walter Stahl, ed., The Politics of Post-
war Germany, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963, pp. 77-84. Rapallo is the Italian town 
where diplomats of the Soviet Union and the Weimar Republic met in 1922 and concluded 
a (surprise) treaty that heightened Western concerns about Gennany's course in foreign 
policy. 
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to expand the FRG's diplomatic room for maneuver. The framework 
of thought in this new Ostpolitik was inherently more nationalist than 
was officially acknowledged, but its recognition of the European sta-
tus-quo also meant a mitigation of the more explicitly revisionist na-
tionalism of the Cold War era. Both Westpolitik and Ostpolitik came 
to symbolize the inevitably Janus-like nature of German foreign pol-
icy.41 As policies and as foreign policy orientations, they reflected the 
imperatives that continued to be generated by Germany's geopolitical 
location. 
In the case of East Germany, developments occurred along a 
somewhat different path. The initial, post-1949 vision of a reunited, 
socialist Germany was replaced by a heightened sense of Abgrenzung 
("isolation/consolidation") after the building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961. Greater emphasis was placed on the development of a clearer 
East German Staatsbewusstsein (state consciousness) on the part of a 
population that could see no alternative but to reconcile itself with the 
inevitability of a separate socialist state. 
By the 1970's, attempts were even made under the leadership of 
Erich Honecker to create an explicit sense of separate East German 
nationhood. 42 And by the 1980's, a renewed appreciation of a possible 
connection between East Germany and the legacy of Prussia could 
even be noted in the GDR.43 A Janus-like East German foreign policy 
would thus become rather problematic, in view of such an explicit at-
tempt to sever any basic sense of all-German national linkage with the 
FRG. Yet, paradoxically, it could be argued that the simultaneous 
East German interest in a special GDR-FRG "security partnership" 
in Central Europe during the era of detente only served to reinforce a 
continued shared political consciousness between the two German 
"nations." In other words, the concurrent pursuit of both Abgrenzung 
and inter-German detente contained inherent inconsistencies. Future 
historians, looking back on the 1970's and the 1980's, may well con-
clude that, in view of the GDR's enduring legitimacy deficit and the 
neighboring presence of an irresistible West German ideological and 
41. See, Josef Joffe, "Westvertrage, Ostvertrage und die Kontinuitat der deutschen 
Aussenpolitik," Europa-Archiv, #4, 1973, pp. 111-24; Peter H. Merkl, "The German Ja-
nus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 89, #4, Winter 
1974-75, pp. 803-24. 
42. See, Jeismann, "Die Einheit der Nation im Geschichtsbild der DDR," supra, note 
18, pp. 3-16. 
43. Jorg Bernhard Bilke, "Preussentum und DDR-Sozialismus," Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 26 December 1981, pp. 23-37. 
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economic magnet, the era of detente did much to accelerate the ulti-
mate demise of East Germany's stagnant Communist regime. 
WINTER OF DISCONTENT AND TURBULENCE 
The astounding events of the fall of 1989 completely shook just 
about all of the German "certainties" of the past 40 years. Only 
months before the Berlin Wall was breached, a prominent analyst of 
German affairs like F. Stephen Larrabee had been essentially correct 
when he wrote that 
the real issue today is not reunification, though this still re-
mains a residual issue, but how changes in the policies of the 
two German states may affect European security in the next 
decade, and in tum what impact changes in the postwar se-
curity order may have on the policies of the two German 
states and their role in their respective alliances. It is this 
question that forms the heart of the new German Question. 
And it is on this problem, rather than the highly theoretical 
and less politically relevant issue of reunification, that schol-
ars and politicians should focus in the 1990s. 44 
Yet events unfolded with a rapidity that left observers and policy-
makers alike breathless. Amid spreading political protest, the true 
dimensions of the fundamental crisis of East Germany's socioeco-
nomic and political system became fully manifest, as discussion and 
recrimination began about its causes and who was to blame. 45 The 
mass exodus of East Germans to the West led to the collapse of the 
Honecker regime in November and the opening of the Berlin Wall. A 
brief SED interregnum followed, led first by Egon Krenz and then by 
Hans Modrow, with whom West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
clearly did not wish to deal in any serious longer-term way. As eco-
nomic and political collapse became imminent, the days of Communist 
rule in the GDR were clearly numbered. Free elections, the first in 
that area of Germany since 1933, were scheduled for May 1990 and 
then re-scheduled for mid-March 1990, in view of a worsening crisis. 
Meanwhile, events in the GDR began to have their international 
implications. Kohl offered a rather daring 10-point plan for German 
confederation, with continued NATO membership, in November 
44. Larrabee, "From Reunification to Reassociation: New Dimensions of the German 
Question," in Larrabee, ed., The Two German States and European Security, New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1989, p. 29. 
45. See, Gert-Joachim Glassner, "Yom 'realen Sozialismus' zur Selbstbestimmung," 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 5 January 1990, pp. 3-20. 
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1989, without consulting his closest allies. His go-it-alone assertive-
ness was a demonstration of West Germany's increased self-confidence 
in an environment of collapsing Communist rule in Eastern Europe. 
The Soviet Union was about to lose one of its closest allies in Eastern 
Europe and made suggestions regarding a possible German confedera-
tion outside both NATO and Warsaw Pact in the hope of salvaging as 
much of its position as possible. GDR leader Modrow echoed this 
idea with a January 1990 proposal for a neutralized united Germany. 
Both ideas were clearly reminiscent of various (Soviet) ideas of the 
early 1950's, and were flatly rejected by a West German government 
that had increasingly worried Western allies to contend with. The 
FRG's allies were concerned about the Federal Republic's future in 
both NATO and the EC, and it fell especially to FRG Foreign Minis-
ter Genscher to provide the needed assurances. It was also Genscher 
who sought to break a deadlock over possible NATO membership of a 
reunited Germany by suggesting that NATO forces should stay clear 
of GDR territory in a united Germany and that the USSR should be 
allowed to maintain a contingent of forces on East German territory 
for a pre-arranged period after unification. 
By early 1990, it was clear that full German reunification was all 
but inevitable, and all confederation ideas, predicated on a continued 
existence in some form of two separate German states, found their end 
in history's dust bin. The rapidity of change rendered obsolete the 
ideas of analysts like Anne-Marie Burley, who wrote in late 1989: 
Stability in Europe means the maintenance of the existing 
international structure: two superpowers and two Germa-
nies. Stability in the G.D.R. means reform without the 
threat of reunification .... (R]ecognizing the German divi-
sion as permanent could be the final step toward overcoming 
it.46 
The human exodus from East to West Germany continued, eco-
nomic conditions in the GDR worsened steadily, and East German 
opinion swung clearly in the direction of unification with the West. In 
November 1989, only 16% of GDR citizens expressed strong support 
for unification, while 32% were moderately in favor, and 52% were 
either moderately or strongly opposed to the idea. By February/ 
March 1990, however, 84% were moderately or strongly in favor of 
unification, while only 16% remained moderately or strongly op-
46. Burley, "The Once and Future German Question," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1989-
90, pp. 82, 83. 
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posed.47 In addition, an interesting 60% of GDR citizens professed 
support for the notion of a militarily neutral united Germany.48 
It is also worth noting that opinion polling in March 1990 in East 
Germany detected an interesting difference among generations as far 
as levels of identification with "Germany" and the "GDR" were con-
cerned. Of those born before 1930, 74% professed a strong sense of 
being German, with only 22% stressing a more primary GDR-iden-
tity. The respective percentages were as follows for the other genera-
tions: among those born between 1931 and 1945, 66% versus 28%; 
among those born between 1946 and 1960, 55% versus 39%; and 
among those born after 1960, 52% versus 37%. In other words, while 
a strong sense of being "German" characterized all generations, a sig-
nificant identification with the GDR was quite pronounced among 
those who had been fully socialized by life in the GDR after 1949. In 
addition, supporters of the SED overwhelmingly continued to identify 
with the GDR, while clear majorities of the supporters of the other 
major parties in East Germany professed a more primary "German" 
identity.49 
A major breakthrough occurred in February 1990. Agreement 
was reached in Ottawa between FRG and GDR representatives and 
the former Allies of World War II (US, USSR, Great Britain, and 
France) with their residual legal rights in Germany (including Berlin) 
on the so-called "two-plus-four" formula: the two German states 
would work out the internal modalities of unification, while they 
would join the Four Powers to make the necessary international secur-
ity adjustments. As far as the internal German process was con-
cerned, the key issue quickly became the cost of what was no less than 
a West German bailout of a collapsing GDR. East-West disagreement 
over a possible NATO membership of the new Germany, plus the sen-
sitive issue of the German-Polish border, clearly topped the agenda on 
the international side of the bargaining process. 
The internal German process was heavily colored by the fact that 
1990 became a year of "siamese" German elections (March elections 
47. For a discussion of the East Germans' unmistakably economic calculations in their 
opinions regarding unification, see the discussion and data provided in Manfred Kuechler, 
"Pocketbook Patriotism: Economic Expectations and the Pursuit of German Unity," pa· 
per presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 
30 - September 2, 1990, San Francisco. 
48. See, "Fremde Zahler," Der Spiegel, #II, 1990, p. 40 for poll results. 
49. Data gathered by the Institut ftir Demoskopie Allensbach on March 8-15, 1990, 
and reported in David P. Conradt, "German Unification and the Remade Political Cul-
ture," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, August 30-September 2, 1990, San Francisco. 
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in the GDR, December elections in the FRG). For the first time since 
the creation of the two German states in 1949, free elections were to 
take place on both sides of the intra-German dividing line. Needless 
to say, reunification became the decisive campaign issue on both sides. 
An additional "siamese" dimension of this joint German electoral pro-
cess lay in the fact that in both German states, some of the principal 
parties in the political contest came to coexist (and be allied) as "sis-
ter" parties. Thus one encountered the phenomenon of Christian 
Democratic, Social Democratic, and Free Democratic parties on both 
sides, in addition to parties or movements with "Green" or ecological 
orientations. 
The partially conflicting visions of West Germany's two key par-
ties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, in the area of 
foreign policy were mentioned earlier. It became obvious rather 
quickly that these differences would continue to play a significant role 
in Germany's political future. The dynamic of "competitive national-
ism" between these two large parties, aimed at proving one's national-
ist credentials to the electorate, tends to be particularly dangerous. 
Carried to an extreme, such a competition could be highly destabi-
lizing for Germany's evolving democratic political culture, not to 
mention the country's image in the rest of the world. 
Chancellor Kohl's West German Christian Democrats sought to 
position themselves as true guardians of the nation, but also as repre-
sentatives of the Adenauer Westpolitik legacy with its strong emphasis 
on both European integration and Atlantic partnership with the U.S. 
The CDU's German nationalism has been primarily embedded in a 
Europeanist, Atlanticist, and pro-capitalist ideological framework, 
although older nationalist elements clearly survive in some sectors of 
the CDU and its Bavarian sister-party, the CSU, and among some of 
the expellees from former eastern German territories. Yet the possi-
bility also presented itself that if East-West negotiations over NATO 
membership of a future Germany would get seriously stalemated, the 
CDU's Atlanticism could become a political liability. Insofar as 
NATO's purpose has been not only the defense of Western Europe vis-
a-vis the Warsaw Pact but also the control of German power, contin-
ued acceptance of NATO constraints (especially foreign troops on 
German soil) by a CDU-led government could well turn into a deeply 
emotional issue in a reunited Germany, an issue with considerable na-
tionalist explosive potential, which the SPD, among others, could be 
expected to exploit. This is why many argued that the transcendence 
of both NATO and Warsaw Pact, legacies of a passing era, by means 
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of the creation of a pan-European security order should receive urgent 
attention. 
The West German Social Democrats have tended to be less 
strongly Atlanticist, and might be willing to re-examine Germany's 
role (and membership) in NATO in the context of the overall reunifi-
cation process, a fact that has led some to warn of a resurgence of 
SPD-led German neutralism. Since the late 1950's, the SPD's support 
of European integration has been quite genuine, although it is sensitive 
to domination of the European Community by big business at the ex-
pense of social needs. After initial, and electorally costly, hesitation in 
1989 about the reunification issue, the SPD endorsed the broad out-
lines of Kohl's confederation plan, before seeking to move ahead to 
articulate its own policy preferences on the matter of national unity 
amid rapidly evolving inter-German conditions. For the SPD, long-
standing contacts with the disgraced and disintegrated East German 
SED could be a political liability in the time ahead. The same could 
be said of the SPD's historic alienation from German nationhood. 5° 
The Free Democrats continue to be a crucial coalition partner for 
either the CDU or the SPD, despite the party's small size. Although 
more Atlanticist than the SPD, they did collaborate with the Social-
Democrats during the years after 1969 in formulating the basic re-
orientation of West German foreign policy known as Ostpolitik. For 
the foreseeable future, the Free Democrats are expected to continue 
their participation in the current coalition with the Christian Demo-
crats. The Greens on the Left and the Republikaner on the Right did 
not appear to be decisive players (yet). 
Needless to say, the East German political scene was much more 
turbulent. The Socialist Unity Party (SED), now renamed Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS), continued to disintegrate as 1990 
progressed, because it faced both a basic political credibility problem 
and a noticeable fragmentation into more conservative and reformist 
camps. Initial SED attempts to retain influence (if not power) by play-
ing up an alleged neo-Nazi threat clearly backfired. The various oppo-
sition groups (New Forum, Democratic Awakening, and Democracy 
Now) that emerged in the course of 1989 saw their political influence 
weaken considerably by the beginning of 1990, despite their participa-
tion in Round Table talks with the caretaker government and subse-
50. See, the essay by Hellmuth Karasek, "Mit Kanonen auf Bananen?," Der Spiegel, 
# 13, 1990, pp. 56-57. Karasek points to the "new gap" that has opened up in Germany 
"between the Left and the national question." See also Michael Charlier, "Deutschland, 
schwierig Vaterland," Bliitter fiir deutsche und internationale Politik, February 1990, pp. 
179-87. 
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quent participation in that government. Some have been heavily 
dominated by groups of intellectuals, and many have had to struggle 
hard to define an electoral identity, to decide whether they wished to 
be a formal political party at all, and tQ delineate a position on the 
twin questions of German unity and the GDR's future. 51 Initially 
committed to the continued existence of a separate East German state, 
they were all soon confronted with a seemingly uncontrollable popular 
rush in the direction of reunification, and had to adjust their platforms 
accordingly. Many developed a clearly enduring resentment against 
what they saw as an East German "sell-out" to West German bour-
geois capitalism. 52 
The SED's former allies, "block parties"53 like the East German 
CDU and FOP, appeared to be severely affiicted by a basic credibility 
problem in the eyes of the GDR's electorate. As a result, the West 
German CDU and FOP were at first far from eager to lend electoral 
support and endorsement to these "sister" parties. Faced with the 
rapid growth of the SPD in the GDR, however, Chancellor Kohl's 
CDU swung its support behind a small East German coalition of 
center-right opposition groups (Allianz fiir Deutschland) that did in-
clude the GDR-CDU. 
By the early months of 1990, East Germany's newly reconstituted 
Social Democratic Party (SOP, subsequently renamed SPD) seemed to 
emerge clearly as the major new force in GDR politics. This party 
could not be tainted by the stigma of collaboration with the SED re-
gime, and could tap the historic electoral strength of Social Democ-
racy in the east of Germany. In addition, the party could present itself 
as a credible defender of those social programs that the average East 
51. On the various East German opposition groups that emerged in the course of 1989, 
see Hubertus Knabe, ed., Aujbruch in eine andere DDR, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989; Gerhard Rein, ed., Die Opposition in der DDR, Berlin: 
Wichern-Verlag, 1989; Hannes Bahrmann and Christoph Links, Wir sind das Volle. Die 
DDR zwischen 7. Oktober und 17. Dezember 1989. Eine Chronik, Berlin/Weimar: Autbau-
Verlag Berlin, 1990; Charles Schiiddekopf, ed., "Wir sind das Volkl" Flugschriften, 
Aufrufe und Texte einer deutschen Revolution, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Tas-
chenbuch Verlag, 1990; Michael Naumann, ed., "Die Geschichte ist o./fen': DDR 1990: 
Hoffnung auf eine neue Republik, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1990. 
52. See, for example, Jens Reich, "Germany- a Binary Poison," New Left Review, 
January/February 1990, pp. 120-24; "Die Krake miissen wir sezieren," Der Spiegel, #31, 
1990, p. 54ff. 
53. The SED always governed as part of what was presented as a truly democratic 
"coalition" of progressive parties. In reality, the SED has been essentially omnipotent, and 
the "coalition" was really more like a "'monolith." See Wolfgang Mieczkowski, 
"Bewegung im Monolith," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 21 April 1984, p. 3ff. 
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German might not wish to see eliminated altogether after reunification 
with the more prosperous Federal Republic. 
Yet the GDR elections on March 18 defied all earlier forecasts, 
turning into a triumph for the CDU-backed conservative Alliance. 
Unlike a still hesitant SPD and PDS, the Alliance promised quick uni-
fication in the most unambiguous way, and clearly benefitted from its 
closeness to a West German Chancellor who would be expected to 
fulfill his promises of massive economic aid. The fact that the Alliance 
fell just short of an absolute majority (circa 48%) necessitated the for-
mation of a coalition. After a brief period of haggling, overshadowed 
by allegations concerning collaboration with the former security police 
(Stasi) by many of the GDR's new politicians, a Grand Coalition was 
formed, including both the Alliance and the SPD, which had polled 
22% of the vote. The PDS, which had scored a somewhat surprising 
16% in the election, was excluded: Communist rule in East Germany 
had formally come to an end. 
With a freely elected East German government in place, the 
"two-plus-four" process could now move forward in more decisive 
fashion. We examine first the internal German process, and then tum 
to the international ramifications of the resurgence of a united 
Germany. 
GERMANY REUNITES: ECONOMICS, ELECTIONS, AND 
EMOTIONS 
The intra-German process of unification focused on some crucial 
constitutional, socioeconomic, financial, and political issues. As far as 
the constitutional modalities of unity were concerned, several pos-
sibilities existed. Usage of Article 23 in West Germany's Basic Law 
would necessitate a reconstitution of the original Liinder (states) in 
East Germany, which could then vote one by one to accede to the 
Federal Republic. 54 This was the formula preferred by the Christian 
Democrats. Another possibility, favored by the Social Democrats, 
would be to take the route of Article 146, which would involve the 
drafting of an entirely new constitution by an all-German constituent 
54. The exact text in Article 23 reads: "This Basic Law applies for the time being in the 
area of the Lander Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Sax-
ony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Wiirttemberg-Baden 
and Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollem. It will enter into force in other parts of Germany upon 
their accession." Note that, given Germany's postwar fate and the loss of various territo-
ries, the phrase ·•other parts of Germany" is strikingly vague. 
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assembly. 55 A third constitutional possibility, namely the continued 
existence of two German states in a confederation of some kind, 
quickly vanished from all official and scholarly discussion. Most ob-
servers came to see unification based on Article 23 as the best route, 
also because it would be the easiest way to bring the GDR into the 
European Community without elaborate negotiations. 56 
The socioeconomic and financial aspects of unification generated 
far more immediate controversy, particularly among the general pub-
lic, than the more technical and even obscure constitutional modali-
ties. The basic question quickly became: what would it cost and who 
would pay? Estimates of the total (long-term) cost of unification 
would ultimately range from 500 billion to 1 trillion D-mark. As 1990 
progressed, popular pressure in the FRG grew to put an end to West 
Germany's generous support of those who had left the GDR. It be-
came clear that the emotional excitement of the fall of 1989 had been 
replaced by outright worry over the economic and financial conse-
quences of a West German "bail-out" of the GDR, in addition to 
widespread concern about the need to absorb and integrate a seem-
ingly endless number of "immigrants" (Ubersiedler) from the GDR. 
As W.R. Smyser put it at the time, "[t]he unification of Germany is 
only superficially a merger between a capitalist and a socialist econ-
omy. It is really a merger between rich and poor."57 
Predictions of increased inflation and higher taxes in the FRG 
created visible uneasiness among the West German public, which in 
turn was probably responsible for the CDU's loss in two important 
state elections in West Germany in May, resulting in SPD control of 
the Bundesrat (the upper house of the West German parliament). 
While clear popular majorities continued to support the objective of 
unification, matters of speed and cost became a source of noticeable 
political divisiveness. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government fa-
vored a rapid pace and played down the possibility of adverse eco-
nomic consequences, while the opposition SPD urged a slowing of the 
pace and hoped to benefit politically from public anxiety over the high 
55. Article 146 reads: "This Basic Law loses its legal validity on the day when a consti-
tution enters into force which has been adopted by the German people in a free decision." 
56. In this context, see the discussion by Werner Ungerer, "Die Europii.ische Gemein-
schaft und die Einigung Deutschlands," Blo:tter fiir deutsche und internationale Politik, 
April 1990, pp. 434-44; Marc Beise, "Die DDR und die europii.ische Gemeinschaft," Eu-
ropa-Archiv, #4, 1990, pp. 149-58. 
57. Smyser, "United Germany: A New Economic Miracle?," The Washington Quar-
terly, Autumn 1990, p. 173. 
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cost. 58 Concern over trends in West German public sentiment even 
seemed to prompt Kohl to strive for earlier-than-planned all-German 
elections, clearly hoping to cash in on his party's popularity in the 
East and thereby offset possible voter losses in the West. 59 
Anxiety was also easy to detect among the population in the 
GDR, focused on fear over increased unemployment, an inability to 
compete with the more powerful West Germans, the possibility of sud-
den property claims arising from past confiscations, and an elimina-
tion of numerous aspects of the GDR's relatively generous welfare 
state provisions. Sadness among GDR citizens over the real prospect 
of a noticeable loss of identity also began to surface, as ironic as that 
may seem, in light of the overwhelming anti-SED and pro-unification 
mood.60 Yet the desire for rapid unity, coupled with the expectation 
of massive West German economic assistance, was sufficient to bring 
the CDU-dominated Alliance a ringing victory in the March elections, 
although their electoral outlook for the longer term had to be consid-
ered uncertain at best. 
Particular controversy was generated by Chancellor Kohl's desire 
to bring about a quick monetary union between the two German 
states, to be set up by means of a formal Staatsvertrag (state treaty). 
Initial opposition by the FRG's Central Bank subsided, but uneasiness 
over the monetary consequences clearly remained. East and West 
German negotiators haggled over the conversion rate that would be 
applied between the strong West German D-mark and the GDR's 
very weak Ostmark. Popular anxiety in the East rose dramatically, 
since an unfavorable rate could have a devastating impact on savings, 
pensions, and purchasing power.61 In the end, a 1-for-1 rate was 
agreed upon, although a ceiling was set for the amounts that could be 
converted at that rate. While early July was selected as the target date 
for full monetary union, concerns and disagreements on related eco-
nomic matters, particularly in the area of market-oriented reform, 
continued to slow down the process. 
58. The frequent fluidity in West German public opinion throughout late 1989 and 
1990 is ably discussed and illustrated in Hans-Joachim Veen, "German Unity: Public 
Opinion and Voting Trends," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, pp. 177-89. 
59. Poll data also showed a continued CDU/CSU-FDP lead in the West German cam-
paign, however. See "Kohls zweiter Sieg schon sicher?," Der Spiegel, #14, 1990, p. 36ft". 
60. "Der Heimatverlust schmerzt," Der Spiegel, #8, 1990, pp. 27-28. 
61. Polls also reflected a continued West German optimism about the unification pro-
cess as a whole, however, although mixed opinion about the FRG-GDR state treaty was 
clearly evident (42% had a "good impression" of the treaty, 28% had "not a good impres-
sion," and a significant 30% were "undecided"). See Richard E. Meyer, "West Germans 
Optimistic About Reunification, Poll Finds," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1990, p. Al. 
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But as the spring ended, considerable progress had been made. 
FRG-GDR negotiations had resulted in a draft state treaty on eco-
nomic and monetary union that was signed in May. After some com-
plex political maneuvering within the West German SPD, involving 
the (unsuccessful) demand by the party's Chancellor-candidate, Oskar 
LaFontaine, that the SPD block the state treaty unless certain im-
provements were made in the text, the treaty was ratified by the parlia-
ments of both German states in June. On July 1, 1990, amid 
uncertainty, anxiety, and anticipation, the FRG-GDR economic and 
monetary merger went into effect. 62 And now, more than ever before, 
the likelihood of all-German elections in December 1990 came clearly 
into view. 
A $70 billion fund to finance the merger had meanwhile been cre-
ated, coupled with a "no new taxes" promise from the Bonn govern-
ment, although widespread skepticism persisted. The fund would 
cover a 4-year period, with expenditures focused on the rebuilding of 
the GDR's old industries and infrastructure, adjustments in the tax 
system, and a much-needed clean-up of the heavily polluted environ-
ment in East Germany. Yet it was also significant that the state treaty 
did not address some highly sensitive issues that would have to be 
settled through separate negotiations, such as ownership of private 
property in a de-socialized GDR and some of the basic aspects of re-
form of East German industry and agriculture, with a potential for a 
level of unemployment that some felt might reach well beyond 1, 2, or 
even 3 million (out of a population of 16 million). 
Some, but by no means all, of these issues were decided in a sec-
ond Staatsvertrag that was ratified by the parliaments of both German 
states on the eve of the formal unification date (October 3, 1990), after 
a turbulent negotiation process that saw continued political instability 
and friction in the GDR's shaky "Grand Coalition" of conservative 
Alliance, liberal FDP, and left-wing SPD. Yet property claims and 
divergences in abortion legislation remained among the most impor-
tant issues that promised continued controversy. The signing of the 
second treaty, and the at times clearly subdued and noticeably non-
nationalistic celebration of unification, were followed by elections in 
the newly reconstituted Lander (states) in the GDR (and in Bavaria in 
the FRG) on October 14. The Christian Democrats scored impressive 
victories in four of the eastern Lil'nder (Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony-
62. See, the special report, "Germany Toward Unity," in Time, July 9, 1990, especially 
pp. 76-78. For an excellent overview in English of the various financial, social, and eco-
nomic aspects of the FRG-GDR monetary/economic union, see the 22-page special report 
("Survey") entitled "The New Germany," The Economist, June 30, 1990. 
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Anhalt, and Mecklenburg), while the SPD was only successful in gain-
ing a majority of the vote in Brandenb_urg. The former Communist 
party managed to gain an average of about 10-12% of the vote in each 
GDR Land. The election results also brought a restoration of the 
CDU/CSU-FDP majority in the Bundesrat. 
Aside from the many economic difficulties faced by the new Ger-
many in its internal affairs, such as unemployment, the risk of infla-
tion, disputes over property claims, hesitation among potential 
investors, and instances of criminal financial corruption in a collapsing 
ex-GDR, political and basic social problems also came more strongly 
to the fore. A fundamental revamping of educational policy and cur-
ricular content in the primary- and secondary-school system of the ex-
GDR was among the urgent questions to be addressed, in addition to 
much-needed reform of over-staffed academic institutions. Health 
care and other social services were on the brink of full-scale collapse. 
Instances of racism and/or violence by skin-heads and other disaf-
fected and alienated groups, including squatters and anarchists in Ber-
lin, emerged as an additional challenge to a virtually disintegrated 
East German law enforcement apparatus. Tensions between East 
Germans and the remaining groups of foreign "guest-workers," as 
well as the thousands of Soviet soldiers, increased steadily. 
Political debate over the appropriate policy to be pursued with 
respect to former GDR spies, Stasi (secret police) employees, border 
guards, and Communist officials, ranging from possible amnesty to 
full-scale persecution and partial incarceration, continued to flare up 
with predictable regularity. At the same time, controversy over ex-
Stasi files and their inherent potential for political embarrassment, if 
not blackmail, persisted undiminished. Furthermore, former East 
German political parties, especially the SED (renamed PDS), were 
forced to surrender their extensive accumulations of capital and 
property. 
Meanwhile, the campaign for Germany's first truly national elec-
tions since the end of the war erupted in full force, with the governing 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn enjoying the clear status of virtu-
ally unbeatable favorite in the December 2 ballot-box contest. The 
polls left little doubt about the likely outcome, especially in light of the 
CDU's renewed successes in the October 14 GDR elections, and most 
of the SPD appeared resigned to the inevitable: Helmut Kohl would 
remain the new Germany's Einheitskanzler (chancellor of unity), a 
new Bismarck in a democratic Germany.63 Despite widespread West 
63. Poll data can be found in "1st die Wahl schon entschieden?," Der Spiegel, #26, 
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German worry about the costs of unification, the SPD proved incapa-
ble of using this issue to greater political benefit. Its political message 
seemed to fall on deaf ears, especially in the East German area. 
The SPD's prospects were further dampened by the decision of 
West Germany's Federal Constitutional Court in September that man-
dated the use of separate 5% electoral thresholds in former East and 
West Germany in the December balloting. This would benefit smaller 
parties, especially in the East, that might not otherwise make it into 
the new German parliament, but it also deprived the SPD of potential 
cross-over votes from small East German left-wing parties and citi-
zens' movements. 
The results of the December 2 all-German vote were largely as 
expected. Kohl's Christian Democrats, with their Bavarian CSU al-
lies, captured about 44% of the total national electorate, as opposed to 
the SPD's 33.5%, which amounted to the Social Democrats' worst 
showing in 30 years. The Free Democrats succeeded in reaching 11% 
of the vote and were widely expected to demand more ministerial posts 
in the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government. Parties on the ex-
treme right or left generally fared badly. In the West, the Greens 
failed to surmount the 5% electoral threshold and would therefore not 
return to the Bundestag. They had been alienated by the increasingly 
patriotic mood after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and their ecologi-
cal agenda had been largely adopted by the larger parties. Only in the 
East did a coalition of environmental and peace groups known as Alli-
ance '90 capture enough votes to gain representation in the Bundestag. 
The PDS, successor of the discredited Communist SED, also gained a 
sufficient number of votes in the East to enter the national parliament. 
The far-right Republikaner received only a meager 2% of the vote, 
well below the required 5% for Bundestag representation. Despite a 
rather low 77% voter turnout, the message of the election was fairly 
clear: no experiments, continuation of the current coalition, and a 
strengthening of the center of Germany's political spectrum. 
TOWARDS A PAX GERMANICA OR A PAX EUROPAEA? 
It is in the international realm, however, rather than in the inter-
nal FRG-GDR sphere with its focus on sometimes bitter electoral 
contests and the marks-and-pfennigs issues of socioeconomic merger, 
that the German Question with its central dimensions of identity, 
unity, and power has made itself felt most dramatically since Novem-
1990, p. 40ff.; "Nur jeder vierte glaubt an Wechsel," Der Spiegel, #31, 1990, p. 32ff.; 
"Kohl dem Wahlsieg noch nilher," Der Spiegel, #35, 1990, p. 40ff. 
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ber 1989. One analyst captured the essence of international concern as 
follows: 
There are only two real certainties in European politics to-
day: Eastern Europe has been effectively liberated from So-
viet domination, and the reunification of Germany is 
approaching. For all their historic worth, these certainties, 
in turn, create new uncertainties - after all, the postwar sys-
tem of European stability, of deterrence and detente, was 
based on the permanence of the Soviet threat and of the divi-
sion of Europe and of Germany. Now that history has 
turned the tables, it is the hitherto unquestioned structures 
of European order that are entering a period of unpredict-
ability: in the East, all structures - from the Warsaw Pact 
to Comecon- set up to camouflage Soviet centralized con-
trol; in the West, the NATO alliance and the European 
Community (EC); in Europe as a whole the familiar ways in 
which East-West relations are conducted. Germany is at the 
center of all these uncertainties, not only geographically but 
politically. 64 
He added that "Europe's two new certainties are interdependent: had 
Eastern Europe not succeeded in slipping away from Soviet control, 
there would be no chance for the reunification of Germany."65 
One basic and decisive question concerned the diplomatic inten-
tions of the various players in this unfolding drama. 66 Perhaps most 
importantly, was Moscow willing to abandon its East German ally and 
permit reunification without major Western concessions? Soviet op-
tions were by no means clear, and neither were their ultimate objec-
tives. 67 After its unsuccessful attempt to bring about an FRG-GDR 
64. Christoph Bertram, "The German Question,'' Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, p. 45. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Although Soviet objectives and interests were probably most affected by the rush 
toward German unity, the other great powers with continued legal rights in the divided 
Germany were also challenged to review and, if necessary, adjust their basic positions. For 
further discussion, see Michael H. Haltzel, "Amerikanische Einstellungen zur deutschen 
Wiedervereinigung" (pp. 127-32), Walter Schiitze, "Frankreich angesichts der deutschen 
Einheit" (pp. 133-38) and Richard Davy, "Grossbritannien und die Deutsche Frage" (pp. 
139-44), all in Europa-Archiv, #4, 1990. 
67. For some speculation, see Wolfgang Seiffert, "Die Reformpolitik Gorbatschows 
und die Deutsche Frage," Osteuropa, Vol. 39, #4, April1989, pp. 317-31; Fred Oldenburg, 
"Sowjetische Deutschland-Politik nach der Oktober-Revolution in der DDR,'' Deutschland 
Archiv, Vol. 23, # 1, January 1990, pp. 68-76. A general discussion of the evolution of 
official Soviet attitudes regarding the question of German unification and security status is 
provided by Hans-Peter Riese, "Die Geschichte hat sich ans Werk gemacht," Europa-
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confederation that would have preserved the Soviet position in Central 
Europe to its maximum extent under already adverse circumstances, 
Moscow appeared to accept full reunification as inevitable, but contin-
ued to oppose NATO membership of a united Germany, until a break-
through was reached in July 1990, as we shall see below. 
The Genscher proposal, discussed earlier, sought to break the 
stalemate, whereupon the Soviets suggested a German membership in 
both NATO and Warsaw Pact. But this idea was quickly rejected by 
both Bonn and its allies. Serious limitations on German military 
power as part of an East-West compromise remained likely, while 
Western leaders expected Moscow to abandon its opposition to Ger-
man NATO membership. Such expectation was fueled by a variety of 
considerations, such as Gorbachev's growing preoccupation with do-
mestic troubles, the steady disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and a 
widespread Eastern European preference for a NATO-bound rather 
than neutralized and possibly unpredictable and uncontrolled 
Germany. 
In addition, polls showed that NATO membership for a united 
Germany remained clearly the preferred option among West 
Germans. A June 1990 poll, for example, found that 51% of West 
Germans interviewed preferred a united Germany in NATO, while 
34% would opt for neutrality and 15% were undecided. In addition, 
53% of the sample indicated willingness to "accept the presence of 
foreign troops [on German soil] as part of [Germany's] NATO obliga-
tions," whereas 31% felt that "foreign troops should withdraw" (16% 
were undecided). Attitudes on nuclear weapons were also interesting. 
Of the interview sample, 54% agreed that nuclear weapons should 
now be removed from German soil, but 37% argued that they should 
remain, while 9% were undecided. When asked whether nuclear 
weapons should be pulled out of Germany if "the Soviet Union made 
its agreement to German unity conditional on [such a removal of nu-
clear weapons]," however, only 25% agreed with such a scenario, 
while 65% felt that "we should not allow ourselves to be pressured in 
the matter of German unity" and 10% declared themselves 
undecided. 68 
As the months passed, the likelihood emerged that NATO mem-
bership of a united Germany would be tied to an overall East-West 
Archiv, #4, 1990, pp. 117-26. See also Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev and German Unifi-
cation: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power,'' Problems of Communism, July-Au-
gust 1990, pp. 1-23. 
68. For poll results and discussion, see "The Germans give their answers," The Econo-
mist, June 30, 1990, pp. 45-46. 
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agreement on conventional military power in Europe (resulting from 
the negotiations in Vienna on Conventional Forces in Europe) plus 
extensive Western economic and financial assistance to the struggling 
Soviet economy. This latter approach, extending beyond the newly 
created Bank for East European Development, was looked upon skep-
tically by the US and Great Britain, but favored by the other Western 
allies, including especially the FRG, which had already promised 
Moscow to assume the GDR's trading obligations vis-a-vis the USSR. 
For many, Kohl's exceedingly clumsy handling of the German-
Polish border issue in early 1990 was unmistakable proof of the need 
to anchor the new Germany firmly in the Western alliance. Allegedly 
concerned over the potential loss of the West German bloc of expellee 
votes to the far right, Kohl hesitated badly when asked to declare the 
Oder-Neisse line as the definitive border between Germany and Po-
land. His argument that only a newly constituted German govern-
ment and parliament could effectively make such a pledge was legally 
correct but politically extremely ill-timed and unwise. Declarations by 
both German parliaments, plus Allied assurances that Poland would 
be allowed to participate in discussions regarding its border with Ger-
many in the context of the "two-plus-four" talks, subsequently defused 
the immediate controversy and anxiety, but the damage had been 
done. By July, the two German states and Poland reached a full un-
derstanding about the finality of the current German-Polish border, to 
be formalized in a treaty at the time of Germany's official reunifica-
tion, and tied to plans for extensive German-Polish economic coopera-
tion. In November, agreement on the formal German-Polish treaty 
indeed became reality: the existing border was declared fixed once and 
for all, although the fundamental challenge of reconciliation and coop-
eration would require more long-term effort on both sides. 
However, the Polish-German border issue was illustrative of 
more widespread anxiety among many of Germany's neighbors re-
garding the prospect of unification. A poll conducted in January of 
1990 in 8 countries (Spain, Italy, FRG, Hungary, Britain, France, 
USSR, and Poland) detected mixed feelings. "Roughly two out of 
three Poles are opposed to the reunification of Germany, but a major-
ity of Russians and Hungarians feel positively about the idea .... 
[W]hile a solid majority of those questioned in five Western European 
countries favored a single German state, a significant number of 
Britons and French - around one in four - were opposed." The poll 
revealed "continuing uncertainty throughout Europe." For example, 
"[a]mong the Western European countries polled, only Italy had a 
majority that thought lasting peace was within reach. Forty-nine per-
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cent of Britons and 50 percent of French said a serious European con-
flict was still possible. "69 As the months progressed, some of the 
international worries seemed to ease, particularly as a result of a vari-
ety of diplomatic assurances made by the Bonn government. 70 Jewish 
concerns frequently persisted, however, in part because no explicit all-
German admission of guilt for the Holocaust was included in the final 
FRG-GDR unification treaty. The likelihood of claims made against 
a reunited Germany by Jews and others also continued to loom as a 
source of very probable controversy. 
As Christoph Bertram pointed out, the basic international agenda 
resulting from the inexorable drift toward German reunification in-
volved "the security status of Germany, the cancellation of the rem-
nants of Germany's now obsolete postwar legal regime, the special 
rights of the Four Powers, the status of the city of Berlin, and the 
finalization of Germany's external borders, particularly with Poland." 
In addition, "the European Community will have to define the modali-
ties of permitting one of its member states to be enlarged."71 
The exact ways in which this agenda would be managed, and the 
various issues settled, could only become clearer as time passed, and 
some aspects might not be fully settled for at least several years after 
formal FRG-GDR unification. What became very obvious, however, 
was that this agenda reflected the basic dimensions of an enduring 
German Question with which Germans and non-Germans alike must 
continue to contend. It is clear that one aspect of that Question, 
namely national unity, has been at least formally "solved," although 
lingering revisionism due to the loss of former Eastern territories 
ought to be watched carefully. 
But it is also important to remember that territorial and legal 
69. "Survey Finds 2 in 3 Poles Opposed to German Unity,'' The New York Times, 
February 20, 1990, p. AS. Additional poll results were published in "They like it and they 
fear it," The Economist, January 27, 1990, pp. 29, 32. 
70. "Europe's Fears of a United Germany Dissipate,'' Los Angeles Times, May 5, 1990, 
p. A16; "From Germany's Neighbors, Respect and Then Acceptance," The New York 
Times, September 27, 1990, pp. A1, A6. Evidence that worries nonetheless linger just be-
low the surface was probably at no recent time clearer than during July 1990, when a 
conservative British government minister resigned after inflammatory statements about the 
Germans and their alleged behavioral inclinations and intentions. The uproar gathered 
further momentum when a British government memo was subsequently leaked which con-
tained very sharp and negative evocations of the Germans' purported "national character." 
An abridged version of the memo was published by The New York Times, July 20, 1990, p. 
A15. See also Dominic Lawson, "Saying the Unsayable," Orbis, Fall 1990, pp. 505-07; 
David Wedgwood Benn, "Germany II: Britain and the 'enemy image'," The World Today, 
October 1990, pp. 181-82. 
71. Bertram, "The German Question," supra, note 64, pp. 50-51. 
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German unification by itself has not yet by any means resulted in gen-
uine East-West German cultural and psychological unity. Forty years 
of political-ideological and psychological separation cannot and will 
not be undone overnight. What is more, the dismal economic picture 
in the former GDR all but guarantees that the population in "East" 
Germany will for some years to come have to cope with a (perceived 
as well as real) status as "second-class" citizens in the new Germany, 
frequently subject to "West" German disdain, ridicule, and resent-
ment.72 In fact, Michael Meyer has suggested that "[t]he German 
Question has ... been reincarnated, in a new form," because "[t]he 
new Germany will be one nation, but two peoples. "73 Interesting in 
this context of continued "disunity" is also the occasional discussion 
of what the "eastern" part of the new Germany ought to be called in 
political discourse: "the former GDR," "the new Federal Liinder," 
"eastern Germany?" For many conservatives who continue to harbor 
revisionist dreams regarding the lost "eastern" territories in Poland 
and the Soviet Union, of course, the former GDR will always remain 
Mitteldeutsch/and. 74 
Furthermore, there is absolutely no doubt that the two remaining 
dimensions, identity and power (and, thus, Germany's role in world 
affairs) will also continue to preoccupy scholars and policy-makers 
alike for at least the foreseeable future. Beyond the concrete military, 
political, and economic issues that the international community faces 
as it strives to deal with the new Germany, the psychological aspects, 
especially fear of a new German nationalism, are equally significant. 
Western World and West German insistence on placing the new 
German giant firmly in the Western community was and is the clear 
outgrowth of perceived lessons of the German and European past. 
Throughout its history, Germany's geopolitical location in the heart of 
Europe, coupled with its growing power, have been the source of both 
trauma and temptation, of insecurity and instability. Germany's alien-
ation from the West was further enhanced by the at least partially 
72. See, the interesting discussion in "Es ist ein anderes Leben,'" Der Spiegel, #39, 
1990, p. 34lf. See also the useful poll data on this issue in "Zwei Klassen im einig Vater-
land,'' Der Spiegel, #38, 1990, p. 28lf. Of East Germans polled, 78% expected to be sec-
ond-class citizens for the foreseeable future, while only 21% anticipated equal treatment 
and equal rights. 
73. Meyer, "The Myth of German Unity," Newsweek, July 9, 1990, p. 37. See also, the 
valuable discussion and polling data provided in "Den Neuen fehlt Selbstvertrauen," Der 
Spiegel, #46, 1990, p. ll4lf. and "Frauen zuriick an den Herd?," Der Spiegel, #47, 1990, 
p. 113lf. 
74. See, the interesting discussion in "Aehm, also, sag doch mal," Der Spiegel, #42, 
1990, pp. 51, 54. 
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diverging cultural values and political traditions noted above. In this 
respect, Germany's reconciliation with the West and the FRO's mem-
bership in both NATO and EC rank among the great success stories of 
postwar Western, and West German, diplomacy. The steady democ-
ratization of West German political culture has been a source of reas-
surance to the country's traumatized neighbors. 
In light of these considerations, Western and West German insis-
tence on a Germany firmly tied to the West, militarily in NATO and 
economically through the EC, has been and still is necessary, inevita-
ble, and under current circumstances desirable. A reaffirmation of 
Germany's Western identity, coupled with a well-defined role in multi-
lateral (even supranational) Western institutions and organizations, 
will provide the most appropriate basis for a solution to what is per-
haps the most crucial dimension of the German Question: power. 75 In 
fact, if this essay has proved anything, it is that what tends to be called 
the German Question is not necessarily the problem of German 
reunification but perhaps primarily the problem of German power. 
History has given us ample indication that the effective management 
of German power by the Germans themselves and by Germany's 
neighbors is crucial to the creation of a stable European order.76 The 
Cold War "solution" to this problem, based on the division of Ger-
many and the integration of both states into opposing alliance systems, 
has come to an end. What lies ahead? 
The management of the new Germany's power will be an interna-
tional task, but, as Bertram stresses, the Germans themselves now face 
perhaps the major responsibility: 
Germany holds a pivotal role as a generator of policy. The 
ideas, initiatives and commitments to shape a stable Euro-
pean future will now largely have to come from the Germans 
themselves - not only because of their weight in Europe's 
politics and economy, but also because, with the notable and 
welcome exception of the United States, Germany's main 
partners in the West have largely retreated into attentive 
(France) or irritated (Britain) passivity. German politicians 
must thus display an immense degree of statesmanship, not 
only in order to manage the domestic process of reunifica-
tion, but to pave the way for the international one as well. 
75. See, "Germany Inc.: Awesome Power Might Be the Only Predictable Trait Of a 
Unified Land," The New York Times, Section 4, February 18, 1990, p. 1; "The New Super-
power," Newsweek, February 26, 1990, p. 16ff. 
76. See, the discussion in Michael Lind, "German Fate and Allied Fears," The Na-
tional Interest, Spring 1990, pp. 34-44. 
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This is a tall order for any country. Germany must accom-
modate the concern of those worried about the German past 
as well as that of those troubled by its new power; it must 
reassure Soviet security interests without arousing suspicions 
in the West; it must strengthen its Western ties through par-
ticipation in the reform of NATO and through promotion of 
political union in Western Europe. In short, Germany has 
to use its weight and power wisely, considerately as well as 
confidently. 77 
International concern over German military power remains, particu-
larly the scenario of a future revisionist German superpower armed 
with nuclear weapons. Hence the increased effort on all sides to ex-
amine various possible security arrangements, including arms control 
agreements, that might stabilize the emerging post-Cold War Euro-
pean continent. 78 
Major breakthroughs on the security status of a united Germany 
were finally achieved during the summer of 1990, after months of in-
tense negotiations and posturing by the various parties. 79 In mid-July, 
the Soviet Union removed its objection to the NATO membership of a 
united Germany, in return for extensive Western (especially German) 
77. Bertram, "The German Question," supra, note 64, pp. 61-62. As Bertram notes, 
the U.S. has indicated that it intends to remain fully engaged in the future of Europe. To 
some, the American presence in Europe is in fact a key stabilizing factor. See Josef Joffe, 
"Europe's American Pacifier," Survival, July/August 1984, pp. 174-81; William E. Odom, 
"Only Ties to America Provide the Answer,'· Orbis, Fall 1990, pp. 483-504. 
78. This crucial issue can only be touched upon in the context of this study. For dis· 
cussion, see Manfred Miiller, "Deutschlands Rolle in einem neugestalteten europaischen 
Sicherheitssystem," Europa-Archiv, #6, 1990, pp. 221-24; Rupert Scholz, "Deutsche Frage 
und europiiische Sicherheit," Europa-Archiv, #1, 1990, pp. 239-46; Robert E. Hunter, 
"The Future of European Security" (pp. 55-68) and Joachim Krause and Peter Schmidt, 
"The Evolving New European Architecture- Concepts, Problems, and Pitfalls" (pp. 79-
92), both in The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990; Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond 
partition and unity: disintegration or reconstitution," International Affairs, Vol. 66, #3, 
1990, pp. 461-75; Ian Davidson, "The search for a new order in Europe,'' International 
Affairs, vol. 66, #2, 1990, pp. 275-83; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Eu-
rope,'· International Security, Spring 1990, pp. 5-41; Roger Morgan, "Germany in Eu-
rope," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1990, pp. 147-57; Ole Waever, "Three 
competing Europes: German, French, Russian," International Affairs, Vol. 66, #3, 1990, 
pp. 477-93. 
79. The important breakthrough was especially made possible by the results of the 
summit meetings of the EC, NATO, and the G-7 (leading Western industrial nations) that 
occurred in rapid succession during June and July 1990. West German success in getting 
allied support for (its own or joint) economic and financial aid to the USSR, plus subtle but 
significant shifts in NATO strategy and military /political posture, were particularly 
decisive. 
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aid for the faltering Soviet economy, a limit of 345,000 on the troop 
strength of the all·German army, a German pledge not to acquire any 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and German agreement t~ 
help pay for the maintenance of Soviet troops on East German tern· 
tory for a transitional period of 3 to 4 years as well as for their subse· 
quent removal. The last obstacle to the rapid and successful 
conclusion of the "two·plus·four" talks was definitively cleared, and 
on September 12, the four wartime allies and the two German states 
signed the agreement formally restoring full German sovereignty. The 
Soviet-German breakthrough culminated in a formal treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation between the two continental European giants in 
November, whereupon a grand European/North American summit 
meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
gave its formal endorsement to German unity, a far-reaching conven-
tional arms control agreement between East and West, and the con-
struction of a new European order beyond the Cold War in what 
became known as the Charter of Paris. 
Yet many of the more immediate and realistic considerations 
have been focused, not on Germany's military power, but on its inevi-
table political and economic clout in a changing Europe. The follow-
ing (estimated) figures give an indication of a united Germany's 
projected economic power. Exports by the new united Germany might 
total $354 billion a year, compared with $321 billion for the US, $265 
billion for Japan, and $110 billion for the USSR. The new Germany's 
balance of trade is projected to show a $74 billion surplus, compared 
with Japan's $77 billion surplus, the Soviets' meager $3 billion surplus, 
and America's $138 billion deficit. Per capita GNP is calculated at 
$14,000 for a united Germany, nearly $20,000 for the US, $14,000 for 
Japan, and less than $9,000 for the USSR.80 Based on 1988 figures, 
the united Germany has a GOP of about $1 trillion, compared to $4.8 
trillion for the US, $2.5 trillion for the Soviet Union, $1.7 trillion for 
Japan, $762 billion for France, $755 billion for the UK, and $754 bil-
lion for Italy. 81 Many have suggested that Germany's geographic lo-
cation can be expected to be a key asset in that country's economic 
future. W.R. Smyser, for example, suggests that "Germany [will] ben-
efit from its central position in Europe, not only as a transportation 
hub but also as a production center."82 
Some have sought to place the economic power of a united Ger-
80. Data adapted from "The New Superpower," Newsweek, February 26, 1990, pp. 18, 
19, 21. 
81. Figures in "Anything to Fear?," Time, March 26, 1990, p. 36. 
82. Smyser, "United Germany: A New Economic Miracle?," supra, note 57, p. 173. 
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many in Europe in context, however, attempting to counter undue 
concerns. Thus John Roper, pointing to the widespread "speculation 
of the role that a united Germany would play within the [European] 
Community," wrote: 
True, its population of some 78m [million] would be one-
third greater than that of either Britain, France or Italy, and 
twice that of Spain. But the change would be quantitative 
rather than qualitative. West Germany is already the largest 
member of the EC with just under 20 per cent of the Com-
munity's population and 24 per cent of its economic output 
(gdp ). A unified Germany would increase its share of the 
EC's population to 22.7 per cent and initially to around 26 
per cent of the Community's economic output, but this could 
rise to 29 per cent if the labor productivity of the two 
Germanies was equated. On the other hand, if eventually 
the other five Eastern European countries were to join, the 
united Germany's proportion of the total EC population 
would be lower than that of West Germany - at present -
only 17 per cent. Its economic share is more difficult to cal-
culate, but it is probable that it would also be less than the 
present 24 per cent.83 
He concludes that "the idea that, by unification, Germany would auto-
matically leap from a non-dominant to a dominant role is clearly mis-
placed." Roper adds that "[a]s to the political aspect, there are too 
many hands on the levers of the Community for any single member 
state to impose its will on the rest. " 84 
Perhaps the hope that a German economic superpower will be 
effectively tamed in a context of progressive European integration is 
justified, but the fact also remains that the new Germany will wield 
very significant influence in most areas of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. 85 It will also be the European country most directly affected by 
any turbulence in East-Central Europe in the wake of the collapse of 
Communism and its socio-economic as well as ethno-nationalist con-
sequences. For historical, geopolitical, and cultural reasons, it is inevi-
83. Roper, "Europe and the future of Germany- a British view," The World Today, 
March 1990, p. 48. 
84. Ibid. 
85. In this connection, see "East, West Economies Join, New German Reich Begins,'· 
Los Angeles Times, July l, 1990, p. Ml; "A Unified Germany's Foreign-Policy Mantra Will 
Be: Go East, Young Germans," Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1990, p. Ml, explores the 
inevitably eastward orientation in the new Germany's diplomacy. See also, the interview 
with historian Gordon A. Craig, "Zu gross ftir Europa?," Der Spiegel, #46, 1989, p. 183ff. 
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table that the united Germany will in the coming years and decades 
once again occupy its Janus-like position as a multifaceted "bridge" 
between the West and the East, with all the opportunities and liabili-
ties that this entails, including pressures from an economically trou-
bled Eastern Europe and USSR for economic and financial assistance. 
In addition, it is an unmistakable fact that the process of German 
unification has run ahead of the process of European integration, 
which will pose particularly difficult challenges for the entire EC in 
the time ahead. 86 In a changing world, where economic strength will 
be as important as military capability, Germany will be a truly deci-
sive actor on the world stage. Yet, as Fritz Stem points out, "[f]or 
Germans more than for any other people in the Western world, both 
the past and the future are unsettled, uncertain, open. " 87 Whether the 
reunited Germans will manage their power responsibly and play their 
new global as well as Central European roles effectively, with a solidly 
anchored Western identity, that is clearly the essence of the enduring 
German Question. 
86. See, Henry A. Kissinger, "Joining Two Germanys," Los Angeles Times, January 
14, 1990, P~· M1, M3. Or as Roper has put it, "Germans and other Europeans may appear 
to be workmg on different timetables" ("Europe and the future of Germany - a British 
view," supra, note 83, p. 48). See also Ungerer, "Die Europiiische Gemeinschaft und die 
Einigung Deutschlands,'' supra, note 56. 
87. Stern, f!reams and Delusions: National Socialism in the Drama of the German Past, 
New York: Vmtage Books, 1989, p. 20. See also the commentary by A.M. Rosenthal 
"The German Question Remains Open," The New York Times, April 26, 1990, p. A23. ' 

CHAPTER VIII 
UNIFICATION AND THE DIALECTICS OF 
(MAL)INTEGRATION IN VIETNAM 
Gerard Mare 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few people have sacrificed so much in the name of national unifi-
cation as have the Vietnamese. Despite appalling casualties and a 
savaged economy, the grand ideal of unification was sustained for 
many years with unflinching intent. While the two decades of separa-
tion into North and South were marked by nearly constant war, these 
same years also witnessed sweeping and rapid change in both societies. 
In the North, the Communist regime carried out harsh campaigns of 
land reform, collectivization, and economic socialization in an effort to 
recast the society along Leninist lines. In the South, over half the pop-
ulation was uprooted; millions flooded the cities. The old rural social 
structure was shattered, largely as a result of the Vietcong strategy of 
commingling terror and land reform. By the early 70's, however, as 
the war became stalemated and the Vietcong · threat subsided, eco-
nomic progress began to take hold, in part due to vast infusions of 
American financial and administrative assistance. When communist 
forces captured Saigon in 1975 after a devastating six-week military 
offensive, the stage was set for a collision of two disparate worlds. 
Within several years Vietnam will have been reunified for as long 
as it was separated. Yet a deep north/south cleavage continues to 
skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two societies remain 
distinct. The circumstances and principles under which unification 
was carried out-the attempt at wholesale socialist transformation and 
the blind disavowal of the South's unique historical experience-set in 
motion a dialectic of malintegration which persists to this day. Pres-
ently the socializing drive is on the wane if not in retreat, particularly 
in the South. The central issue confronting the regime is no longer 
how to recast the South in the Northern mold but the obverse: how to 
prevent changes occurring in the South-the rapid pullback from so-
cialist forms, vocal disaffection, and cynicism-from creating too 
wide a gap or too strong a pull vis-a-vis the North. 
Regarding most divided nations, reflections on unification by the 
(161) 
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parties themselves or by outside observers tend to focus overwhelm-
ingly on ways to achieve a grand national settlement. The Vietnamese 
case suggests above all else the need to see unification as only the first 
step towards the immensely complicated business of realizing political 
reintegration, with all the difficult structural adjustments and inevita-
ble political shocks that it entails. One could hypothesize that in na-
tional cases where one side engulfs the other, there is the tendency to 
believe that lessons deemed successful can be applied wholesale, put-
ting little store in the specific historical lessons or culture of the erst-
while alienated 'other'. 
In analyzing the politics of national reintegration in Vietnam, sev-
eral initial themes stand out. First, the very obsession to achieve unifi-
cation blinded the regime to the bedeviling complexities in realizing 
integration. In the euphoria of victory economic plans were laid 
which forecast rapid recovery and astonishingly high output targets 
over the following five year span. Hanoi's leaders spent little time 
either reviewing the weaknesses inherent in its own socialization pro-
cess or assessing the degree to which absorbing and restructuring the 
South involved a great deal more than simply rooting out foreign influ-
ence. They were particularly blind to the consequences of their own 
initiatives: how, for example, the Viet Cong, in pursuing a land war 
strategy, had fostered dynamics of rural reform which left the South-
ern peasantry resistant to further transformation. 
A second theme concerns both the ideological and international 
context of Vietnamese unification. The war had always been cast as 
part of a univeral struggle against colonialism and imperialism. As a 
result, the ensuing debates about the nature and pace of socialization 
and, subsequently, the need to accommodate policies to the distinct 
conditions in the South became embroiled in ideological conflict and 
distrust. There was a strong ideological linkage across policy fields, 
especially in the initial post-1975 period. Only recently, as the policy 
agenda has become increasingly dictated by the need to respond to 
repeated economic failure, have these links begun to loosen. 
Two arguments are woven in the discussion below, each stressing 
the central role of political malintegration in the regime's evolution 
since 1975. The first examines the problems of North/South integra-
tion in terms of evolving dynamics of state/society interaction. I ar-
gue that the regime's strength, effectiveness, and legitimacy have 
steadily eroded over the last fifteen years as a result of both its eco-
nomic incompetence and of its inability to penetrate and remold 
Southern society. Having made critical macro-economic mistakes and 
having failed to implant tenable socialist structures in the South, the 
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regime had its legitimacy stripped down close to its founding national-
ist core. Vietnamese socialism became a spent force as it progressed 
ineffectually southwards. 
These failures have in turn brewed discontent. In the last few 
years, as the party loosened the strictures limiting criticism, a nascent 
civil society has begun to take root primarily in the South, 
spearheaded by a loosely knit association of former Southern revolu-
tionary leaders of unassailable prestige who had been sidelined in the 
intervening years. Tacit alliances with disaffected peasant groups and 
among the small intellectual elite have begun to broaden. Within this 
budding opposition-whose influence extends to the Fatherland 
Front, to Southern branches of mass organizations, to scientific clubs 
and other professional associations-the rejection of party dogma and 
autocracy, incompetence and corruption, is expressed in ever more 
trenchant tones. While Southern in origin, the dissenters' perspective 
is essentially national in scope, not confined merely to Southern preoc-
cupations or failures. Recent events in Eastern Europe have bolstered 
their courage while at the same time inviting stern rebuff and admoni-
tion from the regime. 
How easily these voices of dissent can be muzzled or how quickly 
they will echo throughout the whole country are difficult questions to 
answer. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese leadership, in failing the expec-
tations of even its erstwhile allies and supporters in the South, has 
fostered a dialectical response which makes it more vulnerable in the 
long term than the leadership of other Asian socialist states. 
Malintegration has abetted regime drift and decay, such that even in a 
socialist state with low educational levels and a limited intellectual 
elite, dissent is increasingly evident. 1 At present, despite having with-
drawn most of its forces from Cambodia, the regime is paradoxically 
more politically isolated than it has ever been as a result of changes in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At the same time the society is 
increasingly open to outside influence through rapidly expanding ex-
ternal economic ties, through the overseas Vietnamese community in 
the West, and through the 180,000 guest workers sojourning in the 
East, presently trickling back to face severe unemployment at home. 
l. Vietnam has a very low percentage of university student population, about I/ lOth 
that of Cuba, l/3rd that of Mongolia. Secondary school percentages are less than one-third 
those of the People's Republic of China, a startling figure even if secondary education is 
defined differently. See Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de Renouveau au Vietnam," Le 
Monde Diplomatique, January 1988, p.l8. For comparisons with other Asian countries see, 
Far Eastern Economic Review Asia 1990 Yearbook, Hong Kong: Review Publishing, 1990, 
pp. 7-8. 
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Whether the regime can adapt and channel the pressures for radical 
change is an open question. 
My second main argument complements the first and asserts that 
another distinguishing feature of postwar Vietnamese socialism is the 
lack of regime goal integration. Before 1975 the regime pursued the 
unification dream single-mindedly, effectively mobilizing all its re-
sources to that end. In the wake of victory it became saddled with 
conflicting priorities: socialist transformation and integration of the 
South; economic reconstruction and development; and the perennial 
goal of military struggle and defense which quickly drew it into the 
Cambodian quagmire. The image that comes to mind for the first 
post-1975 decade and beyond is of a regime caught in different and 
contradictory phases of socialist development, unable to break 
through or break out of any one phase. Both China and the Soviet 
Union evolved through separate stages of war communism, socialist 
transformation, and eventually some conjunction of reform and decay. 
Identified with each phase was a central set of tasks, and a specific 
hierarchy of skills and regime institutions. In Vietnam there was a 
conflation of priorities weakening effectiveness on all three fronts. 
War, radical social transformation, and economic development andre-
form are mutually exclusive tasks which simply could not be prose-
cuted successfully and simultaneously by a resource starved Third 
World revolutionary regime in a downward economic spiral. Associ-
ated-part cause and part effect-with this triple and contradictory 
regime profile is a collegial leadership style and an overwhelming em-
phasis on regime continuity and stability, such that even periods of 
leadership succession have not yielded the kind of major break or re-
alignment often witnessed in other socialist states. 
Presently the socializing profile lives on primarily in a vestigial or 
custodial capacity. The decades-long stress on military struggle has 
also been subsiding. Thus for the first time in its post-war history the 
leadership can marshal its attention and resources toward one strate-
gic goal-salvaging and developing its tattered economy. The compo-
sition of key leadership organs has begun to reflect this change over 
the last few years, though not without some lag. 2 
2. The composition of the Central Committee, for instance, has been significantly al-
tered since the 1982 Congress. Central party organs and the military are much more 
weakly represented while provincial officials and state technocrats now comprise a major-
ity. For a detailed review of these changes, see Carlyle Thayer, "The Regularization of 
Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1951-1986," in David 
G. Marr & Christine P. White (eds.), Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Develop-
ment, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988, p. 187. Military representation in the 
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Both arguments briefly sketched above converge to highlight 
Vietnam's integration problem and the long painful sequels to war and 
separation. Unification threw the regime into contradiction and disar-
ray from which it has only begun to emerge. But it has also created a 
dynamic of change which in time might lead Vietnam to break out of 
obdurate socialist orthodoxy. 
II. UNIFICATION: THE FIRST DECADE 
Many of the problems of malintegration that Vietnam suffers to-
day can be traced to the early post-unification years of 1975-1979. 
During the war, when unification was still a grand ideal and a fighting 
cause, little thought had been given to the concrete issues of planning 
and administration in the post-war years. After an initial phase of 
recovery and consolidation of control, unification was declared as a 
fait accompli and the Hanoi-based regime changed its name from the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the present Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. Resettlement schemes were introduced affecting both the 
North and South to relieve the bloated cities and regions of their bur-
den of unemployed and underproductive population. In the lead up to 
the 4th Party Congress held in December 1976, the first in sixteen 
years, plans were drawn up for the wholesale but gradual transforma-
tion of Southern society. These plans, however, were based on a 
number of flawed assumptions, chief of which was the belief that les-
sons derived in the wake of the collectivization campaigns, carried out 
in the North two decades earlier, could usefully be put into practice in 
a post-bellum South dramatically altered by the war. 
Before 1954 South Vietnamese agriculture was essentially a wet 
rice share-cropping system directed to the export market and charac-
terized by a very unequal distribution of land, power, and status. 
However, over the following two decades both sides in the war focused 
great attention on gaining rural support, subjecting the peasantry to a 
barrage, if not a crossfire, of land reform measures. Though much of 
the undertaking was initiated piecemeal by the Viet Cong, the Thieu 
government's Land-To-The-Tiller program of 1970-1973 nevertheless 
consolidated and made official the changes accomplished to date. 3 
Central Committee has been cut in half, down to 7% at present; yet party recruitment from 
within the military is still 37.2% of the national total for the last year, according to Nhan 
Dan (Hanoi) as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report East 
Asia, (hereafter FBIS, DR/EA), March 13, 1989. While down from earlier figures (58% in 
the 1976-1982 years according to Thayer) the high percentage reveals how the military is 
still viewed as providing a key pool of dependable elite talent. 
3. The discussion of the inherent contradictions in the collectivization policies applied 
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The result was that by 1974 a largely middle peasant-farmer landhold-
ing agrarian structure had emerged from the ruins of war-tom rural 
areas. Helped by effective extension services, credit availability, and 
the introduction of miracle rice strains, rice paddy production rose 
over 40% between 1969-1974, bringing South Vietnam to the verge of 
rice self-sufficiency.4 Thus, concomitant to twenty years of war and 
destruction, steady and extraordinary improvements had been 
achieved for the material welfare of the surviving Delta peasantry. 
One can conjecture that the lower 40% of the agrarian population in 
the Mekong Delta was materially better off in 1975 than the equivalent 
population in any state in the region. One thing was certain: the vast 
majority of middle peasant small-holders had acquired considerable 
interests to protect. And their disposition and receptivity to further 
transformation, especially in the Delta where over two-thirds of the 
agricultural production was based, was at best doubtful. 
In retrospect there seems to be a tragic inevitability to the colli-
sions and failures of these fateful early post-war years. 5 That the re-
gime would collectivize Southern agriculture and socialize the 
Southern economy was inescapable. While acknowledging poor per-
formance of cooperatives in the North and problems of implementa-
tion, the leadership had never seriously examined the classic economic 
rationales for collectivization. Collectivization was furthermore part 
of the effort to unify the country administratively and integrate it so-
cially and economically. Collectivization, equally, served as a poten-
tial tool to remold the social and cultural underpinnings of Southern 
society and to destroy potential bases of opposition-hence the paral-
lel recourse to re-education camps, New Economic Zones, intense 
political discrimination in jobs and education on the basis of family 
background, and pervasive security controls-all aspects of an actively 
socializing regime profile. 6 
to the South is based on Gerard Mare, Socialist Transformation Drives in Southern 
Vietnamese Agriculture: An Assessment Five years after 'Liberation,' UC-Berkeley M.A. 
Thesis, 1981. For detailed information on the Thieu governments' Land-To-The-Tiller 
program, see Charles S. Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social 
and Political Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam, Cornell Ph.D. 
Thesis, 1976. 
4. Callison, ibid., pp. 60-65. These advances were buoyed by U.S. administrative and 
financial aid and by the availability of cheap agriculture imports such as fuel, fertilizer, 
pumps, etc. 
5. This is true only in a broad sense. Many discrete policy failures and repressive or 
discriminatory measures could hardly be called inevitable. 
6. In the levelled Southern rural social context, expropriations were effected primarily 
on the basis of ties to the former regime. They were hence perceived as punitive, not as acts 
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The collectivization program that was launched simply sought to 
apply Northern lessons-learned during the period of self-examination 
following the Land Reform debacle of the mid-50's-in a vastly dis-
similar Southern peasant setting. These lessons focused on the need to 
proceed step by step with a carrot-and-stick approach as opposed to 
relying exclusively on class warfare. But when applied to the South 20 
years later these lessons proved anachronistic. The regime just did not 
have the organizational and material resources, or the requisite cadre 
talent, to penetrate and reweave the rural social fabric-at least not 
without massive coercion, recourse to which had been resolutely ruled 
out. Considerable pressure was applied and occasionally cadres were 
rebuked for using coercion. Yet the pressure was mainly economic, in 
the form of access to key agricultural inputs. 
Initial efforts quickly led agriculture production into a steep de-
cline. In 1977-78 the gradual approach was forsaken as the more radi-
cal wing of the party under Party Secretary General Le Duan, Truong 
Chinh, and Le Due Tho came to the fore. 7 Faced with rapidly falling 
grain procurements, the decision was reached to nationalize practi-
cally all commerce and industry in the South. Combined with a whole 
panoply of repressive and discriminatory measures, this drove nearly a 
half million people into exile, a disproportionate number of whom 
came from the Chinese community. 
Throughout 1978 and early 1979 the collectivization campaign 
was in full swing. Successes were heralded and monthly tallies were 
reported on the number of collectives established in each region. But 
while the campaign did achieve some success in the central region, 
barely 20% of the peasants in the Mekong Delta had been successfully 
cajoled into joining by late spring 1979.8 
By 1979 the country was on the brink of economic collapse while 
militarily committed in Cambodia and at war with China. It is at this 
point that the ·reform' profile begins to appear with a series of liberal-
izing measures promoting the rural household economy, agricultural 
of redistributive justice gaining legitimacy for the new order among the broad peasantry. 
One can view this as evidence of the inherent weakness and ideological degeneration mani-
fest in the Vietnamese Communists' reversion to socialist transformation after a twenty 
year hiatus. 
7. The shift to a harder line was prompted by a number of factors besides dire eco-
nomic circumstances, such as increasing hostility with the PRC, Khmer Rouge armed in-
cursions, the failure of normalizing efforts toward the U.S., and increasing dependence and 
alliance with the Soviet Union. For a useful if brief account, see Nguyen Due Nhuan, 
"Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note I, p. 18. 
8. Ho Chi Minh City Domestic Service reported in FBIS, Daily Report, Asia and Pa-
cific, May 14, 1979, p. 47. 
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markets, and small-scale industry. The results were quickly felt. 
From 1981 to 1985 the regime enjoyed its best economic performance. 
Agricultural production grew steadily, reaching a peak growth rate of 
9.2% in 1982.9 Small scale local industry for consumer goods devel-
oped at an average annual rate of over 14%. 10 Living standards im-
proved markedly. In 1985, the leadership, facing massive deficits and 
acute inflation, decided to adopt a series of further reforms to sharply 
reduce state subsidies and usher in 'real' prices throughout the 
economy. 
However, against the advice of reform-minded leaders and after 
secret deliberations, the government in the same year introduced a re-
vamping of the dong monetary units with disastrous overall economic 
effect. 11 The objective was to soak up the hoard of circulating cash 
which had fueled the second economy and fallen outside the control of 
the central bank. But contrary to expectations, the public sector en-
terprises bore the brunt of the blow. As is typical of all socialist 
'shortage' economies, these enterprises had accumulated large piles of 
cash to acquire goods on the secondary markets and to pay bonuses to 
their employees. 12 However, most of the targeted 'speculators' and 
'profiteers' had long since acquired the habit of dealing only in dollars, 
gold, or bartered merchandise. The combined effect of the two poli-
cies was devastating: within a year inflation shot up to over 700% and 
the stage was set for the severe crisis which persisted until 1988-89 
when radical austerity measures were introduced. 13 
I highlight this incident because it sharply reveals what can hap-
pen when different regime strains collide head on. More than any 
other policy move in the 80's, the monetary disaster, in the words of a 
Vietnamese commentator, "made it clear to all that our top leaders 
were capable of the most egregious errors." 14 As an unanticipated 
consequence, the fiasco aroused freer discussion and criticism in the 
press, discrediting those responsible for the blunder. 
After ten years of unification the regime, though secure in its rule, 
9. Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18. 
10. Ibid., p. 18. 
11. To Huu was the prime instigator of this move, with the blessings of both Le Duan 
and Le Due Tho. 
12. I use the term 'shortage economy' in the sense developed by Janos Komai. See, 
among other writings, "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIV, December 1986, pp. 1687-1737. 
13. This account is derived from Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes de renouveau au Viet-
nam," supra, note 1, p. 18. 
14. The commentator was Nguyen Khac Vien, as cited in Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Signes 
de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18. 
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had neither implanted stable or workable collective structures in the 
South nor effectively remolded Southern society. Malaise and aliena-
tion were endemic. Overseas remittances and a vast sub rosa economy 
helped the bulk of the population to adapt and survive. State employ-
ees and cadres, among the worst hit by the accelerating inflation, be-
came demoralized, easy prey to petty corruption. More disturbing for 
the future was the profound disaffection among the veteran Southern 
revolutionary elite. As Vietnam entered its second unification decade 
and launched its own brand of perestroika and glasnost, Southern dis-
content would find its voice. 
III. DOl MOl [RENOVATION] AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE 
SOUTH TAKES THE LEAD 
Towards the end of 1985 the death of several of the 'old guard' 
and the renewed economic chaos precipitated a political crisis culmi-
nating in the 6th Party Congress held in December 1986. A new party 
secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh, a Southerner, was appointed 
who quickly showed himself a proponent of further socioeconomic re-
forms and greater openness in the image of Gorbachev's glasnost. 
Articles began appearing in the press, occasionally penned by 
Nguyen Van Linh himself, which criticized previous policy and la-
mented inefficient bureaucracy, party arrogance, and corruption. Lit-
erary and film works appeared which greatly stretched the realm of 
the permissible. Nguyen Van Linh, following Gorbachev, sought to 
promote change and renewal by first building a strong constituency for 
himself outside of the top political elite and the entrenched bureau-
cracy: the small intellectual class, youth, women, and Southern party 
networks. While the change in public discourse has been dramatic, 
Nguyen Van Linh unfortunately was not able to staunch the ravages 
of inflation, which continued in the 700-1000% range until1989. Fur-
thermore, in loosening the reigns over society, he unleashed a storm of 
criticism which eventually frightened his neo-conservative opposition 
into defensive reaction. 
Still, new life has begun to spring in mass organizations and in the 
National Assembly, and Southern members have taken the lead in reg-
istering vocal opposition to established practice or party dictates. 
Yearly assemblies of youth organizations, journalists or writers un-
ions, and professional associations have become turbulent affairs 
where non-approved speakers come to the fore and rail against the 
regime. 
But the most significant development has been the creation of a 
loosely knit association of elder veteran Southern revolutionaries of 
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unassailable prestige who began to establish branches in many of the 
Southern provincial capitals. 15 One of the first overt political acts of 
the Club of Former Resistance Fighters was to send a letter to the 
central committee and to the National Assembly in mid 1988 calling 
for a genuinely democratic election and the right to choose a prime 
minister by secret ballot without interference from the party. 16 Signed 
by over 100 old revolutionaries, including a host of former top Provi-
sional Revolutionary Government officials, the letter did not succeed 
in preventing the party's official candidate for prime minister, Do 
Muoi, from being elected. Nevertheless, through public meetings and 
clandestine publications, the Club's influence began to spread. Its 
members' critique was caustic. In the words of Nguyen Ho, a former 
Ho Chi Minh City committee chairman and Club leader, "the Ameri-
can imperialists," could not achieve [i.e. wreak the kind of damage] 
with all their troops, bombs, and money, what has been achieved in 
the 13 years since victory. 17 Of particular note was their call for the 
party to emulate the open proceedings of Soviet party conferences and 
to grant more rigorous oversight powers to the national assembly. 
Pervading much of the criticism was rancor at the rapid unification 
and 'colonization' of the South after 1975, in the process of which 
many of them were sidelined or retired. 
It appears Club members were involved in the demonstrations 
over land disputes which swept a number of Southern provincial 
capitals in 1988. In April 1988 the government issued directives 
downgrading the role of cooperatives. In doing so it revealed the 
kinds of predicaments that can arise in reversing course. In many 
Southern provinces cooperatives were essentially defunct. In trying to 
officiate their demise and even grant quasi-titles to the land, vast pres-
sures were created to return land to previous owners and not merely to 
those, often local cadre families, who had best positioned themselves 
in the new free-wheeling economic environment. In the course of 
these disputes with local cadres, widespread abuse and graft came into 
the open. The state system of taxation and materials supply was re-
vealed to be a particularly severe source of corruption. 18 
15. Le Thien Tung asserts that branches have been set up in at least half of the South-
em provinces. "The North-South Cleavage: A New Pattern of Infighting," Vietnam Com-
mentary, May-June 1989, p. 2. 
16. See Nayan Chanda, "Force for Change," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter 
FEER), October 5, 1989, p. 24. 
17. Ibid., p. 26. These comments, which Chanda, perhaps paraphrasing, relates with-
out quotation marks, were delivered in a speech in December 1988 in Ho Chi Minh City. 
18. The Economic Intelligence Unit, Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Country Re-
port, No. 2, 1989, London: The Economist Newspaper. 
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In this unsettled rural environment the state faces great problems 
of contract and tax compliance. Government reports revealed that 
Southern provinces paid only 54% of their grain tax in 1987. 19 Two-
way contract commitments have often not been met as farmers prefer 
to hold on to their grain as a hedge against inflation. They have been 
emboldened to do so given the state's incapacity to meet its own con-
tractual obligations to provide key agricultural inputs. On occasion 
these problems have had a direct bearing on North/South issues. In 
1988, when the North faced a severe famine, authorities met stolid 
resistance in seeking greater grain procurements from the South. 
Overall, the renovation era of the last five years and the more 
open political climate have aggravated rather than defused political 
tensions and anomie. Greater openness has allowed the latent discon-
tent to find its voice in the stirrings of a civil society. Much central 
authority has been lost to the provinces in the effort to deal with en-
during if not widening interregional differences. Reversing previous 
policies of socialization has tended to raise anew a host of problems 
from the past. At the same time, inveterate attitudes and policy biases 
within the party core are eroding, despite all the gainsaying by fore-
stalling neo-conservatives. A tide has turned in Vietnam, and the 
challenges spawned foremost in the South will not be easily checked. 
IV. PROSPECI'S 
The foregoing discussion of doi moi and North/South integration 
shows how the long shadow of the past complicates the many debates 
enlivening political life in Vietnam today. What does the future hold? 
Will a post-Cambodia era, with its promise of leadership turnover and 
renewal, economic democracy, and a more outward looking economy, 
herald greater political integration? Or will the diverging impact and 
pace of these changes further intensify leadership tensions? The an-
swer is mixed. As argued earlier, the greater integration problem has 
been reconciling the regime's disparate strategic goals, resolving the 
contradictory pulls of economic growth, military struggle, and sociali-
zation. At present, for the first time in its history, Vietnam is entering 
an era in which economic development is a clear priority. On the 
other hand, the regime still faces the enormous challenge of creating a 
consensus around policy packages apt to have a diverging impact and 
response from the country's two halves. The central dynamic, how-
ever, is no longer Southern resistance to Northern transformation at-
tempts, but the opposite: how to prevent the different pace of 
19. FEER Asia Yearbook 1989, Hong Kong: Review Publishing, p. 252. 
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economic liberalization from overwhelming or disrupting the North, 
all in a period of socialist dissolution in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union. 
The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the jettisoning -
even in the Soviet Union - of the Communist party's leading role 
have given rise to sharply different interpretations. In the South, 
younger party members and veteran revolutionaries, disaffected by the 
ruin and poverty of the last fifteen years, see in these events confirma-
tion of their own disillusionment. Articles and commentary by Resist-
ance Club members highlight party arrogance, corruption and lack of 
concern for the people as chief causes. 20 They thus strongly hint that 
the Vietnamese party should draw positive lessons from the socialist 
debacle in Eastern Europe. Conversely, official commentary in Hanoi 
stresses the negative, warning of "imperialist sabotage" and insidious 
"peaceful evolution" tactics by the West. 21 General Secretary Nguyen 
Van Linh, alarmed by the divisiveness engendered by these debates 
and personally closer to his erstwhile allies in the South than any other 
figure among the top leadership, did seek to carve out a compromise. 
While acknowledging internal weaknesses and failures in other social-
ist regimes and by implication in Vietnam, Linh also has stressed the 
present need for party discipline and unity, warning equally against 
'voluntarism and stagnation' and 'overhastyness and demagogy'. 22 
But in the years ahead even greater strains will arise from the 
anticipated expansion of foreign economic contacts and deepening of 
economic restructuring, whose pace and impact are bound to differ 
sharply along North/South lines. To date the expected increase in for-
eign investments and contacts in the wake of the Cambodian with-
drawal has been slow to materialize. 23 If anything there has been a 
20. Jacques Bakaert, "Eye on Indochina," Bangkok Post, Jan. 12, 1990, reported in 
FBIS.DR!EA, Jan. 17, 1990, pp. 67-69. 
21. A recent Hanoi Domestic Service broadcast intoned: "The so-called peace, democ-
racy, and right of self-determination serve as a length of red silk hiding the sinister dagger 
of pluralism with its tip aimed at the socialist countries," reported in FBIS,DR/EA, Jan.22, 
1990, p. 58, under the rubric "Article explains history, nature of Pluralism." 
22. See, for instance, "Nguyen Van Linh Article on Revolutionary Tasks," FBIS.DRI 
EA, Jan. 26, 1990, p. 70. "Voluntarism" in this context refers to authoritarian and arbi-
trary tendencies. In the summer of 1989, however, Nguyen Van Linh, in responding to 
events in Poland, decried the 'wolfish nature' of imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, in 
seeking to affect change in socialist countries. Further changes intervening in Eastern Eu-
rope as well as the complicated dynamics of response domestically appear to have led him 
to a more tempered and sober view. See Murray Hiebert, "Against the tide," FEER, Sept. 
14, 1989, pp. 28-30. 
23. Recent reports indicate 151 foreign investment projects have proceeded to date for 
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decline in foreign trade in 1989. The lack of foreign exchange, the 
continued U.S. blocking of aid and credit by multilateral funding insti-
tutions, as well as the confusion and competition among different bu-
reaucratic entities at central and local levels have all played a part. 
Much remains to be done to develop the country's commercial, legal, 
and financial infrastructure to favor better integration in the world 
economy. 
Yet as these obstacles diminish, the South is expected to play a 
leading role for a number of reasons, including its broader urban mid-
dle class, entrepreneurial experience, and greater availability of capi-
tal. Overseas Vietnamese remittances, which help to support 
anywhere from one quarter to one third of Ho Chi Minh City's popu-
lation, already reach an estimated US$ 200-300 million. 24 Approxi-
mately two-thirds of foreign investment licenses to date have been 
granted to companies investing in the South. Perhaps a quarter of 
these have gone to overseas Vietnamese.25 At least so far, traders from 
ASEAN countries have shown a decided preference to go through Ho 
Chi Minh City, where there is less red tape and where barter arrange-
ments can. be more quickly brokered. 26 
Projections of increasing North/South differentiation vis-a-vis the 
international economy parallel domestic trends regarding economic 
restructuring. While the success of recent anti-inflation austerity 
measures have given government officials fresh confidence, there re-
mains a sense of central drift and loss of control to local actors, as well 
as a weakening of organizational integrity as the party and the market 
a combined estimated value of US$ 1.07 billion. "Vietnam Projects- Heartbreak hotel," 
FEER, September 6, 1990, p. 62. Latest information is presented in note 25 below. 
24. Murray Hiebert, "Looking Outward," FEER, April 27, 1989, p. 70. The $300 
million figure was quoted for 1986, as reported in FEER Asia 1988 Yearbook, Hong Kong: 
Review Publishing, p. 256. 
25. Murray Hiebert gives the total as of last spring at 43 out of 48 licenses going to the 
South, and 11 to overseas Vietnamese. See "The toughest battle," FEER, April27, 1989, p. 
69. According to an official Vietnamese source, as of October 1989, 70 foreign investment 
projects totaling $600 million have been approved, 80% concentrating in the South. See 
FEER Asia 1990 Yearbook, supra, note 19, p. 246. The latest information, as this volume 
goes to press, raises the number of licenses to 273 projects for a total possible of US $2.1 
billion, two-thirds destined to the former capitalistic South. This demonstrates a very re-
cent surge in foreign investments. Yet the frustration and obstacles notes above continue to 
prevail. See, Murray Hiebert, "The Rise of Saigon," FEER, September 5, 1991, p. 62. 
26. The argument for foreign preference towards investments and trade in the South 
should not be overstressed. Central authorities will certainly seek to maintain some bal-
ance where they can. Further, at present over half of Vietnam's foreign trade goes through 
the port of Haiphong, and this city as well as Danang on the central coast are likely to play 
a major role. 
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interact. Greater decentralization translates into more rapid adapta-
tion to a mixed economy in the southern provinces. The disastrous 
currency reforms of the mid 1980's, the ensuing years of 1000% infla-
tion, and the present drastic cutbacks in subsidies have hit the state 
sector particularly hard. State enterprises still in operation have been 
forced to develop alternate sources of supplies, to adapt their products, 
and to depend on unofficial commercial networking. These adapta-
tions are occurring more rapidly in the South. The pattern emerging, 
in terms of different pace of adaptation to measures of reform, to some 
degree parallels what occurred in China during the 1980's, when 
Guangdong and the southeast coastal provinces adapted and devel-
oped much more quickly than the rest of the country. 27 As with 
China, one can predict that such trends will give rise to alternating 
periods of decentralization and central drift followed by retrenchment 
and strident debate about the 'negative social phenomena' concomi-
tant to reform. Needless to add, China, in dealing with growing re-
gional disparities in the 1980's did not face the immediate legacies of 
war, isolation, or harsh and inept recent socialization drives. 
How do these prospects of increased North/South differentiation 
continue to affect regime politics? In the short-run, they complicate 
policy deliberations and exacerbate political tensions. Economic con-
ditions, especially in the overpopulated Red River Delta, are more 
precarious in the North, and encroaching commercialization tied to 
changes in the South could seriously disrupt the flow of key inputs. 
Orchestrating change in such disparate contexts will be fraught with 
peril, especially as problems are voiced in conflicting ideological tones. 
It would be simplistic to assert that there is a Northern and a 
Southern line in Vietnamese political life. But the regime's failures are 
more palpable in the South: the gap between state and society is more 
evident with every passing year. And it is in the South that a vigorous 
inner opposition has more resolutely developed, gaining ground and 
converts throughout the apparat and beyond. Disillusionment with 
what the transition to socialism has achieved to date, coupled with a 
greater awareness of the dynamism of surrounding economies, have 
now been reinforced by events in Eastern Europe. Conversely, one 
can sketch an opposite, conservative syndrome, more prevalent in the 
North. In all evidence, the leadership is entering the new decade 
under great internal strain. 
27. For an in-depth study, see Ezra F. Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong 
under Reform, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
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V. ENDURING POLmCAL BOTILENECKS 
At this juncture it appears doubtful that these tensions will soon 
be resolved. While leadership renewal and turnover will surely con-
tinue from the bottom up, the Politburo remains in a logjam. It is at 
this level that Vietnamese political traditions conspire to block deci-
sive change, in a way unique among socialist regimes. 
Collegial rule has been a characteristic of Vietnamese politics ever 
since the death of Ho Chi Minh. The stamp of authority of the party 
secretary general is no where near as dominant as that of top leaders in 
any other socialist state today. If this feature guarantees a greater 
level of c6mpromise among competing interests and priorities, it nev-
ertheless inhibits dramatic shifts such as those that have occurred in 
both China and in the Soviet Union. Only in Vietnam could you have 
simultaneously a party secretary championing price reforms, private 
small-scale enterprise, and glasnost; and a Prime Minister, Do Muoi, 
known at least previously as a ·pure Stalinist' and as one of the prime 
architects of the brutal collectivization of industry and commerce in 
the South. 28 
Related is the extraordinary emphasis placed on leadership con-
tinuity and political stability, inhibiting the role of succession dynam-
ics as a factor for change. The post of Party Secretary General passed 
from Le Duan to Truong Chinh (briefly), then to Nguyen Van Linh 
and very recently to Do Muoi in less than a decade. Nguyen Van 
Linh, from 1985 to early 1989, sought to emulate Gorbachev and use 
the politics of glasnost to build a constituency for change. But the rest 
of the leadership could not tolerate the unleashing of criticism that 
ensued, and they have sought to curb dissent in the last two years. 
Finally there is what could be termed the curse of victory and the 
tradition of 'struggle' which make a wholesale disavowal of the past 
difficult if not unlikely. Breakthrough changes in the PRC as well as 
in the Soviet Union were accompanied with a perception of deep crisis 
and an escalating attack of past policies and of the preceding leader-
ship. In discrediting the past, new leaders were able to mandate a 
fresh start, outflank their more orthodox colleagues, and instill new 
hope in constituencies of the discontent. While economic failure and 
28. The 7th Party congress was just held in June 1991, at which Do Muoi was desig-
nated as the new party chairman. Weeks later Yo Van Kiet, one of the top leaders more 
open to reforms, was elected as Premier. Thus the same argument of conflicting priorities 
at the top still applies. Many new faces were elected to the new Politburo, but it is still too 
early to predict the fall-out from the congress - or from post-coup transformations in the 
Soviet Union. 
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social alienation are all too evident in Vietnam, new leaders have yet 
to exploit these as possible levers for change. Thus, prevailing crisis 
and economic urgency have been singularly ineffective in initiating a 
break, despite the accepted slogan of 'renewal or death.' A world view 
forged in decades of struggle and that gravest of crises-all out war-
have made the top leadership obdurate and defensive. The collapse of 
socialism in Eastern Europe and presently in the Soviet Union only 
reinforces this trend. 
These patterns-smooth successions, collegial rule, traditions of 
inner leadership compromise and continuity-are usually associated 
with strong regimes. But, ironically, in Vietnam these very traits have 
had a perverse impact. Smooth succession has been like a prison: 
leadership changes have not provided the points of departure many 
might have hoped for. 29 At present there is a widening gap between 
regime and society, with the result that the Vietnamese state, heralded 
as one of the strongest in the Third World by some observers, has 
become in fact considerably weaker, weighed down by external ex-
haustion and internal decay.30 One senses diminished strength in the 
regime's web of accommodation to local actors and to non state-di-
rected economic forces. Indeed, there is evidence of weakness in the 
state's declining extractive (tax), regulative (cadre corruption), distrib-
utive, and symbolic capacities. 
Even if the logjam at the top has not been resolved at the 1991 
party Congress, there will nevertheless be a broad renewal in the lead-
ership ranks. Perhaps two thirds of the Central Committee elected at 
this Congress are either new or incumbents of the last Congress of 
1986. One suspects that the new leadership stratum, while hardly uni-
form in point of view, nevertheless will be generally more sensitive to 
the failures of the past, and more apt to borrow new ideas from the 
ambitious experiments in economic liberalization initiated by former 
bloc allies. Thus over the long run the possibility of breakthrough 
change exists, even if the immediate reaction to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union is bitterly defensive. 
It is a good thing that Vietnam was separated for only 22 years 
and that North/South cleavages have not been aggravated by ethnic 
29. By speaking of the curse of victory and the ironies of strong regimes I am not 
suggesting that either defeat, political instability, or chaotic transitions would have been 
preferable for Vietnam. I simply stress that obdurate resilience over decades has not made 
the regime adaptable, a strength it sorely lacks. 
30. Joel S. Migdal, for example, places Vietnam on the upper end of the scale of strong 
states. See his recent Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
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tensions. Already awareness of regional differences among those 
originating from the north, south, and center is intense and deeply 
rooted. 31 Yet, if the regime's socializing mission ran aground in its 
disastrously inept application in the South, at least the dream of a 
strong independent nation remains whole. Disillusioned Resistance 
Club members still wrapped themselves in the nationalist mantle of 
Ho Chi Minh in disparaging the party's policies towards the South. 32 
One finds little evidence for any groundswell towards Southern inde-
pendence. Therein lies hope for Vietnam in the long run. For it is in 
the South that forces for ANTITHETICAL change will more forcefully 
gather and develop, casting aside long-standing obstacles in their na-
tion-wide sweep. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly all the other unification cases examined in this volume are 
very different from Vietnam. Vietnamese unification was brought 
about through military conquest after decades of war. There was no 
antecedent period of protracted negotiation to define a settlement. 
The less democratic and economically developed half simply prevailed 
militarily over the other. Furthermore, unification was achieved in a 
hostile international environment that forced the country to increas-
ingly depend on Moscow and its allies. 
However, the Vietnamese case does have broader implications. 
For one, the strong commitment to a unification ideal does not neces-
sarily imply that national reintegration can be easily achieved. In 
Vietnam, it masked considerable ignorance about the distinct histori-
cal experience marking 'the other'. As a result, despite the North's 
powerful and engulfing sweep southwards, unification led to a momen-
tous collision in which the lasting effects of separation and war were 
deepened by policy failure, yielding prolonged malintegration. 
The only other unification case today that remotely parallels Viet-
nam is Germany, where one side has engulfed the other. Certainly 
circumstances in the German case are far more propitious. Unifica-
tion was self-determined by the East Germans. No war preceded the 
process, only a shared awareness of the liabilities of being front line 
states in the Cold War. The Federal Republic's economic power and 
resilience nearly guarantee economic betterment for the majority of 
31. One analyst, Douglas Pike, sees regionalism in Vietnam as entrenched as the caste 
system in India. See his "Origins of Leadership Change in the Socialist Republic of Viet-
nam," Raymond Taras (ed.) Leadership Change in Communist States, London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989, p. 112. 
32. Murray Hiebert, "Not resting in piece?" FEER, September 14, 1989, p. 30. 
178 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
East Germans-in time. In addition, the democratic process will pro-
vide the necessary framework to cushion the collision and to work out 
the mutual adaptations. Nevertheless, I would still predict a long pro-
cess of entangling adjustment and a political restructuring that will in 
time utterly transform German parliamentary politics. In this very 
early phase, far too many believe that integration will simply be a mat-
ter of stretching West German political and economic structures to 
spread over the East, a perception abetted by recent electoral results. 
A much more likely scenario is a long period of self-absorption, frus-
tration, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility which, eventu-
ally, will profoundly alter the German political map and perhaps its 
regional and international orientation as well. 
The above analysis on post-unification politics in Vietnam stresses 
the inevitably bedeviling sequels to national division. The passage 
from unification towards reintegration has been marked by ironies. 
Strong, resolute yet tactically flexible in war, the regime has not shown 
the same adaptiveness or resolve in charting out a developmental path. 
Its enviable record of political stability and continuity masks an inabil-
ity to confront a rapidly changing domestic and international environ-
ment. Southern society, defeated and exhausted after a long war, 
stands presently as the vanguard to national renewal. Yet despite 
these bitter ironies, for the past fifteen years the attachment to a na-
tional ideal has been extraordinarily persistent. One can hope that in 
the long run this enduring consciousness of the nation could usher in a 
true renovation in Vietnamese political life. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY* 
Robert Sutter 
The current or formerly divided nations treated in this volume 
have been at the center of the major national security crises faced by 
the United States in the post war period. In the recent atmosphere of 
growing U.S.-Soviet collaboration in world affairs, it is easy to forget 
the enormous U.S. effort that lay behind the western containment of 
Soviet-backed communist expansion. The divided countries were liter-
ally and figuratively the battle-lines of this struggle. The Berlin airlift, 
the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits crises, the Berlin Wall and the 
U.S. war in Vietnam are the highlights of the enormous East-West 
struggle that shaped four decades of post war world history. 
As a result, the thaw in the Cold War has fundamentally changed 
the way that the United States policy-makers view these divided coun-
tries. Their importance as symbols or outposts in the post war effort 
to contain communist expansion has faded or is fading fast. Under 
these circumstances, American decision-makers need to look more 
carefully at longstanding American interests in these countries and to 
assess developing international trends and trends within the respective 
countries in order to prepare for possible contingencies. It seems clear 
that there are more opportunities than difficulties for the United States 
posed by recent trends; conventional opinion tends to be optimistic 
about the future. But prudent policy-making requires a careful weigh-
ing of U.S. interests in the context of new conditions and possible out-
comes. That is the goal of this chapter. 
In a broad sense, each of these divided countries has fit into U.S. 
policy which, when defined broadly, has focused on several major 
goals: 
(1) U.S. political-security interests have seen American 
national security as dependent on an ability to sustain a 
favorable balance of power in both Europe and Asia. U.S. 
• The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not necessarily 
those of the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
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security has been thought to be fundamentally threatened by 
any one power that would be able to dominate either Europe 
or Asia. The collective security arrangements seen in NATO 
and in various U.S. bilateral security agreements with Asian 
countries were the foundation of this post war balance. In 
the late 1960s, the United States recognized that it could no 
longer bear the major burden of security arrangements in 
Asia. It began a large-scale withdrawal from Vietnam and 
other parts of Asia. U.S. leaders used diplomacy, especially 
the U.S. opening to China and the subsequent close Sino-
American cooperation against Soviet expansion in Asia, in 
order to sustain a balance of power in Asia conducive to 
American interests. 
(2) U.S. economic interests have stressed the develop-
ment of free trade and economic exchange, unencumbered 
by protectionist barriers and political or other systematic 
constraints. As the United States has become increasingly 
interdependent with others in the world trading system, it 
has shown great sensitivity to those forces that would 
threaten access to critical resources or undermine the world 
trading system that benefits the United States along with 
others. Indeed, the Bush administration's strong actions in 
1990 against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and threat to Persian 
Gulf oil fields seem to underline this major concern in Amer-
ican policy. 
(3) U.S. political-ideological interests have focused on 
promoting political pluralism, greater democratization and 
human rights. Although these objectives are often seen to 
get less priority than U.S. national security or economic 
goals, they are often decisive in determining U.S. policy. 
This is so especially when basic national security-economic 
goals have already been met, or when they are split in such a 
way that political-ideological interests hold the balance in 
the minds of U.S. decision-makers. 
The post World War II period saw U.S. policy toward divided 
nations as heavily influenced by the national security dimensions of 
U.S. policy. Divided Germany remained the front line of U.S.-backed 
NATO's containment of Soviet power in Europe for over forty years. 
American interest in endeavors designed to promote economic recov-
ery in Western Europe had this security dimension very much in 
mind. American interest in seeing a continuation or revival of demo-
cratic practices and trends in Western Europe did not extend to foster-
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ing a political environment in which pro-Soviet communist parties 
could rise to power. United States policy repeatedly took action 
designed to promote political trends that would check the power of 
these suspected pro-Soviet forces. 
In the three Asian countries, the dominance of the national secur-
ity dimension in American policy was even more clear. United States 
policy-makers judged that the aggressive policies of North Vietnam 
gave them little choice or opportunity to deal much with other aspects 
of U.S. interests in South Vietnam. In the cases of Korea and China, 
U.S. policy succeeded - at great cost - in stabilizing the security 
situation. This allowed for greater emphasis on helping the U.S. allies 
in Seoul and Taipei to develop economically, so that they would be-
come better positioned to deal with pressures from their adversaries, 
and this would require relatively less support from the United States. 
United States political goals of liberalization and human rights were 
often mentioned by U.S. officials but their relatively weak position vis-
a-vis national security concerns was repeatedly seen in U.S. policy. 
Thus, U.S. officials tended to avoid applying too much pressure on its 
authoritarian allies for fear of promoting an unstable situation that 
could be exploited by communist adversaries in Pyongyang and Bei-
jing. By the 1970s, the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations was ac-
companied by PRC gestures toward Taiwan that reduced markedly 
U.S. concern over possible PRC aggression against Taiwan. Nonethe-
less, United States policy remained concerned that instability on the 
island could lead to outcomes (e.g., a declaration of independence) 
that would add tension to the PRC-Taiwan relationship and seriously 
upset the delicate balance in the U.S. relationship with both Beijing 
and Taipei. 
The collapse of the U.S.-supported government in South Vietnam 
in the face of the communist offensive in 1975 represented the most 
serious reversal in U.S. interests in these divided countries since the 
"loss" of the China mainland in 1949. The defeat did not fundamen-
tally affect the balance of power in Asia, as the Nixon administration a 
few years earlier had adroitly positioned the United States to take full 
advantage of the Sino-Soviet split as a means to preserve a balance in 
Asia. The fact nonetheless remained that the way was now open to 
Soviet expansion in Indochina, which resulted in the Soviet-
Vietnamese friendship treaty of 1978, the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia and Soviet military deployments to former U.S. bases in 
South Vietnam. 
The unification of Vietnam under communist rule also clearly 
represented a setback to U.S. economic interests, although it is obvi-
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ously arguable how much the United States expected Vietnam to con-
tribute to world prosperity and the international trading system. By 
far the greatest setback to U.S. interests came in the political-ideologi-
cal arena. The unification under communist rule saw massive repres-
sion of potential political opposition, forced relocation of urban 
populations, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and the outflow 
of millions of refugees fleeing from harsh political or economic condi-
tions. Because of a number of factors, notably the close U.S. involve-
ment with Vietnam up to 1975, the United States government took the 
lead in international efforts to deal with the protracted refugee crisis in 
a humanitarian way. The perceived U.S. need to pressure Vietnam to 
withdraw from Cambodia caused U.S. policy to continue an economic 
embargo and diplomatic restrictions against Vietnam - an approach 
that seemed to worsen economic conditions in the country and pro-
mote the outflow of refugees. 
In contrast to the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1975, the 
move toward the reunification of Germany in 1989-90 can be seen as 
the greatest victory for U.S. interests in divided countries after World 
War II. Soviet-backed communist expansion was successfully con-
tained and rolled back. The need for the expensive U.S. military pres-
ence in Europe was reduced. The political system of democracy and 
pluralism spread from West to East. The Soviet-occupied part of Ger-
many was now free to choose national unification. Economic trends in 
eastern Germany remain bleak in the near term, but there is consider-
able optimism that the vibrant West German economy will provide 
ample support to pull the more backward eastern sector toward mod-
ernization and development. 
In looking to the future, it appeared clear, in late 1990 that inter-
national politics would remain fluid. The outlines of the world order 
that would replace the Cold War dominated system of the past four 
decades remained unclear. Nevertheless, several broad trends were ev-
ident that would have important influence in general on U.S. policy 
and in particular on U.S. policy toward the current and former di-
vided countries considered in this study. Those trends are as follows: 
(1) Soviet backed communism has failed. The Soviet 
empire in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The Soviet Union 
has entered a series of profound economic and political cri-
ses. It was unclear what kind of a Soviet Union would 
emerge from these crises. For the time being at least, Soviet 
leaders placed emphasis on gaining much needed economic 
support from the West and other developed countries. For 
the sake of economizing and other interests, they cut back 
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sharply on expensive commitments to Third World and 
other client regimes. Soviet leaders were more accommodat-
ing in seeking resolution of regional conflicts, arms control 
issues and other disputes with the West. 
(2) Political legitimacy was seen to rest increasingly on 
a government's ability to sustain the political support of its 
people and to meet popular economic needs through effective 
policies fostering modernization. Although there remained 
many exceptions in the Third World, nations and their gov-
ernments appeared to be placing greater emphasis on democ-
racy and the free market economic system as the most 
effective means to insure political legitimacy and related eco-
nomic modernization. 
(3) Because of the end of the Cold War and the greater 
emphasis on economic modernization as a source of legiti-
macy, governments focused more on international economic 
competition. Such emphasis often superceded past concern 
with political-military competition, which had appeared to 
be dominant during the Cold War. As a result, even coun-
tries with relatively weak military structures like Japan en-
joyed much greater international influence and were courted 
by all sides, including the superpowers, on account of their 
need for economic support. 
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Some of these broad world trends had an important impact on 
U.S. foreign policy-making. Policy-makers in the United States do not 
make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum. They are often heavily 
influenced by public opinion, the media, interests groups and repre-
sentatives in the Congress. These groups traditionally place a strong 
emphasis on morality or values as well as realpolitik or national inter-
est in American foreign policy. Thus, when the United States changes 
policy in a significant way, these U.S. groups want to see the right-
eousness of this move, hopefully in terms of values like freedom, de-
mocracy and free enterprise that are fundamental to the American 
experience. 
The collapse of the Soviet empire and decline of the Cold War 
have raised the importance of these groups and their emphasis on val-
ues in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, officials in the 
executive branch had been able to argue, on many occasions quite per-
suasively, that such domestic U.S. concerns with values should not be 
permitted to override or seriously complicate realpolitik U.S. interests 
in the protracted struggle and rivalry with the U.S.S.R. Or they at-
tempted to cloak U.S. realpolitik goals in terms of moral values of 
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freedom against the immoral oppression of Soviet communism. Now 
that the Cold War appeared to be ending and with it the sense of dan-
ger that accompanied the Soviet "threat," the administration's ability 
to control the course of U.S. policy appeared to be reduced. It had to 
take more account of the values held by domestic American constitu-
encies, which tended to be reflected in the opinion of the Congress. 
A challenge for U.S. policy-makers was to find ways to channel 
American enthusiasm for certain values into avenues that supported 
or at least did no harm to the national interest. American history is 
littered with instances where U.S. officials attempted in sometimes 
grandiose, patronizing or self-righteous ways to impose American val-
ues on unreceptive foreign societies. The stalemate in the Korean con-
flict and especially the failure of U.S. policy during the Vietnam War 
had a salutary effect on this American tendency to overemphasize the 
righteousness of America's cause in world affairs. The wars gave 
Americans a sense of tragedy and self-doubt which helped to promote 
greater sensitivity to other countries' perspectives and interests in 
world affairs. 
The danger was that this self examination would sap American 
vitality and optimism. President Reagan set about to reverse a seem-
ing decline in American hopefulness and succeeded in giving the 
American people a greater sense of confidence about themselves and 
their values than had prevailed for many years. Indeed, the triumph 
of traditional U.S. goals such as democracy and free enterprise eco-
nomics in various parts of the world, and the collapse of the Soviet 
communist system in the late 1980s reinforced American determina-
tion to foster and pursue their values in world affairs. 
The recent international trends and changes in priorities in U.S. 
foreign policy-making appeared in 1990 to support the non-communist 
side of the two divided countries, Korea and China. Seoul and Taipei 
had long followed policies that fostered remarkable economic develop-
ment and growth. Over the past few years, both governments have 
liberalized politically and become more truly representative of their 
people. Although some in the United States complained about trade 
and other economic disputes with South Korea and Taiwan, the 
American impression of both governments and peoples have become 
more positive as a result of economic and political changes in recent 
years. 
American opinion also was becoming increasingly positive about 
the reforming government of the PRC, until the bloody Tiananmen 
massacre shocked American opinion. As a result, Beijing was subject 
to U.S.-backed international sanctions. One year later, the PRC gov-
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ernment regained a modicum of world support; and entrepreneurs in 
Taiwan and other parts of Asia were keenly interested in exploiting 
economic opportunities on the mainland. However, the Chinese lead-
ers in Beijing still faced serious internal problems and a crisis of confi-
dence that sapped the legitimacy of the current communist dominated 
political system. 
North Korea appeared to be even more beleaguered by recent 
world trends. Falling behind in competition with the dynamic South, 
pressed by declining support from the U.S.S.R. and China, and con-
fronting serious economic and political problems at home, Pyongyang 
leaders seemed to be trying to find a way out of their current predica-
ment. Few abroad wanted or needed closer contacts with the North. 
In a sense, the North Koreans were fortunate that Korean nationalism 
remained a potent force in the South, and prompted the South Korean 
government and its international allies and associates to make efforts 
to seek compromise and accommodation with the North. 
If one views the interplay of divided countries as a zero-sum 
game, it would probably be fair to say that recent trends in the post 
cold war world give Seoul a dominant hand vis-a-vis Pyongyang, and 
strengthen Taipei's position markedly in the face of the militarily more 
powerful mainland. Both Seoul and Taipei would appear to be well 
positioned to parry demands of the communist side and wait until 
their basic conditions are met before considering compromise leading 
to progress toward reunification. 
Those who see the interplay as more of a positive-sum game also 
would probably tend to see trends moving toward the direction of poli-
cies pursued by Seoul and Taipei. That is, movement toward political 
reunification would be likely to be accompanied by political and eco-
nomic reforms in the communist areas, that would make them more 
open, pluralistic and dynamic. 
Whether an American policy-maker takes the zero-sum or posi-
tive sum perspective, it appears likely that recent trends would be seen 
as supportive of U.S. interests. In particular, they would serve to ease 
tension in these traditional international "hot spots;" broaden oppor-
tunity for economic development and trade; and appear to hold the 
promise of greater political liberalization and human rights on both 
the communist and non-communist sides. Meanwhile, the recent 
world trends were also having a profound effect on the previously di-
vided Vietnam. Declining Soviet support, a military stalemate in 
Cambodia and enormous economic problems at home caused the com-
munist ~eaders in Hanoi to acknowledge past failures and to experi-
ment wtth more open market oriented economic policies. The result 
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was a decided Vietnamese "outreach" to the developed world. This 
change was not yet accompanied by any political changes that directly 
challenged the monopoly of power of the communist party. Neverthe-
less, there was considerable optimism voiced by those who judged that 
economic needs would require openness to the outside world and more 
effective and pluralistic political organizations that would ultimately 
lead to the end of repressive communist rule. 
In short, when viewed from the perspective of U.S. interests and 
policy, the favorable trends seen reinforcing the movement toward the 
reunification of Germany were also likely to result in developments in 
current and formerly divided countries in Asia that are conducive to 
American interests. As noted above, it is even possible to foresee de-
velopments in the next decade that may result in a more market-ori-
ented, politically pluralistic system in Vietnam - a change that would 
in effect reverse the major failure ofthe U.S. policy there in the 1970s. 
Issues for U.S. policy under these optimistic conditions tend to 
focus on sustaining an atmosphere in which favorable world trends 
would move these nations in policy directions conducive to American 
interests. Thus, the United States would appear prudent in avoiding 
sharp changes in security or economic policies such as a unilateral 
pullback of forces from Europe or Asia, or a shift toward greater trade 
protectionism. U.S. diplomats would appear well served by being well 
informed about progress being made toward reunification, reform and 
pluralism in these countries, and by offering political or more substan-
tive support in order to enhance prospects for successful outcomes. 
Of course, prudent analysis requires that analysts do not overem-
phasize the positive trends in the current world situation or their likely 
effects on the four countries considered here. Indeed, the 1990s may 
not see developments favorable to U.S. interests. U.S. policy-makers 
need to prepare for possible adverse contingencies. 
Militarily, the situation along with the DMZ in Korea remains 
volatile. North Korea has the ability, on it own, to provoke a major 
conflict. Decision-making in Pyongyang rests ultimately with Kim 11-
sung. He is approaching 80 and his succession is unclear. Meanwhile, 
the domestic economic situation in North Korea is bleak. Few west-
em analysts judge that North Korea could win an all out conflict with 
the South, but the decision-making process in Pyongyang may not be 
based on western premises, may not require a full scale victory, and/or 
may be based on North Korean internal issues of political succession 
or other factors about which the outside world is only dimly aware. 
Beijing maintains dominant military power over Taipei. The 
communist government in China is also in the midst of a succession 
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crisis of major proportions where domestic factors unappreciated by 
the outside world could result in seemingly provocative a,ction. Be-
cause of recent changes in Soviet policy, Beijing's attention to Taipei is 
no longer diverted as much as in the past by the need to protect 
against the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
On the non-communist side of this equation, in Seoul and Taipei, 
it is also possible to conceive of scenarios where officials would take 
actions adverse to U.S. interests in stability and development. A few 
well placed disgruntled elements in the South Korean security forces 
could precipitate a major conflict with the North along the DMZ. 
And Taipei's leaders could initiate a crisis by following through with 
demands by some that Taiwan establish a de jure independent status in 
world affairs. 
Politically and economically, there is no guarantee that reform 
initiatives and signs of greater openness to outside contacts will persist 
in the Asian communist capitals. Leaders in Pyongyang, Beijing and 
Hanoi face major economic development problems that would be 
solved to a certain degree, by greater contact with the West and other 
developed countries. But the leaders there are also well aware of the 
line of argument in the West that greater economic contact will lead to 
the exchange of political ideas that will ultimately subvert the commu-
nist systems in Asia. These Asian communist leaders do not appear 
ready to give up their monopoly of power. If they are forced to 
choose, they may cut back on economic exchange in the interest of 
preserving their monopoly of power. 
Over the longer term, perhaps the greatest challenge to U.S. pol-
icy lies in the area of greatest victory in the current period - Ger-
many. Although the Bush administration has been determined to 
support German reunification and works closely with Chancellor 
Kohl, many in the United States are skeptical that American interests 
will be served by future trends. Various perspectives prevail in this 
formative period determining a new Europe. One skeptical view holds 
that after a few years Germany will succeed in incorporating the East 
and will move with new vigor to dominate Europe. Some judge that 
this will occur within the framework of European institutions such as 
the European Community. The net effect thereof will make U.S. influ-
ence on the continent increasingly marginal. U.S. options under those 
circumstances would boil down to acceptance of German dominance 
or resistance. Although the German-dominated Europe would not 
fundamentally challenge U.S. interests in democracy or human rights, 
it could hamper the United States eco-nomically, and undermine U.S. 
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power and influence militarily by calling for a complete U.S. military 
withdrawal from Europe. 
Perhaps the most important lesson for U.S. policy seen in these 
and other possible adverse trends is to remind U.S. policy-makers that 
while they could happen, they probably don't have to. Any U.S. pol-
icy that appears to be premised on a hostile or worsening relationship 
with any of these countries could become a self fulfilling prophecy. A 
more prudent course would appear to keep available enough American 
strength to deal with possible contingencies; to carefully assess chang-
ing trends and their possible implications for U.S. interests; and to 
adjust U.S. policy in ways designed to check potentially adverse 
trends, before they become major crises, thereby preserving American 
interest in a balanced security environment and economic and political 
trends fostering greater outreach, interdependence and pluralism. 
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